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From 1959 – 2009, Texas has annually led the nation in the number of flood
fatalities. On average the number of deaths in Texas was three times the amount of the
second leading state (Sharif, Hossain, Jackson & Bin-Shafique, 2012). Quantitative
studies have attempted to construct the definition of when, how and the likelihood that a
person dies in a flood event, why they made the fatal decision to drive, and who is
particularly vulnerable to making this decision. This dissertation used a qualitative
approach to explore this occurrence in a deeper and more meaningful context.
This dissertation includes four research questions. What factors govern drivers’
decision-making during a flood? What social norms about driving and flooding
contribute to the risk factor decision? What mitigation measures has the local
government implemented to prevent driver fatalities during extreme flooding? What
experiences from drivers are missing in current Flood Warning Systems (FWS)?
This qualitative dissertation used a historical narrative approach to provide a
critical case study of fatalities in Harris County, Texas. The selected storms were Great
Flood of 1994, Tropical Storm Allison of 2001, Memorial Day Flood of 2015, Tax Day
1
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Flood of 2016, Hurricane Harvey of 2017, and Tropical Storm Imelda of 2019. Data
was collected from live broadcasts, online and printed media sources, 97 semi-structured
interviews, public government documents and reports as well as social media posts and
comments from Twitter and Facebook. Street observations were conducted at the known
locations where fatalities occurred for those that either died in their car or abandoned a
car and died.
This research resulted in the creation of a database of the victims demographics
and reasons for driving as well as a database creation of street design characteristics at
the fatality locations. All fatalities that occurred in Harris County were mapped,
including non-vehicle related fatalities. This dissertation concludes that both driver error
and road design error contribute to fatalities. Social norms influence the lack of adequate
mitigation from local governments and better Flood Warning Systems could prevent
deaths from occurring.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, July 31, 1976, approximately 3,500 people were enjoying a three-day weekend at
Big Thompson Canyon, an hour northwest of Denver, to celebrate Colorado’s centennial. Most had taken
the scenic route of U.S. Highway 34 to their campsite, which runs alongside Big Thompson River. While
rain fell daily before this Saturday, the campers were enjoying a sunny, yet cloudy day at the
campgrounds between Estes Park and Glen Haven, Colorado (Cotten, 1976). As they vacationed, a
severe thunderstorm formed east of the Rocky Mountains because of two weather fronts colliding (Speer,
2016).
By dusk, the rain started to fall and remained stationary; an estimated 10-14 inches of rain fell
hourly. The only flood gauge in the area quickly washed away. By eight that evening, local patrol men
traveled from campsite to campsite warning the tourists to evacuate and find higher ground. Many did
not believe the warning as they had not personally experienced severe weather that day. Even more
campers in the lower and more narrow area of the canyon walls never received a warning. The National
Weather Service’s Denver office had broken equipment and was receiving updates by phone (Cotten,
1976). The Limon Radar had been set up in 1970 but had been plagued with technological performance
issues and was far enough away from the Big Thompson canyon area that it could not adequately
calibrate to read the weather systems correctly (Speer, 2016).
Between the hours of nine and ten that night, the river rose to 19 feet and the speed and force of
the water increased due to the slope downwards and narrow width between canyon walls. The water
moved with great strength uprooting trees, pushing 250-pound boulders, washing up sections of the
highway, while pushing homes off their foundation and carrying cars along its path (Cotten, 1976).
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Highway engineering under the New Deal era had designed the river to meet the design of
Highway 34 and straightened the river in twenty-seven places, only exacerbating the force of the water
during the flood (Speer, 2016).
Many of those that realized the severity of the flooding got in their cars to drive away and became
trapped in the floodwaters. Thirty-five women at Estes Park for a retreat were warned by megaphone to
evacuate immediately and they got in eight separate cars to leave. None of them knew where to evacuate
and took separate paths. Two of the cars followed a patrolman and all died except for two women who
could roll down the window and get out of their car; today’s vehicle technology would have trapped them.
When trying to help the other women escape the car, the currents of the water pushed them away and
carried them until they were able to find a tree to hang onto for the remainder of the cold, long and wet
night (Cotten, 1976).
Flooding in the canyon had occurred in the past but had amounted to a few washed-out bridges or
some road destruction. Nothing of this magnitude had occurred before in the canyon. Only a few years
prior in 1971, the United States Army Corps of Engineers had published a report saying that a major flood
was highly possible to occur at least every six years in the area due a steady spike in population and
encouraged residents to purchase flood insurance, yet most of the residents had not heeded the warning
and did not purchase flood insurance for their homes (Speer, 2016). This event became the highest single
flooding event in United States history for people to die in their car. Most of the 144 people dead were
traveling in a car (Pohl, 2016).

Lessons Learned and New Field of Research
Lessons were learned from this historic flood. Not all the people received the warning as it was
issued by word of mouth. Not all the people that received the warning believed it. The technology used
to monitor the weather patterns and threat of flooding in Big Thompson did not work properly; therefore,
the warnings were issued too late for many to evacuate safely. After the flooding event, it changed the
flood warning systems such as reverse 911 practices and advanced the need for weather prediction
science. The National Weather Service added more monitoring stations in the area. Roadway signs with
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the warning of climb up to safety in the event of flooding were added along the highway. The lessons
learned from the Big Thompson 1976 flood saved many lives in the Big Thompson flood of 2013 because
more aggressive warnings were in place and more people listened to the warnings. While the canyon
faced more property destruction in the 2013 flood, only ten lives perished compared to the 144 lives lost
in 1976 (Speer, 2016).
As the Big Thompson Canyon Flood of 1976 revealed, those who evacuate in a flooding event
with their cars are more likely to die than those that stay in the area and seek higher ground. This
observation has remained accurate even for present day flooding events (Ashley & Ashley, Flood
Fatalities in the United States, 2008). Literature reveals that natural disasters affect built environments at
greater costs and casualties due to the manipulation of natural environments for urbanization
(Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska, & Erikson, 2008). As a result of the increased occurrence of natural
disasters in built environments, a new field of experts in emergency management have emerged (Mileti,
2004). Of the four phases of emergency management, preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery,
mitigation is the newest phase and the least researched (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2014). Mitigation
policy is critical to lessening the magnitude of property destruction and fatalities in the event of a natural
disaster (Mileti, 2004). As research in this phase of emergency management expands, it is important to
connect it to transportation policy, which is largely unstudied compared to the relationship of mitigation
and infrastructure, yet transportation itself is its own built environment (The H. John Heinz III Center for
Science, Economics and the Environment, 2000). As a result, literature offers unchartered opportunities
to bridge the gap between mitigation and transportation policy, which from a theoretical lens, parallels
each other but fails to work in tandem to realize greater mitigation in roadway disaster events.
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Proposed Research
Research on vehicular related flood fatalities is scarce and both climatology and highway
engineering fields offer the most literature. As such, this dissertation is a critical case study of Harris
County, Texas. With twenty-two waterways flowing to the Gulf of Mexico, Harris County is prone to
both sudden onset and slow onset flooding. Flood fatalities in the greater Houston metropolitan lead in
numbers for the United States (Sharif, Hossain, Jackson, & Bin-Shafique, 2012). While these fatalities
are not isolated to Harris County, the region does offer an excellent critical case to examine why these
deaths are occurring and how to better mitigate them in future flooding events. To understand why
vehicle related fatalities, this research will conduct interviews of people who have experienced driving in
flood water, will provide story mapping of flood fatality sites and the infrastructure nearby through a
historical story-mapping lens, and will reconcile the accounts with public meeting records, newspaper,
videos, and social media outlets that chronicle these events.

Research Gap and Significance
Various quantitative research projects indicated observed characteristics of those most likely to
die and the potential reasons for it; however, the field is missing a narrative to explore the reasons behind
the phenomenon. Despite the body of quantitative analysis, no one understands why people end up
driving into flood water. Specifically, urban planning studies could provide a missing link to engage a
more interdisciplinary discussion among public health officials, highway designers and engineers. Using
qualitative methods this research project will provide insights into more impactful and appropriate public
education initiatives and improved flood warning systems, resulting in saving potential lives.

Research Objectives
This research will focus on the decisions made by drivers and officials to find patterns that can
mitigate future loss of life in extreme flooding events. To achieve this, the research will:
1. Learn from people who have had firsthand experience with vehicular flooding incidents.
2. Understand the reasons why people take the risk of driving into floodwater.
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3. Discover ways to mitigate this risk through improved flood warning systems and public
education

Research Questions
1. What factors govern driver’s decision-making during a flood?
Drivers have a series of decisions to make when extreme flooding occurs. They
make an initial decision to get behind the wheel, the route they will travel, and then
the spontaneous judgement to drive through standing water, reverse their route or
abandon their vehicle. This research question will investigate what factors propel
those decisions.
2. What mitigation measures has the local government implemented to prevent driver fatalities
during extreme flooding?
a. Government officials
Once government officials learn of an impending extreme flooding event, they have
several decisions to make at the prediction stage to inform the public of the potential
threat and keep them safe. Once the actual storm arrives, they have a duty to monitor
the weather and make decisions throughout the duration of the event to continue to
keep the public informed and safe. By speaking with officials about the factors
driving their decisions, new themes could emerge.
b. Mitigate / Response
Understanding these motivations that govern decisions will lead to a better
understanding of the problem, which will set the stage for solutions to mitigate the
problem.
3. What experiences from drivers are missing in current Flood Warning Systems (FWS)?
Flood warning systems offer real time information to the public to warn them of potential
flood hazards. Data are also used by the National Weather Service to issue flood watches
and warnings. After the storm event, the data are used to determine the soundness of the
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built environment’s infrastructure. Initial research shows that FWS could do more to
prepare drivers and give them knowledge of the extra dangers faced while driving in a
flood event. The experiences collected and studied in this research could help improve
FWS to target the driving audience and speak to them specifically when issuing warnings
and, in a post storm analysis, prepare for future storms.
4. What social norms about driving and flooding contribute to the risk factor decision?
By speaking to those who have driven during extreme flooding events, the researcher can
glean hidden nuances that may point to great social factors at play that regulate a person’s
or groups of people’s decisions to make the drive such as inability to trust warnings, not
taking the flood threats seriously, or perceived failure of past government advice.
Possibly there are social norms that need to be addressed through public education such
as feeling a badge of courage for not overacting to the threat of washing away and driving
through standing water.

Conceptual Framework
Emergency management (EM) research discusses how climatologists and meteorologists collect
data on precipitation and use weather models and predictive sciences to determine if there is a threat
(Mileti, 2004). They release this information to decision makers by issuing flood warnings (Lindner,
Schwerts, Bedient, & Fang, 2012). The potential for extreme weather threatens the safety of streets and
highways and the two disciplines must be connected to mitigate harm to the general (Mitsakis, Stamos,
Diakakis, & Grau, 2014). The dangers that highways and streets pose for people should be incorporated
into flood warnings (Terti, Ruin, Anquetin, & Gourley, 2017). As noted earlier, there is a disconnect
between the research on transportation planning and the research on disaster emergency response
planning. Both impacts the probability of flooded driving fatalities, but they do not speak to each other.
This research will begin to fill this gap in the literature.
Research on transportation planning for flood mitigation discusses how floods of either a 100year, 500-year or 1000-year recurrence interval factor into highway design (U.S. Department of
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Transportation, 2002). They also factor into storm drain placement, the width of the road, pavement types
and conditions and flood barriers, both temporary and permanent (Black & Jackson, 2000). Storage and
surface run off in the hydrological cycle are important in design, construction, and maintenance (see
Figure 1). Both common ponding and extreme flooding events affect highway design (U.S. Department
of Transportation, 2002).
I will examine transportation planning and emergency management as two separately functioning
entities with an eye toward the ways that they can work together to inform and prevent death by driving
during an extreme flooding event (see Figure 1). Driving “involves perception, cognition, emotion, and
social acumen to operate a car – to process the information conveyed by lines, signs and symbols, to
navigate while steering, and to share the space with all those other drivers” (Conkle & West, 2008, p. 1).
When a person and or group in a vehicle encounter floodwater, each experience is different as described
below in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 Conceptual Framework of Driving in Extreme Flooding

Also as illustrated in Figure 1, each experience is situational to the time of day, a driver’s
visibility, a driver’s comfortability of driving the route; information that driver has about the weather.
Additionally, the experience is impacted by the condition of the road and the type of vehicle driven. The
experience of the driver will also affect the situation. There are many other possibilities that can drive the
outcome; therefore, studying the situation to discover the relationship and networks will allow for
unprecedented knowledge on how to potentially mitigate these tragedies.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review explores the impact the built environment has on flooding. It also looks at
existing literature on highway design and safety as well as emergency management practices. Also
important to review is the existing literature on Flood Warning Systems research and its accuracy,
timeliness, and activation to the general population. One I have reviewed the literature of these major
themes, I will specifically connect them to any existing literature on vehicle related fatalities in extreme
weather events.

Flooding, Urbanization, and the Built Environment
To study vehicular flood fatalities, it is important to understand the relationship between
increased urbanization and increased flooding events. Natural hazards have always been present;
however, we did not know about many of them because people did not live near them and were not
affected by them (Drabek, 2010). Flooding vulnerabilities stem from human made land use changes;
“…floods march to a far more secular rhythm brought on by chain saws and bulldozers. Strip-mine the
landscape into submission and the floods will not be far behind” (Steinberg, 2006, p. 36). When an urban
area spends more on flood protection, they ironically cause more monetary damage when a flooding event
occurs (Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska, & Erikson, 2008). Part of this stems from a false sense of
security that flood control measures implemented will protect them from flooding; however, the
population growth often outpaces the intended flood plain infrastructure, and the engineering project may
only protect certain areas of the region. Despite these mentioned factors, people often believe the erected
flood barrier protects more (Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska, & Erikson, 2008).
Rapid expansion can cause several problems for the environment of an urban area. Increased
runoff due to urbanization and suburbanization will cause flooding as well as engineering on bodies of
water (Kousky, 2010). Clarke uses the descriptive “hubris” to explain how years of manipulating the
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Mississippi River to control its flow and direction for commercial and residential development ultimately
leading to utter destruction in 1993 when the Mississippi River flooded (2005, p. 182). This flood was
due to human action rather than a natural evolution. Rapid urbanization is the result of a natural
environment quickly evolving into a built environment of pavement with a purpose for commercialization
and with little concern for environmental impact (Kousky, 2010).

Impact of Flooding on a Built Environment
Natural disasters, such as flooding, only occur when they impact a built environment, so it is
particularly important to understand the relationship and consequence of the built environment. Humans
exacerbate the level of disaster by building in low lying areas, practicing deforestation, and dredging
wetlands (Cigler, 2007). Flooding is the result of a cycle and viewing it as a stand-alone phenomenon
will only make it more recurrent (Roberts, 2009). Ultimately, flooding occurs due to development in
floodplains, population growth and further development alongside coastal areas (Jha, Blocch, & Lamond,
2012). More than half of the U.S. population lives in a coastal area (Brody, 2012). This population
growth has increased along the shoreline by forty percent since 1980 (Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014).
Even more troublesome, urbanization has expanded to both suburbanization and exurbanization along the
coastal regions that has caused more extensive flooding (Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014).

Flood Control Measures
Levees are a flood control system used by many urban areas, but they cut off land and future
sediment that could protect the area from floods (Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska, & Erikson, 2008). It is
also important to keep updating drainage and waste management for protection from floods, but this is
outpaced by population and highway expansion (Jha, Blocch, & Lamond, 2012). Another troubling
aspect are the risks that come from flood control systems. Flooding can occur due to technological
factors such as levee and dam failures as well as inadequate drainage structure to match the population of
an area (Murphy & Gardoni, 2010). Nature provides the best source of flood prevention with the
existence of wetlands, one of the greatest casualties to urbanization and a built environment (Brody,
Highfield, & Kang, 2011).
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Flooding and Transportation’s Built Environment
While literature is extensive on the detrimental role a built environment plays in increased size
and cost, focus on researching the built environment of transportation infrastructure and how it can
improve to mitigate flood disasters on highways is not as prolific. In the twentieth century, transportation
planning focused on forecasting for population growth and widening and building more roads.
Construction was important to meeting future growth of expanding urban areas and transportation
planning was more about capital investment (Gayle, 2009).
As a result, transportation has its own unique built environment. This includes highway, support
facilities, traffic signs and signals, public stations, bridges and many more (The H. John Heinz III Center
for Science, Economics and the Environment, 2000). The intensity, duration, time, distribution, storm
shaped, size, depth, movement, and frequency of rainfall are all important to highway design; however,
the intensity of the storm is most important (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2002). The design of
pavement will also affect intensity of hazardous road conditions. Lane and shoulder width, color of the
road and roughness of the pavement can impact the amount of flooding (Lee, BooHyun, & Abdel-Aty,
2015).
Paving roads will lead to a decrease in soil evaporation and lower infiltration of water. It will
also increase surface runoff. Most areas have paved roads and areas with impervious surface, or nonpenetrable surface (Du, Shi, Van Rompaey, & Wen, 2015). Storm drains along paved roads are an
unnatural way to redirect water; therefore, it causes a higher concentration of flooding or overland flow.
The more highways in an urban area, the more dramatic the increase of runoff and peak discharge will
occur (Du, Shi, Van Rompaey, & Wen, 2015).
In transportation, hydrology is important in where the surface runoff will occur in the hydrologic
cycle (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2002). Transportation planners are concerned with
precipitation, infiltration, age, and surface runoff (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2002). Storage is
most important because it can mean small puddles or worse on highways. When highway meets water,
they determine the amount of water that could flow at peak rate to determine risk (Du, Shi, Van
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Rompaey, & Wen, 2015). Transportation designers use various hydrologic design methods to factor
flooding into developing infrastructure. They can use peak discharge regression equations and unit
hydrograph models. Hydrograph models are utilized when watersheds do not have a consistent behavior
to use peak discharge as a measurement (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2002). Hydrograph models
could also be used to compare to vehicular flood fatalities to determine any repeat high-risk areas.

Highway Design
Most areas have paved roads and areas with impervious surface. The storm drains placed along
the paved roads do not adequately redirect the water, consequently flooding will occur. As an urban area
increases its roadways, it will experience an increase of runoff and peak discharge (Du & et. al, 2015).
When it rains, the intensity, duration, length of time, distribution, storm shape and size along with
movement and frequency can affect the flow of traffic and the chance of ponding or extreme flooding
(U.S. Department of Transportation, 2002). Hydrograph models are the mostly widely used method to
measure watershed activity. Placement of highways and bridges can also impact ponding or extreme
flooding on highways (Hedrick, Welsh, & Anderson, 2009). In Harris County, a third loop around the
great metropolitan area, the Grand Parkway, was designed near the two dams that are meant to provide
flood control to the greater Houston area. The Sierra Club filed a lawsuit to prevent the construction from
occurring as the petitioners’ fear is it will cause more urban growth and increase runoff that will
compromise already overworked dams. They lost the lawsuit, and the construction was completed, which
will only cause further problems in future floods (Fehling, 2016).
Typically, the transportation network is divided into three separate fields, design, maintenance,
and traffic operations. By working together, more incidents could be avoided since the design and
maintenance understand little about traffic causes (Black & Jackson, 2000). It is also recommended that a
study is conducted at trash crash sites and the frequency of occurrence is measured to ensure that highway
design has not caused unsafe driving conditions (Black & Jackson, 2000). Urban Planning, municipal
flood experts and emergency management personnel can also work with traffic engineers in mitigating
fatalities due to ponding on highways or high-water flooding.
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Highway Conditions and Traffic Incidents
Several conditions of a transportations’-built environment can contribute to more traffic crashes.
Gutter spread can cause water to spread out of the gutter because rain has exceeded its capacity, or it is
clogged or poorly designed (Black & Jackson, 2000). Frequent use of roads can cause wheel rutted
highways or dips in the pavement that allow ponding (Black & Jackson, 2000). This is due to inadequate
maintenance, poor design, or overweight vehicles on the roads (Lee, BooHyun, & Abdel-Aty, 2015). The
increase of front wheel drive on vehicles has also caused more traffic crashes because if they lose traction
while they are trying to push the vehicle forward, it causes hydroplaning and differential drag (Black &
Jackson, 2000). Walter B. Horne published his theory on hydroplaning in 1968 which largely influenced
the design of highways (Black & Jackson, 2000). Under his model, he predicted the weight and speed of
vehicles that would be required to cause a vehicle to lose friction between the tire and pavement in wet
conditions (Black & Jackson, 2000). In 1984, he reversed many of his findings and stated that vehicle
design and tire patterns had led to his new findings that vehicles with properly inflated tires driving at
posted speed could hydroplane (Black & Jackson, 2000).

Transportation and Emergency Planning
Predominately, research in transportation infrastructure and emergency planning tackles large
scale evacuation in preparation for a storm event or in emergency vehicles responding during or after the
event; however, more research is needed to discover why those most vulnerable to become trapped in a
vehicle during the flood. Traditional transportation forecasts travel demands, but an emergency requires a
different and unpredictable demand (El-Sergany & Alam, 2012).

Common Transportation Hazards in Flooding Events – Ponding
All rain events do not cause extreme flooding events. However, it is important to chronicle the
issues that do occur in a common rain event to understand how problems become more magnified in an
extreme event. Common rain events cause several risks, such as loss of visibility, reduction of vehicle
performance and an increased number of traffic incidents. Mitsakis, et al. conducted research in Athens,
Greece by comparing data collected from 32 weather stations, press and electronic media and local
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emergency management records. They looked at the amount of rainfall in the stations to compare to the
traffic data and determined that rain can cause a disruption of public and commercial transportation by
reducing vehicular speed and congesting roadways (2014).
Pluvial flooding, most commonly referred to as ponding, will occur in flat areas when the
rainwater exceeds the amount that can be stored in the ground (Black & Jackson, 2000). As a result,
puddles and ponds develop on roadways (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2002). The depth and
circumference of the area covered in water may not be great enough to cause engine damage or loss of
life. However, many traffic crashes blamed on reckless driving during rainstorms, result in traffic reports
with the National Transportation Board that do not provide a full scope of the problem (Black & Jackson,
2000). Per a Florida statistical regression model, the correlation of traffic incidents versus the condition
of the pavement, it was found in several incidents when rain was present the impact of the wreck was not
as severe as expected due to drivers reducing their speed and they found other literature that supported
their findings (Lee, BooHyun, & Abdel-Aty, 2015). The researchers did find that poor pavement versus
pavement in better condition did contribute to more wrecks regardless of the severity of the wreck or the
number of cars involved in the wreck (Lee, BooHyun, & Abdel-Aty, 2015). Further research could be
conducted at areas where high levels of accidents occur on stretches of highway to indicate if pavement
condition or highway design contributes to those accidents.

Extreme Transportation Hazards in Flooding Events
In 1976, the Big Thompson Canyon in Colorado had many losses, as mentioned in the
introduction, because people waited too long to evacuate and were stuck in their cars (Drabek, 2010).
This led to “climb to safety” signs to be a daily reminder to people living or vacationing in the area that
they could become trapped in a flash flood event and should climb up to safety rather than staying in their
cars (Drabek, 2010).
In the July 1996 flooding of South Chicago, eight bridges collapsed and there was a 280%
increase in automobile accidents, with two vehicular related fatalities. Six suburban communities were
inaccessible for two days (Changnon, 1999). When highways do not properly drain in extreme weather
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events, this can prove deadly (Ashley & Ashley,
2006). These events are indicative of the impact of
extreme flooding on highways (Black & Jackson,
2000). When a moving vehicle travels in water (as
seen in Figure 2 below), the moving water will
exert pressure on the vehicle and become a force
Figure 2 Vehicle Meets Water (Waters, 2006).

(Waters, 2006). This will then reduce the friction
force of the tires (Waters, 2006). A vehicle can

float when the stream force becomes greater than the friction force (Waters, 2006). In calculating the
chance of a vehicle floating, water weighs 62.4 pounds per cubic foot and typically flows at 6 to 12 miles
per hour (Waters, 2006). As a vehicle stalls in water, 500 pounds of water force are applied to the car
affecting its friction (Waters, 2006). The car will also figuratively weigh 1,500 pounds less for each foot
of water that surrounds it (Waters, 2006). A driver of a small car can lose the power to steer a car in only
a foot of water, and two feet of moving water can carry away most vehicles (Turn Around Don't Drown,
2001).
Six inches of water can knock over an adult walking in water if the currents are strong. The National
Weather Service has a program, “Turn Around, Don’t Drown” (TADD) to help educate the public on the
dangers of walking and driving in flood water (Turn Around Don't Drown, 2001). They have partnered
with the Federal Highway Administration to have permanent yellow signs available to cities and states
with the message to serve as a reminder. They also offer temporary pink signs, which can be placed in a
flooded area to warn that it is currently impassable due to flood waters (Turn Around Don't Drown,
2001). While the slogan is catchy, the effectiveness of the program is undetermined. Further research
could be done to test its effectiveness. How useful is the program at adaptation at the local and state
level? Does the program offer flexibility to adequately educate the public based on the type of flood they
will experience?
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Mitigation Technology for Ponding and Extreme Highway Flooding
Ponding or more severe flooding poses a risk to drivers, and it is important to mitigate the risks
through available technology. Flood barriers can be erected that prevent drivers from entering an unsafe
highway and implementing flood warning systems that report inaccessible roadways can help (Burton,
Kates, & White, 1993). Temporary flood barriers may not be the best solution. They are not practical
when flooding occurs so rapidly that emergency personnel cannot access the area to place the temporary
barriers. The way to reduce excess loss from floods is having a warning system in place, erecting flood
barriers to control the flow of water, and having a better building design. With technology available to
mitigate highway disasters in flooding events, it is important to understand the challenges to
implementing them.

Updating Storm Water Drainage
When highways are expanded due to population growth, oftentimes the drainage and waste
management infrastructure does not receive the same attention (Burton, Kates, & White, 1993). In
looking at number of crashes in a highway, Black and Jackson determined that wrecks occurred because
of the design of the highway and the placement of the drains (2000). More lanes had been added, but the
storm drains had not changed, and they were ill positioned to capture the water causing more ponding
(Black & Jackson, 2000). Houston, a city that deals with extreme rainfall and flooding, has storm water
systems that have not been updated since their original building in 1950, despite the increase in traffic and
the widening of the roads (Baddour, 2016). Criteria today calls for larger size storm sewers with and
larger trunk line to drain water more efficiently. New regulations require a storage place for excess water
near built environments such as detention ponds to detract the water from ponding excessively on
roadways (Houston TIRZ 17, 2016).

Permeable Pavement Systems (PPS)
Concrete highways increase run off and do not allow for soil absorption of excess water. An
alternative to this has been studied and suggests the adaption of permeable pavement systems (PPS).
With PPS, the water can filter through the soil below the paved area and into groundwater aquifers. This
Taken from
http://www.houstontirz17.org/files/9113/9964/9954/Local20Drainage20Criteria.pdf
can not only offer
better absorption but act as a purifier for polluted water (Imran, Akib, & Karim, 2013).
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Currently, PPS use is confined to less traffic volume areas such as residential driveways, parking lots,
trails, and shoulders of roadways because the life expectancy is much less than that of traditional
impermeable roadways (Scholz & Grabowiecki, 2006).

Flood Warning Systems
Relatively in its infancy, the field of emergency management is dwarfed by the growing
frequency of man-made, technical, and natural disasters. The historical approach of reactionary measures
to disasters has gradually evolved to the element of a proactive discipline characterized in four main
phases: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation (Mileti, 2004; Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola,
2014). While the response phase birthed federal policy, adequate preparation would lag. Therefore,
adequate warning communication began in the last forty years. A lack of disaster management will
impact the consequences from a disaster event; and this happens in both developed and developing
countries (El-Sergany & Alam, 2012). Early warning systems serve to mitigate the impact a disaster can
have on the region it hits (Perry, 2007). While emergency processes have allowed better preparation and
response, the advancement of science and technology have also allowed a high success rate with warning
the public of impeding danger with the result of less casualties in times of both sudden onset and slow
onset flooding events. The goal of early warning systems should be to collect the information in a timely
manner and report this to the general population in a way that the threat is understood so that sufficient
time is given to reduce the risk of harm (Macherera & Chimbari, 1996).

Federal Involvement in Early Warning Systems
Federal policy for natural disasters does not offer a consistent approach and is chiefly relegated to
state and local governances; however, there are institutions that focus their efforts on warning and
preparedness for flooding (Mileti, 2004). The United States Geological Survey (USGS), an entity of the
Department of Interior, focuses on surface and groundwater data. The counterpart organization is the
National Weather Service (NWS), a division of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). The NWS uses the data from the USGS as well as other sources and will issue flood warnings
and watches. While the NWS does have the ability to issue warnings, a large portion of early warning
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communications does fall to local jurisdiction; therefore, if the proper technology and resources are not in
place, some areas suffer more from flooding than others (Mileti, 2004). The Weather Forecast Offices
(WFO) of the NWS offer software to help analyze the threat of floods such as Flash Flood Monitoring
and Prediction (FFMP) based on Geographic Information System (GIS) to looks at drainage basins and
compares it to water flow. They also have Site Specific Hydrological Predictor Model (SSHPM) that is
available to local WFO to aid in predicting flash flooding by looking at stream and creeks change in flow
and speed based on the predicted amount of rainfall and the rainfalls length of time (Lindner, Schwerts,
Bedient, & Fang, 2012). The Texas Medical Center in Houston, Texas required better protection from the
threat of flooding from Brays Bayou due to their world-renowned research and huge complex of patient
treatment, so they became one of 150 sites that the NWS used doppler radar technology to unroll the Next
Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) in 1997. The NEXRAD helped them weather many major storms
such as Tropical Storm Allison, resulting in detailed flood plain library of the area it measures to help
determine flooding risks for future storm events (Fang & Bedient, 2007).

Data Collection
Vital to accurate and timely warnings, data collection must occur on a regular basis. Local areas
have a variety of methods to do so. ALERT gauges, technology implemented by the NWS, are placed in
a standing structure such as a pier or bridge to collect stream level data (Lindner, Schwerts, Bedient, &
Fang, 2012). Most ALERT gauges are transmitted by radio, but some receive the data by satellite or
cellular. Another form of data collection, the tipping bucket rain bucket allows the rain gauge to collect
an amount of rain before the container tips and dumps out collected water while then sending an electrical
signal to the data transmitter (Fang & Bedient, 2007). The integrated data logging system monitors
stations in real time and the data logger is there at the monitor a station as well as the powering supply.
The mounting hardware means that the data machine is mounted on an abutment or other structure in the
vicinity to collect data. Also, the radar water level sensor can collect data by using radar technology to
gauge the water levels (Lindner, Schwerts, Bedient, & Fang, 2012). This form of technology is used in
areas difficult to reach. Another form of data collecting, telemetry allows those monitoring to access the
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data as it is collected. Mapping technology will also play a part in aiding with flooding notification, and
software such as GIS is used for this (Pearson, 2012). This data can also be reported in the form of
hydrographs that tell the story of discharge or rate of water flow versus time and volume of water
(Lindner, Schwerts, Bedient, & Fang, 2012).

Crowdsourcing Data Collection
Information and communication crowdsourcing as well as crisis mapping crowdsourcing can
contribute to the early warning system. The challenge to early warning systems is engaging the
community stakeholders (Jha, Blocch, & Lamond, 2012). With the rise in smart phone use of
stakeholders, their indigenous knowledge of the area can help disseminate information at a quicker pace
(Pearson, 2012). Loughborough University developed a crowdsourcing tool, called Floodcrowd, in a PhD
program and this application was then used by public officials in England. In a December 2015 storm in
the north-western England town of Carlisle, the officials encouraged stakeholders to view and tag a
satellite map for sections of flood damage. Over 700 participants tagged 13,000 affected areas (Assessing
Flood Risks through Crowdsourcing: Floodcrowd, 2017). While this is not an example used in flood
warning, the high participation and concept could be repurposed for flood warning success. The greater
Dallas – Fort Worth metropolitan uses an application called iSeeFlood. This particular program was a
collaboration with the National Science Foundation, University of Texas at Arlington, and the University
of Massachusetts Amherst. By using iSeeFlood, the participants report real time flooding observations
from the general population. They can submit reports along with photos to report flooding at exact
locations and these aid emergency management officials in the current as well as future flood modeling
(Crowdsourcing the Weather with iSeeFlood, 2014). Crisis mapping is also a great tool for understanding
what areas pose the most flood related danger. In Alberta, Canada, a flood in 2013 caused emergency
management server damage so google maps were created for people to share and mark flooded areas
(Malzer, 2013). Google mapping was also used in Harvey for people to mark high water they
experienced (Bonnington, 2017).
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Organizational Challenges
Interagency cooperation is imperative in times of hazards. Lack of communication between all
responsible parties with an understanding of clearly defined roles will cause a disruption in public safety
because communication will falter (Mileti, 2004). Software such as Hazards and Operability Study
(HAZOP) can aid in setting up a structure for delegating responsibilities in preparedness for future
hazardous events (Sommerville, Storer, & Lock, 2009). This was shown in Hurricane Katrina when local,
state, and federal powers failed to cooperate, and the poor evacuation of New Orleans caused unnecessary
deaths (Shughart, 2011). This also rang true with Tropical Storm Allison. People called and went to the
TranStar website to learn about roadways impacted by the storm, but they did not have the capacity to
handle this volume of visitors. The storm hit in the evening when they had fewer emergency personnel
staffed. They discovered communication roles with the Texas Department of Transportation were not
clearly defined and they needed to develop a better emergency plan for flood events (Wegmann, Bausher,
Jackson, & Wahl, 2003).
With cooperation and clearly defined roles, emergency management should also recognize
significant variations within a local area and offer flexibility to adapt to those local needs rather than
require them to fit a mold that does not adequately work (Nance, 2010). Personnel should be ready for
“emergent norms” to occur in times of crisis, routine tasks and preparedness will change as each
hazardous event leaves a unique fingerprint on both emergency personnel and those surviving the disaster
(Drabek, 2010, p. 152). Transparency in plans also deserves a role in a successful partnership between all
agencies involved as well as community stakeholders. After a flood event of the French Garonne River in
2009, officials embarked on new information gathering to learn how to improve relaying information to
the public. They found that involving the public and elected officials in their preparations, they
combatted the issue of knowledge and best-known practices leaving when emergency officials left their
employment in the region (Daupras, Antoine, Becerra, & Peltier, 2015).
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Socio-Economic Challenges
Many factors can prohibit people from seeking appropriate shelter or evacuation plans in times of
disaster;
warning response is a process with several states: (1) hearing the warning, (2) believing the
warning is credible, (3) confirming that the threat does exist, (4) personalizing the warning to
oneself and confirming that others are heeding it, (5) determining whether protective action is
needed, (6) determining whether protection is feasible, and (7) determining what action to take
and then taking it” (Mileti, 2004, p. 191).
However, these do not actually encompass the truer picture of challenges with communication actualizing
in safety for the stake holders. In a survey conducted with migrant workers, the results showed that not
enough flood warnings were disseminated in Spanish and sometimes not owning a car meant the person
surveyed could not leave despite warnings for them to do so (Burke, Bethel, & Britt, 2012).
Communication that is too technical for the general population can also be problematic. During
Harvey, the media discussed the evacuation orders for people living near the Addicks Reservoir and
provided a map for the residents to determine if they should evacuate. Social media comments on the
news articles showcased a sense of panic and confusion of people saying they did not know how to use
the map and how to determine if they should evacuate or not (KTRK, 2017). Children and the elderly are
the most vulnerable in hazardous situations and representatives of advocacy groups should be consulted
for relaying information in a manner that aids these vulnerabilities (Ashley & Ashley, Flood Fatalities in
the United States, 2008). Transient populations and poverty ridden stakeholders as well as those with
special needs, may not have access to the mediums that communication is relayed. Special focus on
finding ways to reach them should be considered (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2014).

Vehicle Related Flood Fatalities in Literature
This section of the literature review discusses existing literature that specifically targets research
conducted regarding vehicle related flood fatalities and the methodological approaches used. I found
three distinct categories from existing literature. The early stages where inconclusive findings resulted in
the researchers advocating for a new approach to collecting and categorizing deaths. The next phase of
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research provides data for that void by building datasets. The third phase uses the previous databases to
then determine vulnerability to vehicle related flood fatalities.

Methodological Approaches Used in the Existing Literature
Most research on driving in floodwaters is found in public health, engineering, and climatology
disciplines, albeit in a segmented fashion. Most of the peer-reviewed literature available as of 2018 does
not employ qualitative methods. The following three sections will explain the three phases of research
methods relevant to this research question.

Early Stages – Inconclusive Findings Using Quantitative Methods
Initial researchers of flood fatalities in public health and climatology struggled to find
comprehensive datasets to determine the causes of flood fatalities (Songer, 2003) (French, Ing, von
Allmen, & Wood, 1983). They implored that developing these datasets would offer a better opportunity
to mitigate future fatalities (French, Ing, von Allmen, & Wood, 1983). In one instance, engineers
Jonkman and Kelman (2005) attempted to define flood, flood disaster and flood fatality versus flood
related fatality while developing a classification method to assign deaths to activities, timing, and
demographics. The earliest studies reviewed National Weather Service (NWS) survey reports that are
published when more than thirty deaths or $100 million in property damage occurs because the reports
determine mortality, effectiveness of warnings and sometimes the circumstances causing the death. The
public health researcher deemed the results inconclusive and called for a systematic method for collecting
data to make interpreting data valid (French, Ing, von Allmen, & Wood, 1983). Another inconclusive
study reviewed deaths related to thunderstorms because both lightening and flash flooding occur during
thunderstorms, yet the safety warning for both contradict one another (Songer, 2003). For lightening
threats, the public is generally warned to stay low to the ground and in their vehicle; whereas flood
warnings tend to encourage them to seek higher ground and avoid their vehicle. Songer called for better
record keeping of those that die in flood related natural disasters, which the future researchers tackle
(2003).
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Dataset Building to Support Quantitative Research Design
Some of the existing research has attempted to build datasets so that future researchers would be
able to comprehensively assess the problem; furthermore, the most cited of these is from the climatology
works of Ashley and Ashley (2006 and 2008), who built a database of deaths from 1959-2005 using
monthly Storm Data Reports from the National Climatic Data Center, in which they also reported most
likely scenarios for these deaths to occur. Geographers Maples and Tiefenbacher (2009) took this a step
further and incorporated data from the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States
(SHELDUS) from 1950 -2004 with Storm Data Reports and field samples of eight of the 2004 drownings
by visiting the intersections to observe the built transportation environment where the casualty occurred.
They also pulled rainfall data and pertinent flooding information to build a scenario for Texas, which
leads the nation in terms of deaths (Maples & Tiefenbacher, 2009).
The latest compilation published was a joint partnership spearheaded by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) that used archived streamflow data from the United States
Geological Survey (USGS) to build a spatial analysis tool that works well with either Google Maps or
Geographic Information System (GIS). They combined this with NWS Storm Reports after flash flood
events and a database from the Severe Hazard Analysis and Verification Experiment (SHAVE) that
prompted students to call areas that were experiencing flash floods during the summer months of 2008-10
(Gourley, et al., 2013). These database studies did not include details about non-fatal incidents such as
injuries or rescues (Terti, Ruin, Anquetin, & Gourley, 2017). Australia’s Macquarie University Risk
Frontier program compiled a database for hazards with PerilAus data from 1788. They used data from
1900 to present day to study natural disasters such as flooding, and their results showed a high frequency
of vehicle related flood deaths (Haynes, et al., 2016). Another Australian study focused on data for river
flooding related fatalities to determine the vulnerabilities specifically for that hazard (Peden, Franklin,
Leggat, & Aitken, 2017). Once the datasets were established, those vulnerable to flood fatalities could be
determined.
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Defining Vulnerability in Flood Fatalities – The Key Research Variable
While those who research flood fatalities predominately use quantitative methods, one study did
conduct a mixed methods approach collecting data to record an extreme flooding event in France (Ruin,
Creutin, Gruntfest, & Lutoff, 2009). It included interviews of twenty individuals that experienced the
flooding; however, this research was not isolated to just drivers (Ruin, Creutin, Gruntfest, & Lutoff,
2009). It found that most people continued with their normal activities unless the flooding caught them at
home before they had a chance to leave and conduct their planned itinerary (Ruin, Creutin, Gruntfest, &
Lutoff, 2009). The findings focused more on the data collected rather than the results of the interview
that could have potentially given more insight for further research (Ruin, Creutin, Gruntfest, & Lutoff,
2009). In an interdisciplinary study with backgrounds in engineering, psychology, public health and
geography, researchers provided a predictive scenario to determine vulnerability in a survey mailed to
participants in Denver, Colorado and Austin, Texas to determine what factors might cause the survey
participants to potentially drive through standing water versus waiting the storm out or finding an
alternative route (Drobot, Benight, & Gruntfest, 2007). They found that cities with more historic
flooding had more cautious drivers, those that did not take warning seriously were more likely to drive in
flooded roads, those that didn’t realized that half of fatalities in flooding came from drivers were more
likely to drive in flooded roads and drivers with no previous experiences to flooded roadways and drivers
under the age of thirty-five were also more willing to risk driving with water on the road (Drobot,
Benight, & Gruntfest, 2007). Flood modeling and simulators were used in a study of the relationship of
flooding and mortality in a case study of New Orleans and found that one third of the deaths occurred
outside of the flooded area in hospitals and shelters, two thirds of the deaths occurred from direct impact
of the flooding and people over the age of sixty-five represented sixty percent of the fatalities (Jonkman,
Maaskant, Boyd, & Levitan, 2008).
Other engineering researchers used original storm data publications rather than summary statistics
like other projects to determine the demographics and the time, date, and place of fatalities in Texas and
found that urban areas and male drivers were particularly vulnerable (Sharif, Hossain, Jackson, & Bin-
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Shafique, 2012). Using a historical event review and systematic literature review, Doocy, et al (2013)
examined vulnerability to flood fatalities from a global perspective and found that motor vehicle related
accidents are the most common cause of fatality in developed countries, with males being most at risk
while females are most vulnerable in developing countries. Their comparative analysis against data
published by international organizations would seem more valid.
Zahran et al. (2008) used measuring social vulnerability to flood-related deaths using SHELDUS
data for reported deaths and rainfall information, United States Census reports to measure poverty,
income and race, and Federal Emergency Management Agency insurance rating scores and found that
flooding near socially vulnerable populations, increased rain the day of the flood, the duration of the
flood, and population density can increase the number of deaths. This study did recommend that future
research include a qualitative component (Zahran, Brody, Peacock, Vedlitz, & Grover, 2008). Jonkman
et al.’s review of flood fatalities from Hurricane Harvey found that most of those deaths occurred outside
the 100-year floodplain, and that men comprised seventy percent of the deaths (2018). They also reported
vulnerability of people over the age of 50 and marked this as an increasing trend (Jonkman, Godfroy,
Sebastian, & Kolen, 2018).
In summary, those most likely to die are men, children and elderly populations, single drivers
with no passengers in the vehicle, and those living in urban areas. Also, fatalities are most likely to occur
during morning and afternoon rush hours. This leads to more questions than understanding. For instance,
if driving with no passenger makes a person more likely to die, then how is it also more likely that
children are dying? Instances of people dying in flooded vehicles must be more situational, and
quantitative approaches are limited in this regard. Furthermore, the existing research states that drivers
either do not recognize the risk or take unnecessary risks that results in their mortality, but only research
from Hamilton et al (2017) has conducted in depth interviews of people to determine if this is truly the
reason such behavior continues to occur.
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Problem Statement and Significance
Flooding is the second most common natural disaster to result in death, and approximately sixty
percent of those who die in extreme flooding events are in their vehicle (Ashley & Ashley, 2006). The
percentage of those who die in common rain events is unknown as many of those investigations blame the
driver and are not recorded properly; however, the US Department of Transportation shows that twenty
five percent of all vehicular casualties are weather related (Lee, BooHyun, & Abdel-Aty, 2015). Flood
warning systems save lives, but many flood warning systems do not include adequate information about
driving in flood water. Improved weather prediction technology has not translated to fewer lives lost as
the number of deaths has increased in the last twenty years (Terti, Ruin, Anquetin, & Gourley, 2017).
Flood fatalities that result from driving in floodwater is an emerging phenomenon. In retrospect,
it is human nature to wonder why a person would react this way and to believe they would have acted
more safely, yet the tragic anomaly continues to happen. Little research has been done on why people
drive through flood water. In general, driving behavior studies indicate that as a driver ages, skills like
navigation and utilizing the brakes and gas pedals do not preserve as well as the ability to follow traffic
laws (Conkle & West, 2008). Also, teenagers are more likely to die from vehicle related injuries than any
other disease or injury, and this is attributed to lack of experience (Conkle & West, 2008). Distracted
driving due to new technologies at driver’s fingertips, also contribute to poor driver performance (Conkle
& West, 2008). Personality type, mental health, social and cultural norms, perceived behavior control,
attitudes, and alcohol and drugs can also be linked to risky driving behavior (Sarma, Carey, & Bimph,
2011) (McDonald, Sommers, & JD, 2014). With driver’s that encounter flooded roadways, behavioralists
experts Hamilton et al (2017) found that the elderly and non-experienced drivers, especially males, will
make risky decisions to drive through the standing water due to societal pressures and constraints of them
either reversing their route or staying off the roads altogether.
With the potential for more extreme and more frequent flooding, understanding this behavior
pattern could influence how urban planners and emergency management professionals prepare people and
cities for extreme weather. I will examine why people drive through floodwater. This research could aid
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in saving lives during future flood events, and with more extreme weather predicted due to expanding
urban built environments and climate change, this problem will continue.

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the methods used for executing research as well as providing explanations
why these methods were chosen. I have designed a qualitative study that uses a critical case study
method based on a historical narrative. Data from semi-structured interviews, public records and reports,
social media uploads and media coverage of selected storms in Harris County were collected and
analyzed to research the phenomenon of vehicle related deaths during extreme flooding.

Research Design & Methodology
The previous quantitative studies of vehicle related flood fatalities attempted to construct the
definition of when, how and the likelihood that a person dies in a flood event, why they made the fatal
decision to drive, and who is particularly vulnerable to making this decision. Quantitative approaches to
measure these very social and situational events can only provide a surface level explanation for why
people may have driven through flood water to their deaths, whereas a qualitative inquiry could provide
ample meaning – making to the phenomenon of vehicle related flood fatalities (Denzin & Lincoln, The
Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research, 2005). Therefore, at the suggestion of several of these
previous quantitative works, this research will utilize a qualitative approach to explore this occurrence in
a deeper and more meaningful context (Babbie, 2010). Based on the previous literature offering more
questions than answers, a case study can help shape a conceptual framework better than using quantitative
methods (George & Bennett, 2005).

Historical Narrative Approach
When looking at the databases built from data collection of the early research in vehicle related
flood fatalities, there is a lack of a retrospective retelling of the events in an effort to find meaning in why
the people died, some of the recordings being genderless, ageless or other missing demographic
explanations that a narrative inquiry could afford (Chase, 2005). Narratives are stories of time and space,
28
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how people spent their time in the space around them and this research will reveal how people
encountered flood waters while in their vehicle and how they reacted to them (Clandinin & Connelly,
2000). By connecting these large-scale events, I will bring a new understanding to the dynamics of these
fatalities (Riessman, 2008). By doing so with a historical lens, my research will allow society to make
sense of past experiences in the context of current situations when experiencing the problem of driving in
floodwater (Riessman, 2008).
This research will utilize historical analysis to establish the relationships between the drivers and
the transportation-built environment, flood warnings and public perceptions. It will also establish patterns
between the records and interviews when recounting the phenomenon. Use of NVivo will offer the
ability to analyze individual documents separately or a set of documents as a group to develop content
analysis. This will allow the researcher to become grounded in the context (Talanquer, 2014). This
research will also use GIS to story map the flood fatalities by using a collection of data on rainfall levels,
location of victim and car discovery as well as demographics of victims (Steinberg & Steinberg, 2006).

Critical Case Study
Selection of the Case
From 1959-2009, Texas annually led the nation in the number of flood fatalities. On average, the
number of deaths in Texas was three times the amount of the second leading state (Sharif, Hossain,
Jackson, & Bin-Shafique, 2012). Texas leads the nation in cost of flood damage, which is more than New
York, California and Florida combined (Brody, 2012). Texas has experienced a dramatic increase in
vehicle-related deaths during flooding events since the 1990s (Maples & Tiefenbacher, 2009). While the
national average of vehicle-related flood fatalities is approximately sixty percent, it accounts for roughly
seventy-five percent of flood fatalities in Texas (Sharif, Hossain, Jackson, & Bin-Shafique, 2012). This
case study will specifically target Harris County in Texas. Harris County is the county seat to Houston,
the largest city in Texas and fourth largest city in the United States. The population is projected to
increase by thirty-seven percent by the year 2030 (Binkovitz, Projections Show How Houston, and the
Country, Will Change by 2030, 2018).
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Harris County has a built environment that increases the chances of extreme flooding. It is sixty
miles of pavement in length and forty miles wide (Brody, 2012). Since 1992, Houston has lost half of its
wetlands and increased its pavement by twenty-five percent (Brody, 2012). Houston is the largest city in
the country to use deed restrictions rather than zoning for land use planning (Vojnovic, 2003). The
second largest city in the United States to do so is Pasadena, Texas, also located in Harris County
(Vojnovic, 2003). Many criticize the lack of land use planning as giving leaders less objectivity when
working with developers and businessmen (Bajak & Borenstein, 2016). This makes Harris County more
vulnerable to flooding.
Harris County experiences both sudden and slow onset flooding. Four inches of rain can flood
major roadways, especially highway underpasses (Brody, Highfield, & Kang, 2011). Harris County has
low lying land and clay soil, which offers little absorption of rain (Brody, 2012). Sixty percent of
Houston’s development is within a 100-year floodplain; however, the extent of the floodplain itself is
expanding along with broader changes in climate (Brody, 2012). Houston also has twenty-two major
watersheds that drain into 2,500 miles of channel, of which only 800 miles are natural. Almost all these
artificial channels were built prior to the 100-year flood criteria (Sipes, 2012). If Harris County were a
state in the US, it would be fifth in the number of flood-related deaths (Brody, 2012). Harris County
represents a worse case for this research, and with no set rule-based criteria, a worse case study approach
does not present constraints to reviewing the situations that occurred to determine the material – semiotic
network of drivers during extreme flooding. This, in turn, will still have relevance in areas prone to less
flooding or even less extreme flooding events (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

Selection of Harris County Floods
This case study will focus on people who have driven in Harris County during extreme flooding
events from 1990 – 2018. The top five leading flooding events during these years:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Great Flood of 1994, occurred October 15-19, 1994, and resulted in 17 deaths
Tropical Storm Allison, occurred June 5-9, 2001, and resulted in 18 deaths
Memorial Day Flood, occurred May 25-26, 2015, and resulted in 8 deaths
Tax Day Flood, occurred April 15, 2016, and resulted in 7 deaths
Hurricane Harvey, occurred April 26-28, 2017, and resulted in 36 deaths
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6. Tropical Storm Imelda, occurred September 17-19, 2019, and resulted in 2 deaths
Previous research has been quantitative “rule-based”, but by looking at this qualitatively we will gain
“context–dependent” knowledge and take a step forward in understanding the phenomenon of vehiclerelated flood fatalities (Flyvberg, 2011, p. 303). Because Harris County is most likely to have this occur,
this becomes a critical single case study; and since the problem is fatal, this research could potentially
make it a paradigmatic case, in which it could establish a school of thought for mitigating vehicular
related flood fatalities (Flyvberg, 2011).

Data Gathering Methods with Justification
This research will employ with-in case methodological triangulation to help validate the findings
(Denzin, 2017). There will be multiple sources of data.
1. Newspapers
Articles, editorials, and photos will be extracted from the Houston Chronicle and the Houston
Post (last publication in 1995) to find reporting on extreme flooding events. The researcher
will look for information that chronicles the flooding event with specialized focus on
information about flood fatalities, emergency response for those trapped in flooded streets,
roadways, and highways. Articles that have interviews from drivers that survived and
interviews with family members of victims to discuss their last interaction with the victim
will also be included in the data collection process. These records will offer a broad scope of
many flooding events and settings to enrich the other data collection methods (Yin, 2009).
2. Semi-structured interviews
This research will include semi-structured interviews of people who have experienced driving
through floodwater. It will encompass those that have driven through standing water,
abandoned their vehicle or reversed their car to go a different route. The drivers selected for
this process were a convenience sample based on recruiting them from social media
comments and groups within the Harris County region. A semi-structured type of interview
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will allow for certain key questions to be asked but allow for flexibility of the interviewed to
tell their story in a way that establishes meaning-making (Babbie, 2010). I will personally
conduct all semi-structured interviews, but translators will be utilized when necessary and
available. A copy of the possible questions asked can be found in Appendix I of this
proposal.
3. Social Media from Facebook and Twitter
To avoid ignoring contemporary voices, this research will conduct a careful examination of
social media. Many people chronicle their observations and experiences on social platforms
through photos, blogs, vlogs, and comments. This will reveal not only narratives to explore,
but also a view into public perceptions of drivers in floodwater and the social norms about
driving during floods (Marwick, 2013). Facebook and Twitter will both be utilized for
meaningful narrative (Ahmed, 2017).
4. Public Meeting Records and Reports
The city of Houston and Harris County have held several town hall meetings to discuss the
issue of flooding. There have been several informative meetings regarding highway
construction and expansion. These will be reviewed to determine if any specifically address
the problem of vehicles and flooding. I will also review public reports issued regarding the
storm event as well as transportation reports. By doing so, the research will understand how
the problem is prioritized in terms of the overall problem of flooding that constituents face
(Marshal & Rossman, 2006).
5. Videos of Houston flooding
During extreme flooding events, local Houston networks will interrupt regularly scheduled
programs to cover the flooding non-stop for the duration of the storm. Many of these are
available for review on the websites of the local news stations as well as YouTube. Many
people experiencing the flooding have also uploaded home videos as the event was occurring.
These are essential data sources for supplementing the narrative to “capture visible
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phenomena seemingly objectively – yet always from the perspective of the filmmaker, just
with other forms of observation” (Marshal & Rossman, 2006, p. 120).
6. Miscellaneous – Emergency Response Programs / Processes
The flood warning systems programs of Harris County as well as its precipitation records will
need review to add to the narrative. Houston area research institutes house great information,
such as Houston-Galveston Area Council (HGAC), Houston TranStar, Harris County Flood
Warning System, and Harris County Flood Control District. These organizations will have
data available on emergency response, precipitation records and demographics that will help
shape the narrative. The National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), it’s
junior department National Weather Service (NWS), Texas Department of Transportation,
US Department of Transportation, various City of Houston, and Harris County government
offices will also provide data for this portion of the research.
7. Street Observations
Literature has recommended that street observations be made to factor into the safety of the
roads (Black & Jackson, 2000; Lee, BooHyun, & Abdel-Aty, 2015). Maples and
Tiefenbacher (2009) did incorporate street observations in data collection on flood fatalities
(Maples & Tiefenbacher, 2009). The observations conducted for this dissertation are located
in Appendix 11.

Procedures / Data Cleaning
After conducting the interviews, I will transcribe them. The news broadcasts of the day will also
need to be transcribed when transcripts are not available. The data will be classified chronologically and
by themes to build a time-series analysis as well as a logic model (Yin, 2009). The data will be coded and
recoded to make retrieval easier and clean (Creswell, 2009).
NVivo, a computer software built for qualitative research, will be used to store, and organize the
data as well as analyzing content, but this will only be a tool to help the methodology of this particular
research and not in itself the method of the said research (Fisher, 2017). Cleaning qualitative data can be
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more difficult to do as much reflection on successful quantitative data cleaning exists. To avoid the
pitfalls of weak or erroneous data, this research will carefully look to detect errors and repair discovered
errors (Chu & Ilyas, 2016).

Analysis
This critical case study will offer an in-depth focus on a single instance to develop future
interpretations (Flyvberg, 2011). By incorporating a qualitative design into this research, the final
product will have more dimension than a quantitative study, thus providing more interpretative
understanding. There is a need to build a historical narrative to reveal patterns and what has improved
and prevented death and what still needs addressing to mitigate more tragedies due to driving in
floodwater. Groundwork research has provided quantitative data that proves there is a problem, and this
requires further exploration to discover why the problem occurs so frequently (Zahran, Brody, Peacock,
Vedlitz, & Grover, 2008). The primary sources and interviews will be analyzed to determine causal
patterns to improve public education on the dangers of driving in floodwater as well as improved FWS
that focus on the dangers of driving when the threat of flooding exists.

Ethical Concerns and Human Subjects
At this proposal stage, the researcher has no premeditated generalizations or definitive answers
that the research must conclude. To remain ethically guided in this study, the researcher will allow for the
possibility of any possibilities (Babbie, 2010). Ahmed touches on ethics that Academy of Social Sciences
has published dedicated to use of social media data (2017).
Another ethical dilemma will involve strict adherence to the confidentiality of the people
interviewed. The researcher will be trained on ethical research practices by Texas Southern University’s
(TSU) Office of Research, and all interview questions and research methods were reviewed and approved
by TSU’s Institutional Review Board. The researcher informed all parties interviewed of the purpose for
the study and informed them of their right not to participate. The researcher also outlined any risks and
benefits to their voluntary election to proceed with the interview or survey. Prior to the interviews,
participants signed a written consent form. This consent also included the researcher’s promise to keep
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the personal information confidential when reporting the results (Groenewald, 2004). A copy of this
consent form can be found in Appendix 2.

Delimitations
The research will be a broad collection of data, so it is necessary to tighten the amount collected.
As a result, this research did not conduct interviews with official emergency personnel that respond to the
scene. It will also not include interviews from tow truck drivers after the flooding event that remove the
abandoned vehicles. It will focus only on Harris County and not the surrounding border counties. It did
not look at other flood related fatalities such as those walking through flood water or electrocution.

Limitations
There will be some limitation to my research. The key witnesses to flood fatalities are not alive
to build this narrative. Also, there may be language barrier issues with my research as Houston speaks
over 145 different languages a day (Kriel, 2015). There may be interviewees that are unwilling or
withdrawn, and their cooperation is key to successfully obtaining the data necessary to the narrative.
Also, they may remember the experiences differently resulting in half-truths or inaccurate information
relayed (Marshal & Rossman, 2006).
Limitations from the computer software should also be considered. The researcher will work
with a GIS technician and will supply them the data. Data fuels GIS so it will be important to pull quality
data so that GIS adequately maps the narrative (Mennis, Mason, & Cao, 2012). For the use of NVivo for
content analysis, it will also be only as good as the data used and it does not have the ability to transcribe
audio or video files, so the researcher will use NVivo software for transcription to feed into NVivo
(Talanquer, 2014) It is also easy to use this software with a quantitative driven mindset and try to crunch
the words in the same fashion as done with numbers (Fisher, 2017).

Threats to Validity
1. Underrepresented populations in those that are interviewed. To avoid this, the researcher will
use translators (Babbie, 2010).
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2. Interviewee recalls different experience than reality due to trauma and / or time of the
experience (Bernard, 2006)
3. Mapped locations maybe different because vehicle and deceased are found at different
address than the actual event due to the speed and force of water (Steinberg & Steinberg,
2006).
4. Transcription – quality of recording & playback may cause misinterpretation of some
information (Fisher, 2017).

External Validity
This study focuses solely on behavior-based knowledge of Houston drivers. However, it remains
relevant for other future disasters/natural hazard studies. The research could be used in further studies to
implement different public policies regarding flood mitigation as it is a universal problem where
populations use cars as a primary mode of transportation. The framework of the research can be applied
to other natural hazards (Babbie, 2010).

Strategies to Reduce Bias
1. Have participants review my results (Bernard, 2006)
2. Verify/triangulate with more data sources (Denzin, 2017)
3. Check for alternative explanations and think comparatively of numerous incidents to avoid the
initial interpretation (Babbie, 2010)
4. Establish an audit trail of why decisions are made during the coding and decision-making process
(Babbie, 2010)

Reliability
The interviews continue until consistent themes are revealed. It is important that the information
is credible and transferable to other case studies. With this being a worst-case scenario, I will be covering
extreme events of this occurrence which should find merit in events that are even more moderate
(Golafshani, 2003). Furthermore, this research will employ methodological triangulation by using
multiple avenues of information to find the consistency that merits reliability through also reviewing
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newspapers, social media, news videos and public meetings that cover extreme flooding events in Harris
County and drivers that experience flooded roads (Denzin, 2017). The processes will be recorded in
detail for future research endeavors as well so that my findings can be confirmed in those studies
(Creswell, 2009).

Reporting of Results
A fluid historical narrative of events peppered with images retrieved from research as well as GIS
story maps will be produced. NVivo will be used to create diagrams and graphs to describe networks and
relationships (Talanquer, 2014).

Anticipated Results with Overall Limitations
While I do not want to hastily pre-determine the results of this study, based on the review of
literature and availability of resources to design the research method, I do have some anticipated results.
By using Actor Network Theory, I can expect to establish a conceptual framework. Interviews will reveal
people had many factors that propelled their decisions. Some factors could be used to shape education
and flood warnings. Public records will offer interviews from drivers and victims’ family to use in this
research. GIS maps will show that some areas experience hazards in multiple events and flood barriers
installed there could prevent future deaths. The research will also show that drivers are judged based on
an assumed lack of education, which influences public policy implications.

CHAPTER 4
WHY PEOPLE DRIVE DURING EXTREME FLOODING
This chapter will focus on historical information to introduce the selected storms and provide a
comprehensive look at the demographics of the victims. It will describe any known reasons why the
victims were traveling during the storm. The chapter will also include information collected from semistructured interviews that I conducted and what the interviewees revealed about their motivation for
driving during extreme weather.

Selected Greater Houston Storms
The selected storms mentioned in Chapter Two represent both slow onset and flash
flooding storms as both types of flooding occur in the Greater Houston region. Table 1 below
lists the selected storms for this dissertation and their total number of deaths. To understand
human behavior in these times, the type of storms serves as actors if a driver meets water on the
road they travel. It is important to see how the driver’s behavior shifts or stays the same based
on the type of rain event.
Table 1 List of Selected Storms

Selected Storm

Date

Great Flood of 1994
Tropical Storm Allison
Memorial Day Flood
Tax Day Flood
Hurricane Harvey
Tropical Storm Imelda

October 1994
June 2001
May 2015
April 2016
August 2017
September 2019
Total
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Number of Deaths
17
18
8
7
36
2
88
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Great Flood of 1994
This storm hit north of Houston, but the San Jacinto River, Cypress Creek and Sims
Bayou experienced significant overflow
(Villafranca, 1994). Figure 3 below shows an
image of stranded cars alongside Interstate 45 as
a result of flooding from this storm. Due to the

Figure 4 San Jacinto River Fire (Alexander, 2019)

overwhelming calls from this storm, the Trinity River
Authority opened an unlisted number for officials to have a
way to have direct contact with emergency response offices
and personnel (Thackeray, 2016). While Harris County did
not experience the brunt of the storm, sixteen counties north
of Houston were declared disaster areas by the Texas
Governor (Villafranca, Smith, & Moody, 1994). The inner
loop 610 southbound at highway 288 and two other Houston

Figure 3 Flooding Alongside
Interstate 45 (A look back at
Conroe's 1994 flood, 2017)

area freeways experienced high water (Villafranca, Smith, & Moody, 1994). In downtown
Houston, a public metro bus flooded out and required high water rescues of the passengers
(Villafranca, Smith, & Moody, 1994). There were delays to reopening US Highway 59 to the
north and Interstate 10 to the east as well as US Highway 90 after the storm due to road damage
and pipeline fires that erupted during the storm (Villafranca, 1994). A fire erupted after a
pipeline burst as shown in Figure 4 above. Due to the pipeline bursting, it did significant damage
to the alternative route, US Highway 90, for travelers eastbound on Interstate 10 from Houston to
Beaumont, and many had to resort to traveling by the Bolivar Ferry system from Galveston,
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Texas (Tolson, 1994). The Hardy toll road, only open for six years prior to the storm, was used
as an alternative route as Interstate 45 was flooded at Spring Creek near Greenspoint Mall (Staff,
Flood Forces Diversion on Tollway, 1994). This event inspired the news to provide interrupted
coverage of the event, a historical precedent that continues during major weather events since
(McDaniel, 1994). By Tropical Storm Allison, there would be listings of all those that died and
their locations. Data for this storm is included in my study although the locations of those died
were not available to include for mapping or street observations.
Tropical Storm Allison
Tropical Storm Allison hit the Houston area in June 2001 and flooded portions of the
south and eastern portions of the United States from June 5th to June 18th (National Weather
Service, 2001) Tropical Storm Allison is the only tropical storm to have its named retired. It
first made landfall on Galveston Island during the evening of June 5th and traveled across
Houston heading north. The Houston area received an average of four to six inches with isolated
areas receiving eight to ten inches on the first day (National Weather Service, 2001). The
moisture coming from the Gulf aggravated the storm. The flood levels exceeded the 500-year
mark standards. It was a slow-moving storm system. One house got four feet of water on June
5th and then eight feet on June 8th (Burnett, 2008). What made the storm an anomaly was its
double entrance from the Gulf and its record rainfall due to stalling over Houston. The twentytwo deaths in Houston occurred on the second flooding event of the storm, which started in rush
hour traffic Friday, June 8th and lasted until the early hours the following day (National Weather
Service, 2001). More than 70,000 vehicles were flooded from Allison floodwaters, but it is
difficult to determine the exact number that were stationary and those that were destroyed from
driving or abandoning vehicles during the storm (National Weather Service, 2001). As shown in
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Figure 5, Interstate 10 by the Houston Heights neighborhood was deep enough to submerge 18
wheelers. After the storm cleared, “police were unsure whether there were any more bodies in
the hundreds of vehicles immersed on the roadways” (Bernstein, 2001).
Of the 22 fatalities from Tropical Storm Allison, 19 were
related to driving or abandoning their vehicle (Lewis P. , 2011).
“We’ve seen bodies found in cars along the side of the road and
it’s just obvious people who tried to get to higher ground and just
didn’t make it and really started to absorb the fact that this was
truly a deadly storm.” (Flood of a Lifetime, 2001). The storm did
major damage to Interstate 10, and an engineer described the
damaged roadway to being “peeled ‘like an orange’” (Graves,
Figure 5 Stranded on I10 (DeSoto, 2019)

2001).

Hurricane Ike
Hurricane Ike was the third most destructive hurricane to hit the Texas coast and had a
storm surge of 17.8 feet. The eye of the storm passed north of downtown Houston (Bedient &
Sebastian, 2012). Approximately 2.5 million residents lost power because of Ike and
CenterPoint energy had ninety percent of their customers lose power because of the storm. Ike
was the third costliest storm in the United States at its time and is now ranked sixth in costliest
storms. In Bolivar Peninsula, they lost most of their residents, resulting in 70 percent loss from
property taxes. This was the largest power outage in Texas history at the time of its storm
(Bedient & Sebastian, 2012). The change of direction of Hurricane Ike preserved the Port of
Houston from sustaining large scale damage but increased the concern of protecting the port
from future storm surges. Any devastation from storm surges could in turn affect the nation’s

42

economy as forty percent of the nation’s petroleum is around the Port of Houston (Falloure,
2014). While the storm was costly and Harris County incurred substantial damages from this
storm, it experiences more damage from wind than floods, so this storm was not selected for this
study.
Memorial Day Flood
On the night of Memorial Day, May 25, 2015, Houston was hit with heavy rain. In only
ten hours, some areas of Houston experienced twelve inches of rain (Cooper, 2015). Some areas
received upwards of eight inches in three hours, which caused Buffalo Bayou to be out of its
banks and exceeded the 100-year rainfall rate (KPRC-TV, 2015). Of the eight people who died
because of the historic flooding, five deaths were vehicle related (Cooper, 2015). San Antonio,
Austin, Dallas, and Houston, the four largest cities in Texas, all experienced extreme flooding
from this weather front. Images of flooding in all four cities can be seen in Figure 6 below.
Over five million dollars in damage was done to
Texas’s transportation network. Texas had
twenty-two deaths and Oklahoma had four from
this storm (Barned-Smith, 2015). The flash
flooding event occurred for roughly thirteen hours
with the peak rainfall occurring for a steady six
hours. The National Weather Service said these
types of downpours typically had not occurred in
Figure 6 Four Largest TX Cities Flooded (Texas Hill Country,
2015)

Houston since the 1960s, except for hurricane and
tropical storms. The amount of rainfall from this
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flash flooding would not match that of the following year that occurred during the Tax Day
Flood of 2016 (Harden, Breaking down Houston's recent flooding events, 2016).
Tax Day Flood
Flooding occurred in Houston on April 17-18 in 2016 and most affected were those living
in the northern and western parts of Harris County (Harris County Flood Control District, 2016).
Primarily occurring after midnight and into the early morning hours, a group of thunderstorms
were stationary for several hours above Greater Houston. There was up to seventeen inches of
rain that fell on parts of Harris County (Perera, 2017). Five watersheds caused homes to flood.
When the original storm water drained in the north, many roadways and homes experienced a
secondary flood (Harris County Flood Control District, 2016). Both the Addick’s and Barker
Reservoirs filled up to their highest levels ever, though this record would be broken a year later
during Hurricane Harvey (Perera, 2017). Six weeks later, it rained on Memorial Day May 28,
2016, and some previously flooded areas received an additional 8-13 inches of rain that caused
them to flood yet again. An estimated 240 billion
gallons of water were dumped on the county
(Madrigal, 2017).
A federal disaster was declared on April
25th for individuals. The rainfall from Tax Day
became the highest level of rainfall that the city of
Figure 7 Greenspoint Neighborhood Street Flooded with
Stranded Motorists (Ciaglo, 2016)

Houston had experienced since Allison hit in

2001. However, it did not measure to the volume of Allison or Harvey that would hit in 2017
(Harden, 2016). Over 40,000 vehicles flooded (Lindner, 2016). Figure 7 above shows people
and automobiles stranded in the Greenspoint neighborhood due to the flood. Eight people died
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in the storm and three of those died in separate vehicles at the same underpass. The streets along
the Addicks Reservoir to the west of Houston were not navigable for several days after the storm
(Associated Press, 2016). Highway 6 was closed for several weeks because of damages from
high water (Perera, 2017).
Hurricane Harvey
When Hurricane Harvey made landfall, it stalled and circled back out into the gulf and
returned. Houston, at the east of the storm, received the dirty side rainfall and was inundated
with a total of one trillion gallons over four days. This volume of rain could cover the entire
Harris County with a depth of 33 inches. The highest point of rain registered by a gauge was
49.6 inches. More than 136,000 homes and
businesses were flooded and 30 people in Harris
County perished at the hands of Harvey (Harris
County Flood Control District, 2017). The
transportation network was disrupted for weeks,
Figure 8 Flooding at Interstate 10 at Market Street
(Coomer, 2017).

especially to the west of Houston where the
Addicks Dam has been forced flooded, and traffic

signals were given a different timing schedule to help with expedite traffic congestion. Interstate
45 south of Houston also had lanes closed for safety measures (Now: After Harvey, Houstonians
eye long road to recovery, 2017). Figure 8 above shows Interstate 10 completely under water on
one segment.
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Imelda
Tropical Storm Imelda was active from September 17-19, 2019. It first formed in
Brazoria County Texas and moved north to cause rain for Harris County and Montgomery
County. Due to grounds being dry, the
rainfall did not create a flooding issue for
Harris County until the third day of rain,
September 19th, during a 12-hour period.
Rain on this day fell at an average of four
to six inches hourly while it had only
average 1.5 an hour the previous two days.
Figure 9 Flooded Interstate (Skelton, 2019)

Emergency officials responded to 2,789
calls for high water rescue or stranded calls (Lindner, 2019). Figure 9 above shows a portion of
an interstate with stranded motorist. The roadway and the areas on either side of the interstate
are flooded.

Data from Storm Related Deaths
Each of the deaths from Allison, Memorial Day, Tax Day, Harvey, and Imelda were public
accessible records. I built a database that includes demographics, reasons for traveling, locations,
and watersheds responsible. Raw data on these collected information about Victims can be found
in Appendixes 3, 4 and 5. Raw data on the demographics of those interviewed can be found in
Appendixes 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. There were 71 total deaths, and 45 of these were driving and died
either in their car or shortly after escaping their flooded car. People most likely to die are Hispanic
men above the age of 60.
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Table 2 below breaks down the victims’ demographics by race. It includes all 71 that died
as the total population. It also separates the 45 victims that died in vehicle related casualties.
People of color represent 73 percent of those that died in vehicles and almost 70 percent of total
deaths during the event.
Table 2 Deaths by Race

Race

Hispanic
White
Black
Asian
Unknown
Total

Vehicle
related
deaths
24
10
6
3
2
45

Percentage

Total
Population

Percentage

53.33%
22.22%
13.33%
6.67%
4.44%
100%

35
19
9
5
3
71

49.3%
26.76%
12.68%
7.04%
4.23%
100%

Table 3 below breaks down the victims’ demographics by gender. It includes all 71 that died as
the total population. It also separates the 45 victims that died in vehicle related casualties.
Males represent over 65% of both vehicle related deaths and overall deaths.
Table 3 Deaths by Gender

Gender Vehicle related deaths Percentage Total Population Percentage
Male
30
66.67%
48
67.61%
Female
15
33.33%
23
32.39%
Total
45
100%
71
100%
Table 4 below breaks down the victims’ demographics by age. It includes all 71 that died
as the total population. It also separates the 45 victims that died in vehicle related casualties.
Adults sixty years and older represent the highest population to die in these selected storms.
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Table 4 Death by Age

Age
Vehicle related deaths Percentage Total Population Percentage
60 & up
17
37.78%
25
35.21%
41-59
11
24.44%
19
26.76%
26-40
7
15.56%
13
18.31%
18-25
6
13.33%
9
12.68%
Under 18
4
8.89%
4
5.63%
Unknown
0
0%
1
1.41%
Total
45
100%
71
100%

Reasons for Drivers on the Road
It is important to determine why people are on the roads during extreme flooding in order
to mitigate deaths. Through interviews conducted, archival live footage interviews of drivers
during these events and news articles that interview survivors or family members of the victims,
here are some of the more common reasons found from the research. As development and
population increases, many are caught by surprise as new flood patterns emerge. Others are
unaware of a threat of extreme flooding. Some feel unsafe sheltering in place and attempt to
evacuate. Others know of the threat of dangers from flooding, and it propels them to check on
loved ones. Many feel force to go to work despite the dangers, and those that drive
professionally such as chauffeurs, emergency personnel and truck drivers are especially
vulnerable. Others equate home as safe and brave the torrential rain with the objective of going
home to be safe. Graph 1 below looks at the reasons discovered about why those that died in
vehicle related casualties were driving.

48

Graph 1 Reasons Victims Drove

Changing Flood Patterns and the Element of Surprise
There is a sense among drivers about the safety of local knowledge and this can trap even
veteran drivers. Just as the built environment grows and people have a false sense of security
with their homes in floodplains, this can also occur with the decision to drive in extreme weather.
In a city that is prone to flooding, it is easy to judge a road’s safety based on experience of it dry,
but as development and rain patterns change, previously dry streets become rivers. One driver
interviewed during Allison said it was the first time the street in front of his house had ever
flooded, and when he arrived home from work and saw that, “… I really started to get concern
about myself and even then seeing the anticipation of deaths which I thought was certain because
of the conditions” (Flood of a Lifetime, 2001). In a live broadcast, a driver described a road

49

underwater and explained this was the first time he had seen it flooded in over twenty years. The
camera panned to show many stranded motorists that had also been surprised by the excessive
ponding (Flood of a Lifetime, 2001). Another stranded driver waiting to be rescued explained
they had never expected it to flood as bad in Houston and hoped to never experience a flood as
bad as Allison (KHOU-TV, 2015).
During the initial downpour that came from Harvey, drivers could be seen coming from
the West part of Harris County into downtown. While the west part of Houston was not
experiencing the rainfall initially, they began to experience it as they came into the portions
where rain had been falling heavily (KHOU-TV, 2017). In one of my interviews, a driver during
the Tax Day Flood decided to make her forty-mile one way commute from her home to her job
despite her awareness of the news coverage of flash flooding because it was not raining at her
house and believed the threat was not as alarming as she saw on her television (Participant XX).
In an early livestream during Harvey, KHOU described the people driving during torrential rain
and implored people to stay home. They mentioned that people may have been misreading the
warnings because the storm had already made landfall twenty-four hours earlier, but that this
would be misleading because the rain would be coming for the next unforeseeable future
(KHOU-TV, 2017).
Unaware
Some drivers missed the flood warnings. One driver caught in Harvey rain was
interviewed by the news and said while the rain was “pretty bad” the area was “not expecting a
lot” (KHOU-TV/WFAA-TV, 2017, pp. 78:40-79:12) This was true for many during Tropical
Storm Allison due to its quick development. During Harvey, a reporter panned the camera to
show the south bound lanes of interstate 45 leading to Galveston with deep water and several
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abandoned vehicles along the roadside (KHOU-TV/WFAA-TV, 2017). This became very
apparent from those I interviewed. When I asked them how many days, they were aware that the
flood event may happen, roughly 43 percent of them could not remember or did not answer as
seen in graph 2 below. However, the next highest percentage of answers was zero days,
especially those from Hurricane Harvey which was promoted more than the flash floods and
other tropical systems.

How many days before flooding event
where you aware of storm?
30
25

27

20
15

10
5
5

7

2

7

2

5

0
No
Knowledge

1 day

2 days

3-4 days

5 days

Can't
Few Days
Remember

Graph 2 Interviewed People and their awareness of the flood event

Evacuation
One reason that will put drivers on the road is the evacuation of the place they are in
shelter. A survivor of the Great Flood of 1994 described putting as much of his household into a
rented U-Haul to evacuate and then leaving with the contents only to total the U-Haul in flood
waters (Villafranca, Smith, & Moody, 1994). During Hurricane Harvey, an elderly couple in
their eighties died along with their four of their great grandchildren when their van was
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submerged in flood water. They had left their shelter fearing that it was too dangerous to stay
(Now: After Harvey, Houstonians eye long road to recovery, 2017).
In three separate incidents during the Flood of 1994, children died due to evacuation. A
two-month-old infant drowned when he slipped out of his father’s hands where they had been
stranded after driving and losing control of the vehicle due to the water on the road before them
(Johnson S. , 1994). Two more children would perish due to a small car of one adult and four
children that flooded on a roadway (Teachey, 1994).

Also, during the 1994 flood, a 33-year-old

man was traveling with his five daughters when their car took water. The three oldest children
were swept away but able to hold onto tree branches, while he held his four-year-old and sixmonth-old daughters. Fortunately, a deputy for the sheriff’s department was able to help, and he
was one of only twelve deputies that had training in swift water rescues so all of them survived.
However, these types of instances are what make children vulnerable. When adults are unable to
safely navigate swift water, it becomes increasingly difficult to hold children that are unable to
swim in calm water (Stewart, 1994). In fact, of the 71 deaths from the selected storms, only
eleven casualties came from those that sheltered in place. Seven of those deaths were from
Hurricane Harvey, which lasted longest and created the most flooding of the selected storms, and
none came from flash floods.
An 18-year-old interviewee described only having her driver’s license for four months
prior to Tropical Storm Imelda. She decided to leave school early to go home because she feared
the streets would only get worse and she felt safest at home as staying on campus might have
kept her there for a “couple day” though this storm did not cause floodwater to stand more than a
few hours (Participant CCC).
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Checking on Loved Ones
Concern about the welfare of loved ones proves a significant motivator for people to
drive during extreme flooding conditions. A 23-year-old Hispanic female I interviewed drove
with her mom to a shelter to pick up extended family that had experienced a flooded house. She
made this decision to drive despite totaling her own car the night before in the floodwaters of the
streets in the same route (Participant U). During Allison, a woman walked after she could not
drive towards her home because she had a minor child and elderly parents at home (Flood
victims: Manuel Quiroga, Mary Garcia, Louis Carranza, 2001). The distance she had to travel
was not far, but this did not make the trip safer as the route was located next to White Oak Bayou
as shown in Map 1 below.

Map 1 Google Map to illustrate distance between Vara's Lounge and Victim's Residence as well as Location of Discovered Body
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Technology during Allison did not help allow people to readily check on relatives as many
landlines were knocked out by the storm and cell phones were not as widely used at that time. In
fact, on a news broadcast, viewers were warned “it’s a serious situation, a crisis for many of us
not being able to phone somebody and say hey I’m in trouble or hey you know are you okay.
That’s a little scary but there’s not a lot that can be done overnight tonight and we do remind you
that travel is not advisable, so we hope that you made a decision to get yourself through the next
six to twelve hours over the course of tonight” (The Weather Channel, 2008). A couple became
fearful for their daughter and drove over to check on her (Flood victims: Isabel and Antonio
Cordova, 2001). A lady in her twenties was trapped in her SUV during a live broadcast during
Harvey and described her mother being in a home with three inches of water and her need to get
to her to rescue her, but her SUV was almost completely submerged. She was able to be rescued
as it was the daytime and a news crew came to report on the area and rescued her (NBC Nightly
News, 2017).
Work
Pressure to make it to work also influences people to drive during extreme flooding.
During the Memorial Day Flood, a 35-year-old male went to a bar to help them when the storm
knocked their computer system down. While he went to one of the highest elevations in Houston
to do the job, he left and drove to a lower elevation near White Oak Bayou and became trapped
in his car and died (Barned-Smith & Tolson, 2015). A worker for Houston metro started at 3:45
am on Sunday morning of Harvey’s landfall and was interviewed before noon. She said that she
was needed at work as an essential employee, but she could not find a safe exit from the highway
loop 610 near 45 south (KHOU-TV/WFAA-TV, 2017).
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During Imelda, a driver described trying to make it to work and did not see any signs that
the road in front of him was flooded. He drove in and was able to be rescued by other people
who had their cars fully submerged on the road. He gave a cautionary message to viewers that
he had made a choice to go to work to not lose his job, but that the result could have been that he
lost his life. These are concerns drivers may face (Houston Chronicle, 2019). One of the victims
of the Memorial Day Flood died traveling to her job. She was responsible for changing prices at
a local grocery store, and the rain fell on a night when prices would need to be changed from
Memorial Day sales to regular prices. It is not clear if she felt a responsibility to go into work
due to her internalized importance or if her job had pressured her to come to work despite the
bad weather (Barned-Smith & Rice, 2015). Also, during the Memorial Day Flood, a woman
attempted to go to her job at a convenience store and her body was later recovered near her
abandoned car (Staff, 2015). For those that I interviewed, many felt real pressures to make it to
work. For instance, one driver also explained that her mother drove to work simply because her
family “lived paycheck to paycheck, and she couldn’t miss work” (Participant H).
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Professional Drivers: People that drive a vehicle regularly for their profession, are at

increased risk. Two such professions are police officers and commercial truck drivers. During
Allison, a news reporter covered an officer that had become stranded in a Galleria intersection
and successfully escaped his vehicle (The Weather Channel, 2008). From the years 2015 to
2019, thirteen Houston area police officers died while on duty, and of these deaths, two died
being trapped in high water while driving (Sternitzky-Di Napoli, 2019). Many county and city
police in the Houston area were stranded or unable to patrol during the flood in 1994
(Villafranca, Smith, & Moody, 1994). In Allison, a police car was also stranded and not visible
on Interstate 10 and Washington Avenue when camera man captured what appeared to be a lake
with 18 wheelers and some tops of cars visible (Flood of a Lifetime, 2001). An image of the
floating trucks is shown in Figure 10 below.

For the major flooding events covered in this dissertation,
at least one death from the event was a professional truck driver.
Though eighteen wheelers are higher from the ground, they are
susceptible to water on a roadway that is deeply flooded. During
Harvey, one driver for SAIA described driving from Odessa through
San Antonio to Houston that had him driving the path of Harvey.
He had lived in Houston since before Alicia in 1983 and was aware
Figure 10 Stranded 18 wheelers
on Interstate 10 at Washington /
Westcott (Einsel, 2019).

of the danger. As such, he said he drove the opposite way on major
interstates and waited until there was a break in the rain for the

water to recede (KHOU-TV/WFAA-TV, 2017).
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Home
Many are caught in a storm simply trying to make it to their home rather than sheltering
in place. Another person that experienced driving during Allison, described how the water rose
quickly and only took ten minutes for the car to be completely submerged in water. He was
headed home and successfully escaped the vehicle to find shelter at a nearby McDonald’s for
over eleven hours (Freemantle, Residents thrust into nightmare, 2001). During Hurricane
Harvey less than 24 hours after the rain began, the loop highway 610 was flooded at the
Interstate 10 exchange and the clearance bridge indicated the depth at sixteen feet and four
inches where three people were rescued by a police officer. One of those rescued was a woman,
who had completed her first shift at a hospital, was stuck for more than nine hours trying to make
it home from work (KHOU-TV/WFAA-TV, 2017).
There seems to be an association of comfort with one’s home that propels them to
navigate waters rather than sheltering in place. One driver in Imelda felt she might be trapped at
her school for more than a day if she did not try to reach home during the storm (Participant
CCC). This seems to be more prevalent if the driver had responsibilities waiting at home. One
man described that his “eagerness to get home increased as the rain did” during Imelda because
he was concerned about his wife and children at home experiencing the same fears as they shared
during Harvey (Participant FFFF). Another described having her children with her at a place
with no power and how getting them home would be better than being stranded for an unknown
period without their normal comforts (Participant II). One respondent, who also had her children
with her, described her need to go walk her dog that had been left home alone (Participant HH).
A single parent discussed her stress of racing home because her children were let out early and
arrived by bus before she did (Participant R).
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Summary
Central themes did emerge from combing through news stories of eye-witness accounts
and my personal interviews as chronicled in Table 5 below. Many were caught in the storm
because they did not anticipate that that flood patterns had changed, or they had missed the
weather forecast altogether. Special circumstances motivated others to travel because they
believed it necessary to evacuate or check on people or pets. Primarily though, most driving in
the storms were either going to work or home. By understanding the motivations of these
drivers, it supports the inquiry of social norms that collectively motivate this established yet
risky behavior of driving during extreme flooding.
Table 5 Findings about Drivers.

Reasons for Driving During Extreme Flooding
Concern for family, friends and/or pets
Evacuation: fear shelter is not safe
Belief that Home = Safe
Commute to Work
No Knowledge of storm being dangerous
Previous flooding had not occurred in their familiar commute
Occupation Requiring Driving
Special Events

CHAPTER 5
SOCIAL NORMS ABOUT DRIVING DURING FLOODS
To fully assess the phenomenon of drivers who die in extreme flooding events, it merits
looking at any existing social norms that may also shape perceived dangers and driving patterns.
This could be helpful in shifting people’s behavior. Social norms appear to be transitioning as
these events occur more frequently and intensely. Pockets of communities have more stake in
changing the way society views these tragedies. When the Tax Day Flood occurred and two
people originally from India died, the local newspaper for the Indian community called for the
population to write and lobby their representatives to ask for mitigating measures such as better
warnings and flashing lights. They also suggested that engineers from their community help
improve urban design for Houston (Malhotra, 2016).

Understanding of Effects of Flooding
In order to assess people’s opinions of driving in flood water and the mitigation of drivers
from doing so, I posed the question, what causes the most problems during flooding? Many
respondents had a grasp of the problem and cited drainage issues alongside an over-populated
area. They mentioned the abundance of pavement and lack of trees did not help matters. For the
most part, it seemed that those interviewed understood how a built environment can cause
problems for flooding. Some were opposed to an overregulation by government, while others
were frustrated with the area’s cultural phenomenon of few zoning regulations and what it meant
overall to the potential for greater flooding loss and damages. However, most of those
interviewed described the flooding problem in terms of edifices and property loss. Most did not
feel that the damages to transportation or people in driving situations warranted much further
improvement or study. Those interviewed in earlier storms such as the 1994 flood and Allison
58
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stated that advancements in technology and weather prediction was enough to warn drivers. A
driver from the Harvey experience stated, “I think they do a pretty decent job already all things
considered and thinking about how bad it can flood in New Orleans makes me grateful for how it
is in Houston” (Participant L).

Impact of a Perceived Life-Threatening Experience
Based on the interviews conducted, those I spoke to that perceived their experience as
life-threatening were more vocal in expressing a change in their driving behavior during
inclement weather. A woman, who recounted her experience of watching water slowly rise at
her intersection and her inability to back up or move, stated that any time she drives since then
with some ponding on the road “my heart feels like it’s going to explode” (Participant B). A
woman who had to abandon her vehicle on the interstate and had to be rescued by friends stated
that she experienced PTSD from the event. She moved away from Houston to a town about two
hours away for several years. She described returning to Houston for a shopping visit and that it
was raining when she got to the outskirts. She said that she immediately returned home as she
mentally could not handle driving in Houston with rain (Participant O). Many used the words
“nervous” and “anxiety” to describe how their previous experience impacts their decision today
to drive during rain events.
Others described how it shaped them to check the weather forecasts. One person
interviewed had just driven through an intersection that was questionable to her during the
Memorial Day Flood. She described watching a Department of Public Safety trooper move to go
rescue someone who became trapped at the same intersection and would later find out the person
did not survive (Participant HE). She described this as having a profound impact on her
decisions to drive during extreme flooding and refuses to do so now. Another interviewee from
the Tax Day flood became trapped in his car and could not get the doors open but finally was
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able to open his windows and exited his vehicle in more than waist deep water. He described the
event as near death and attributed his survival to luck as well as remaining calm. He thanked me
for the study and said that people do not understand how dangerous and how easy it can happen
for a person to become trapped in their vehicle (Participant AAAA).
Those who have driven during the extreme flooding but did not express a life-threatening
experience were less concerned about driving in this type of storm event again. They also have
less concern with implementing change. Addressing unsafe driving conditions during flooding
does not seem to be a priority in shifting the social norm. One interviewer answered me
ambivalently about how her experiences driving in Houston did not change her behavior
significantly by responding “yes and no. I mean, I respect a tropical storm more and am more
aware of those types of events. However, like I said, I am a gulf coast girl and storms, and
flooding are just kind of a normal occurrence” (Participant BBB).

Status Quo Mentality
In many instances, there seems to be an undercurrent of acceptance in their fate that at
some point, people will be stranded in vehicles during flooding, and they will continue to
experience this problem. During the Memoria Day Flood of 2015, a police officer stranded on
an interstate was asked if he was concerned about crowd control of stranded motorist that might
be impatient to wait and he answered, “It’s Houston. Everyone expects it to flood here” (KPRCTV, 2015). A popularized song “Hold it Down” that local Houston rap artist, Z-Ro, has themed
about living in Houston was morphed into the social media hashtag #HTowntilidrown, which
implies a loyalty to the city of Houston regardless of the flooding problem and even a confession
that it is simply their fate (Walker, 2018, pp. 189-194). This has saturated social media among
locals and has even been culturally appropriated in t-shirts sold online. In an editorialized
experience about living in Houston floods, a writer for the Texas Monthly likened the experience
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to being in the denial phase of the five stages of grief, in which she and her husband were
trapped during the Memorial Day flood in their car overnight at a parking garage. Then, her
husband totaled his car in a separate storm in a flooded underpass, and then they drove in the
aftermath of Imelda through flooded streets (Swartz, 2019). One Allison driver described a
sense of immunity from the dangers of driving in extreme flooding, “We think ‘hell it’s just
another thunderstorm’ or ‘we might lose a fence or tree but no reason to leave’ or we stock up on
booze and have hurricane parties or ‘I know my truck can make it through that puddle’
(Participant AA).
Social norms can be gleaned from the various types of memes posted during an extreme
flooding event. The following two memes below depicted in Figure 11 and 12 show people still
mobile during extreme flooding to go do normal activities at places very prevalent in Houston
such as Whataburger, a fast-food hamburger restaurant and H-E-B, a San Antonio based grocery
chain. The messages indicate that despite flooding, people still have the expectation they can go
out and do everyday activities.
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Figure 12 Whataburger Meme
James L. Smith Realtor, 2020 cited

Figure 11 HEB Meme
Melle-Johnson, 2020 cited

“Them Vs Me” Mentality
This glorification of making it despite dangerous conditions permeates the local culture.
When flooding from Tax Day 2016 devastated the area, the news reported a star for the Houston
Texans, the local professional football team, being able to make it to his scheduled workout
despite the dangerous flooded roads (Young, 2019). One driver during Allison commented that
he saw abandoned cars of “people unfamiliar with the route they took who had turned too early
at an intersection and went into a ditch they couldn’t see” after he had mentioned driving in more
than three feet of water himself (Participant AA). This meme in Figure 13 was posted on an
insurance agents page to advertise for insurance during Hurricane season.
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Figure 13 Meme Used by Car Insurance Agent in Houston (Youragentjet3, 2020).

This sentiment of acceptance was expressed in an editorial for Texas Monthly, where the
writer described, “There’s now a soporific sameness to it all. With more frequent storms, it’s
déjà vu all over again: Again, the underpasses with only the tops of cars, trucks, or buses visible”
(Swartz, 2019). In fact, during Harvey, one news reporter said, “this could be psychology and
we warn of this saying we are going to get through most of the weekend without any trouble and
you will think we missed Harvey because it will have made landfall… the problem is this thing
is stalling to the west.” He then warned the rain could stretch for as long as a week, but people
might not heed the warning (KHOU-TV, 2017).

Risky Drivers
It is important to review how dangerous Houston drivers are on ordinary days with no
extreme rainfall. If drivers are risky in general, this can make the risk greater during extreme
flooding. The state of Texas is above the national average for fatality rates in car wrecks and this
is also true for fatalities that have an alcohol-impaired driver (National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 2020). Harris County leads the state in fatality rates (National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 2020). The Houston Chronicle analyzed data from the National Highway
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Traffic Safety Administration from 2001 to 2016 and compared Houston to the other top 11
metropolitan areas in the country and found that Houston recorded the most roadway fatalities
per capita and miles traveled (Begley & Barned-Smith, Out of Control: Houstons roads, drivers
are country's most deadly, 2018).
While social norms may influence people’s beliefs that drivers are responsible for
totaling their cars in extreme weather or dying, there is a disconnect between this and recording
it as a transportation safety issue. The latest transportation safety report from the U.S.
Department of Transportation does not factor in rain or flooding in their 2018 Fatal Motor
Vehicle Crashes report, the latest published to date (National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 2020). The Houston-Galveston Area Council (HGAC) is a regional organization
that tackles local issues such as economic, health and safety. Their transportation safety program
released two reports in 2018, the Adopted Regional Safety Plan and the State of Safety Report.
The Adopted Regional Safety Plan does not mention rain or flooding at all (Houston-Galveston
Area Council, 2018). In the State of Safety Report, they do mention twice that rain is less than
ten percent of a factor in traffic safety incidents (Houston-Galveston Area Council, 2018).
One interviewee had an interesting response when I asked how she learned of driving in
floodwater. She said, “Just the obvious. I mean it’s just not safe, right? You know people have
died and wrecked or whatever,” yet she also described her driving experience of not being able
to see in front of her and driving through standing water (Participant Y). The interviews
indicated people took risky behaviors whether or not they acknowledged the risk. Risky driving
appears to have occurred more with the male participants in this dissertation than the female
population, which may explain why more men have died in these events than females. However,
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more females reported an unsafe outcome to their driving experience than the males that I
interviewed as seen in Table 6 below.
Table 6 – Outcome of those Interviewed by Gender

Gender
Female
Male
Total

Body
Engine Stranded Totaled
Damage Damage
Car
1
9
2
6
0
4
1
7
1
13
3
13

One man I interviewed drove through five of the selected storms and said that all he
“drove through was kind of like your everyday like flash flood driving job” (Participant YY).
This indicates his belief that there are some flash floods that are safe to drive in, even though the
named storms he had driven during where dangerous and caused deaths.
Others mentioned to me their youth caused them to take risks they now would not do.
One from Allison described being 19 at the time and “foolishly didn’t take storms serious” when
she went to go shoot pool with her friends despite her mother pleading for her to stay home
(Participant S). One respondent in her twenties ventured out during Harvey to celebrate her
birthday while her parents also urged her to stay home (Participant RR). A young driver in
Imelda described her terror of driving because she only had her license for four months and how
she is still affected by the fear (Participant CCCC).

Accepted Driving Methods
Those interviewed indicated there were certain acceptable behaviors to driving during
extreme flooding. These influence their actions on the road even though many of the behaviors
could contribute to them dying or having vehicle damage or loss. Several norms were indicated
for safely driving through water such as following other vehicles, controlling speed, checking
depth of water, using the correct size vehicle, and knowing the local roads.
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Many of the respondents, especially men, described the importance of knowing how to
drive through water and knowing the capabilities of your own vehicle. One man, who served in
the Lebanese Army, attributed his ability to drive through water based on his military training.
He stated that he does not fear his own driving or outcome, but that of those driving around him
and is more concerned with their skills impacting his driving. He said there was no danger to
drive “because I know when it’s dangerous and I know exactly how much a car can handle as
well as a truck” (Participant QQ). Another male driver described turning off his radio so that he
could hear his tires on the pavement (Participant LL). One lady described driving slow with her
door open in a lifted truck to ensure that she would make it ok (Participant HHHH).
Following Others
One behavior pattern people use to judge safety is by watching to see if the car before
them made it through water on the roadway (KHOU-TV, 2017). This was mentioned multiple
times in my interview though my questions had not prompted them. One driver during Imelda
said the reason he remained safe; “the strategy that kind of helped me get out was basically only
driving where I saw a car as a similar height going” (Participant W). A driver in Harvey cited
the reason he totaled his car because he had no one to follow and see the depth. He said there
were other cars behind him compelling him to try and he said immediately the water began
“picking up the car and kind of moving it” (Participant LLL). Several stated that following
larger trucks helped clear their path to successfully drive through standing water.
Following others was not only cited as a deciding factor of going through water, but it
also was mentioned when changing a route. One driver in Imelda said as the water continued to
rise at his intersection, he saw other drivers driving on the grass to prevent their cars from being
flooded and he followed their pattern and parked his on the grass (Participant I). A driver during
Memorial Day flood described having two options as some chose to turn around at an
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intersection and others chose to make a new route to drive around the water. She followed the
path of those with larger trucks because she was driving an SUV (Participant WWW). Others
expressed not driving through water when they only saw larger cars than theirs drive through the
water (Participant TT).
Slow Speed
Most of those interviewed that described safe ways to drive in extreme flooding said that
a slow speed in water was necessary. They described two different reasons this was important:
not causing a wake to flood surrounding business and homes and not allowing water to splash
into the engine and potentially cause engine failure. The argument regarding the wake seems to
place value over property versus that of the life-threatening condition it places the driver in by
driving through the water. In my social media posts that recruited people for interviews, many
replied to the forum describing the nuisance of drivers causing additional water to go into their
homes. One person messaged me privately and said “the big wheel pickup gentlemen love to
speed flooded streets to produce a wake of water that may flood homes otherwise not flooded.
Really sick behavior.” As streets are designed to flood to preserve homes, this observation
negates the true reality that it is more dangerous for the driver who is at a lower elevation and
driving through the water than the value of the home.
However, several men interviewed that do rescues during these events agreed that driving
slowly was best, “Contrary to what a lot of the general public thinks, [driving in water is]
something that has to be done with some deliberation and foresight because you don’t just get in
the water and drive fast” (Participant GG). Another rescuer described driving slow as especially
important at night due to low visibility and the importance to “just take your time. It’s a walking
speed. Just you drive at a walking speed. That’s all you got to do” (Participant N).
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Increasing speed
Other drivers differ on the slower speed and claim increasing speed enhanced their ability
to successfully drive through water. One driver described successfully navigating his vehicle
through Harvey water because he “had to lower the windows and keep pressing the accelerator
until I finally got out of that street” (Participant KKKK).
Check Depth of Water
A man that drove through Allison stated the importance of watching the flow of the water
and checking the depth of it by finding trees or street signs to determine depth. He did state that
a person should know the area and neighborhood streets to accurately assess the depth, but even
this is a risk because he stated that “after you’ve done it a few times, you kind of know how deep
you get with your own vehicle” (Participant F).
Size of Vehicle Matters
Many people based their driving behavior on the size of their vehicle. They believe if
they have a bigger vehicle, they are safer in these extreme flooding events. One driver who has
only driven in larger vehicles said it is a matter of “knowing your limitations” (Participant GG).
A driver during Allison commented that he would never own a car for daily use in the Houston
area because of flooding. He did have a sports car, but only used it for special driving occasions
(Participant F). While a larger vehicle can go through deeper water, it does seem to embolden
some drivers to taking extra risk as one stated “I got into my truck and figured I would be okay
to drive around since my truck was high enough to get through all of the water” (Participant E).
This was during Harvey, which was worst rain event of this selected study. Others cited having
a bigger truck and watching others around them to base their decisions. One person stated that
he drove to pick someone up during Harvey but doubted that they would make the decision today
as they are in a smaller car. Another driver stated that she and her fiancé were warned not to
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drive through standing water from a guy in a big truck after he looked at the backseat and saw
her children there (Participant HH).
The bigger is better philosophy was not unanimous among those interviewed. One cited
that he had always owned a Volkswagen Beatle and drove “just fine” in events around Houston,
though he did indicate having ruined a car in a flood before (Participant GGG). Another small
car owner “consider[s] my little Toyota Camry to be heavy duty to navigate around and survive a
lot of these Houston floods” (Participant KKKKK). Another one described driving in water as
non-threatening “unless I suck water in the motor. Can’t really mess it up” (Participant UUU).
Local Knowledge
Others attributed their success to knowing the roads or someone guiding them that did. A
mother and daughter were stuck in an unfamiliar area during Allison and parked at a locally
owned pizza delivery shop. Being in 2001, this was prior to smartphones and direction
applications, so they asked the owner of the shop, and he was able to map a route for them based
on his knowledge of the bad roads in the area (Participant GGG). A driver in Harvey that was
new to the area and hurricanes found herself in a dangerous spot to drive and called her friend
who had her husband guide her until she got home because he had lived in the area his whole life
and knew the better routes (Participant BBB).
Many described their choice in route based on their knowledge of roads that they knew
would be flooded. Some still expressed surprise that their route still had water on the road they
had selected based on it not previously flooding. Others discussed the hazards that came from
people driving on unfamiliar routes. One witnessed a driver wreck his 18-wheeler truck because
he was in a parking lot and unaware of the ditches in front due to water covering the parking lot
and ditches equally (Participant GG). Another rescuer described how manholes in streets can
pop up and disable a vehicle. He stated that if you were unfamiliar enough with the street that
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you may not consider that or speed bumps when driving and really do damage to the engine or
get stranded. He then recounted a story of a driver doing such and becoming stranded in the
rescuer’s driveway during a storm with oil pooling over the water Participant N. A driver in
multiple events from the storm described his local knowledge as maybe his only risk; “have I
learned not to drive in water of unknown depth- not entirely. I’ll still push it, based on my
knowledge of the road (much better than it was back then) and indicators of depth. I am aware
of places that get fatally deep, and I wouldn’t even consider driving there (Participant F). There
is also an air of superiority among those from Houston who scoff at the new people who move to
Houston and an assumption they are the drivers taking the risks; however, most of the victims
have lived in Houston for more than ten years as indicated in Graph 3 below.

Graph 3 Years Victims Lived in Houston

Judgement of Drivers
There is a belief that many who have been stranded in their vehicle due to flood water
deserved their fate. Judging those that do could perhaps stymy productive dialogue in
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understanding the problem and preventing it. During a live coverage of drivers stuck in Harvey,
one Facebook user commented “I don’t understand why people see water, and still try to drive
through (sic) it. Too many roads in Houston, go around (Live Look of flooding around Houston
area. Aug 27, 2017).

Figure 14 – Example of Social Media Comment Judging Drivers (ABC13 Houston (@abc13Houston), 2015).

The irony in figure 14 above is the following year, the Tax Day floods affected the northern
region mentioned in his comment and Jersey Village and the CyFair areas of Houston
experienced some of the highest water levels than other parts of Houston.
Others discuss how driver’s education has changed to where new drivers are not required
to learn how to maintain a car, such as change a tire. Others said the physics of operating a car
are left out of the curriculum now at the detriment of people being able to handle a car in adverse
situations such as dense traffic or inclement weather (Participant F). Some suggested that there
should be special courses at driver’s license renewal time for risky driving behavior.
Some have assumed that drivers do so only to be able to report their car damaged to
insurance claims. This was hard to measure as true or untrue based on those interviewed. Of the
97 people I interviewed, only 24 of them reported some issue with their car. Of those, 58% had
full coverage and 33 percent did not reveal their level of insurance coverage.
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Many people described the driver at complete fault for damages to their vehicle or life. Below in
Table 7 are some of the responses to me asking how flood warning systems or the government.
Table 7 Interviewees Describing Driver Fault

“I’m not really sure that there is much more than Houston can do to prevent it. … They’ve put
up the gauges under every bridge or every flood area. … They already have the campaign
Turn Around Don’t drown” (Participant QQQ).
“They think they can do anything, right? I mean, I just couldn’t believe that guy went through
that water that I know that I worked with. I was like, dude, you couldn’t see that” (Participant
BBB).
“The road-side programmable traffic signs do a fair job. They tend to be somewhat nonspecific, and warn of general threats, with catch phrases, and not always specific instances”
(Participant D).
“I think [the government does] try. It’s just like with the virus [COVID 19], some don’t take it
seriously. Does not matter how much you try to tell them; they will go try to drive through it
anyway” (Participant B).
“When people actually listen and obey rules when there are warnings. If there are signs that
say, ‘turn around and don’t drown’ people should take that serious and save themselves”
(Participant XXX).
“I’m not sure because honestly, I’ve seen a video of the professor driving around barricades
and obviously high water. There’s just some people you can’t help. I mean, I don’t think the
city is doing a bad job of alerting people to high water” (Participant CCC).
“If you don’t listen, you’re not going to learn why. Right?” (Participant C).
“People ignore signs of flooding and drive out due to not believing they will be stuck or
because they have to go to work” (Participant GGGG).

Despite this, there was one rescuer that I interviewed who described the phenomenon
differently, “It’s just not that people are stupid….Most people can get around and they get to
work every day, buy groceries. They’re not that dumb. They just don’t have the experience”
(Participant N).
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Self -Blame
Many of the drivers that experienced engine failure, or a total vehicle loss completely
took ownership of their action. They disagreed that anything could have been done by others to
prevent the events. One driver in Allison who drove through over three feet of water and was
stranded for over 10 hours stated that warning systems are good enough but that “it would have
been my own fault if anything had happened to me” (Participant AA). One driver totaled his car
in a flash flood that is much smaller than the selected storms but is known as the Halloween 2015
flood because it occurred on October 31st of that year. The flood warnings for this were last
minute and he was unaware of the storm. He drove a car through his neighborhood and totaled it
six months before it would have been paid in full and he blamed himself completely calling his
own actions stupid (Participant CC).

74

Summary
Below in Table 8, a summary of common social norms found in my dissertation research
are listed. To have people’s norm shift from this as being a problem that can be solved would be
the first step towards meaningful change, however, in order to do so would require investments
into infrastructure. This would involve higher taxes to fit the budget to make the improvements.
This would take an extra step to educate the public in the importance of the money investment to
help solve the problem. The Netherlands is a country below sea level that has led the world in
flood mitigation structure, but it also has a population that supports this by paying a national
flood tax (Blackburn, 2019). While social norms indicate blaming the driver, a changing tide of
opinion will be necessary for government to do more to mitigate these hazards.

Table 8 Findings About Social Norms.

Social Norms About Driving During Extreme Flooding
Houston flooding is part of life
Driver invincibility due to tenure in Houston
Risky Driving Behavior
Knowing the Difference between the Right and Wrong Way to Drive
Drivers with totaled cars and/or death completely at fault
People drive through floodwater for insurance claims

CHAPTER 6
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE & MITIGATION TO FLOODED
ROADWAYS
With an established risk of people driving in the Greater Houston area during an extreme
flooding event, how the government mitigates this risk is significant to aiding in the decline of
this trend that Texas has unfortunately led with most deaths in the nation annually since 1959
(Sharif, Hossain, Jackson, & Bin-Shafique, 2012). There appears to be missed opportunities for
collaboration between emergency management and transportation officials. While streets are
designed to flood to protect structures, Harris County Flood Control District was established to
manage the county’s waterways and improve drainage. The county has invested in technology to
improve transportation warnings.

Missed Opportunities for Collaboration
Local government has missed opportunities for emergency management and
transportation departments to collaborate to address the risks of driving during extreme flooding.
The latest transportation safety report from the Houston Galveston Area Council (HGAC), the
agency that provides safety and performance measures to receive state and federal funding,
briefly mentions inclement weather in six places of its sixty-page report. Each time, it minimizes
the impact that weather has on the safety of drivers, when this is an opportunity to write a brief
statement of the dangers that flooding will have for drivers on the roadway and coordinate better
with emergency response (Houston-Galveston Area Council, 2018).
In the HGAC Regional Safety Plan, adverse weather or flooding conditions are not
mentioned at all (Houston-Galveston Area Council, 2018). In the Living with Houston Flooding
report, Blackburn states “it is difficult to give definitive advice about street flooding in all areas.
75
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The best way to learn about an area’s accessibility is to talk to your neighbors. … Most of us
who have lived here for a while have a general idea of which routes are better during intense
rains” (Blackburn, Living with Houston Flooding, 2017, pp. 24-25). This contradicts what I
have discovered about them living here as seen in Graph 3 of Chapter 5. After Hurricane
Harvey, the Harris County Judge Ed Emmett spoke to the Texas House Transportation
Congressional Committee about the disruption of freight due to flooding and abandoned vehicles
on the interstate system in Harris County rather than local roads and their safety (Begley, 2018).

Driver Education
The state of Texas allows for residents to apply for a driver’s license at the age of 18.
This license is valid for eight years. Drivers ages 15 to 17 can apply for a provisional license
once they have completed driver’s education. Drivers between the ages of 18-24 must complete
a driver’s education program if it is their first instance of pursuing a license (Texas Department
of Public Safety, 2021). Initial applicants must also pass a written test and the State of Texas
provides a handbook of traffic laws and safety regulations. The handbook does instruct drivers
to use headlights and a slower speed when driving in special situations such as rain (Texas
Department of Public Safety, 2017, p. 50). Despite leading the nation in vehicle related deaths
during flooding events, the handbook does not provide much information about flooding in the
handbook. Much of the information provided describes the physics of driving in water as well as
promotion of the federal initiative “Turn Around Don’t Drown” as shown in Figure 15 below.
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Figure 15 Information in the TX Driver Handbook regarding flooding (Texas Department of Public Safety, 2017, p. 53).

Traffic Safety signs are covered in the handbook as well. However, it is not a
comprehensive list of all the signs used throughout the state for safety. Interestingly, it does not
include information about roadside flood gauges or water on the roadway. It does include a sign
warning of hydroplaning on a wet road (Texas Department of Public Safety, 2017, pp. 29-32).

Street Design
The streets in Harris County are designed to flood. Most of the man-made waterways are
designed to handle the water, but the drainage systems for the streets cannot handle much rain
(KPRC-TV, 2015). The goal is for them to drain the water away from homes (KHOU-TV,
2017). When the rain causes high rain levels on the elevated freeways, this only increases water
amounts at exits and roads underneath to an even more unsafe route (Watson, 2001). However,
the streets and highways are designed with a 100-year flood, but we are seeing recurring flooding
at levels higher than that (Blackburn, 2019).
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Another issue that flooding contributes to roadways is the destruction of the asphalt base.
Many times, this is undetected by the driver when they are going through water and can increase
their risk, but the damage can also be undetermined even when the water drains away, and cars
are then put back on the road. Concrete roads typically withstand the water damage better than
those with asphalt. Like many storms after it, the Great Flood of 1994 had many major
thoroughfares closed for several weeks to repair road damages brought by torrential rain
(Greene, 1994). Some of the streets, especially in the downtown area are previous constructed
aqueducts meant to channel water from neighborhoods, such as Stamford Street that leads to
Allen Parkway (KHOU-TV, 2017). Population growth has caused repurposing of flood control
and transportation networks that will cause problem areas during an extreme flooding event.
While there has been a design and almost acceptance that the streets will flood, freeways
are also flooding. These freeways are part of the interstate highway system and are designed for
supplies and people to enter and exit the city efficiently. In an interview with Houston Public
Media, Blackburn argued that there needs to be a warning system that works in tandem with a
system that forces passengers off flooded freeways, and places responsibility on the state and
federal government to help with this as the interstate system is their jurisdiction (Blackburn,
2019). However, the locations where the deaths occurred in my selected storms indicated the
Interstates are the least dangerous during floods as described in Chapter 9 of this dissertation.

Drainage
The Greater Houston area has two major New Deal reservoirs built to the west of
Houston in response to major flooding to downtown during 1929 and December 1935. This was
to relieve the Buffalo Bayou from flooding which flows in a west to east direction through
Downtown Houston. As populations grew alongside the reservoirs and the rest of Houston, these
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reservoirs are no longer able to prevent biblical proportions of rain (Harris County Engineering
Department, 2020). There are over 2,500
miles of waterways that flow through Harris
County and there are twenty-two watersheds
as shown in Figure 16 (Harris County Flood
Control District, 2020). Keeping water from
ponding after an extreme rain event is
Figure 16 Network of waterways through Harris County
(Harris County Flood Control District, 2020)

challenging, and that is why infrastructure is
designed for the streets to flood in order to

preserve homes. As a result of the Great Flood of 1935, the Harris County Flood Control
District (HCFCD) was also organized by the Texas Legislature in 1937 and is governed by the
Harris County Commissioners Court. This organization has developed stormwater detentions to
help store excess rain fall so channels are not overburdened with the water. With a flat
topography, most of the stormwater detentions are excavated to store the water when needed;
however, as these are placed in the region, new development projects for residential and
commercial purposes are placed alongside them with the idea that the stormwater detentions will
help mitigate from potential flooding.
Drainage will impact the roadways during flooding events, and the largest project to
mitigate this is Build Houston Forward (formerly known as ReBuild Houston) that was passed
by Houston voters in 2010 as Proposition One. The program, run by the Houston Public Works
Department, is structured to collect funds from property taxes based on the number of
impervious surfaces as well as a portion of money from Houston Metro, the public transportation
system as well as federally awarded dollars to Texas Department of Transportation.
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Since the 1980s, Harris County has employed detention regulations to help mitigate
flooding potential known as “No Adverse Impacts” (NAI) in which new development should not
increase flooding upstream or downstream. HCFCD requires detention pond design to be based
on a minimum of 24 hours storm. This policy has proven fallible because the regulations to
underestimate the runoff from new development and therefore overestimate detention required
(Dunbar, Glenn, Gonzalez, & Bedient, 2019). In 2018, both Harris County and the City of
Houston adopted new measures to combat this by requiring new structures and significant
improvement to structures to use elevation based on 500-year flood plains. Previously,
structures had to be at 12” higher than the 100-year flood plain benchmark, now they will require
it at 24” above the 500-year flood plain (Houston Permitting Center, 2020 & Harris County
Engineering Department, 2020).
Project Brays
Harris County Flood Control District has partnered with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to mitigate flooding risk on Brays Bayou in a project called Brays Bayou Federal
Flood Damage Reduction Project, also known as Project Brays. This project will modify the
channels to allow for more stormwater to be held by the bayou, improved bridges, and the
creation of stormwater detention basins. The project is divided into four segments along the
length of Brays Bayou as shown in Figure 17 below (Harris County Flood Control District,
2020). Brays Bayou, however, receives a lot more funding as a predominately white
demographic than other watersheds such as Greens Bayou (Harris County Budget Management
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Department, 2021). Greens Bayou watershed also represents significantly more deaths than any
other watershed as will be discussed in Chapter 9.

Figure 17 Map of the Planned Segment Upgrades to Brays Bayou

(Harris County Flood Control District, 2020).

One of the goals from this would be to reduce the amount of high water on feeder roads and
other roads near Interstate 45 in the first segment of the project (Poirier & Radtke Russell, 2019).

Barricades
Due to urban sprawl, the transportation network has many underpasses that are several
feet deep. Underpasses have caused deaths during extreme flooding despite the flood gauges
present. It is important that these underpasses are barricaded during extreme flooding. After the
Memorial Day floods, the city of Houston had added early warning systems of high-water
sensors and flashing lights at nineteen locations with a plan to install eight more. They had
originally planned on also using wooden gates that drop down to block flooded roads, but after
the first one was installed and implemented, a driver tried to drive past it and crashed into it
(Associated Press, 2016). The ditched effort of adding wooden gates to underpasses was
criticized by the husband whose wife died during the Tax Day Floods (KHOU Staff, 2016).
During Harvey, Harris County Judge Ed Emmett reported that all the underpass locations
where people have died were barricaded to avoid the trap for drivers (KHOU-TV, 2017). This
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had been promised after two Tax Day Flood related deaths in 2016 that occurred at different
parts of the same underpass because deaths had also occurred near this area in the Galleria during
Memorial Day Floods the preceding year. Judge Ed Emmett also promised to have local
deputies stationed at other flood locations and vowed to work with City of Houston officials and
state of Texas officials to place more barriers for future flooding (Associated Press, 2016).
When the Addicks Reservoir was force flooded during Harvey to prevent it from collapsing, the
TXDOT put temporary dams up on interstate 10 to try to prevent flood water from spilling onto
the freeway as shown in Figure 18 below.

Figure 18 Workers for the Texas Department of Transportation Construct a Temporary Dam to stop water from Addicks
Reservoir flooding Interstate Ten (Shapley, 2018).

Transportation Technology
Allison caused over $5 million dollars in Houston’s transportation system and caused
Houston TranStar to revamp the network to account for flooding hazards. Placement of closedcircuit television cameras were moved from under freeways to higher levels (Wegmann,
Bausher, Jackson, & Wahl, 2003). Their scope of emergency response during flooding would
expand as the years progressed with more historic flooding. One-person recounted riding to
Lakewood church the morning after Allison pummeled the city and said, “it’s the eeriest ride
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I’ve ever been on. The sun was coming up, and you looked out on the streets and the highways,
it looked like we had been at war. There was literally hundreds and thousands of cars flooded
everywhere” (Flood of a Lifetime, 2001).

Houston Floodway Warning System
In 2018, the Houston TranStar system implemented a new Flood Warning System for
local roadways through a federal program Transportation Investment Generating Economic
Recovery (TIGER) Grant (City of Houston, 2017). TIGER grants were introduced in 2009 to
provide federal financial aid to local projects through the United States Department of
Transportation to provide improvements to both freight and transportation networks through all
modes of street, rail, and port networks. The federal program
was renamed to the Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage
Development (BUILD) program in 2018 (United States
Department of Transportation, 2021). This program
improved the Dynamic Message Signs (DMS) on Freeways as

Figure 19 Dynamic Message Sign in
Houston, TX

well as coordination with Harris County Flood Control
District on water levels. An example of the DMS is shown in Figure 19 above. The HRFWS
also included adding new roadway flood signs at 40 locations and new technology for water to
move more efficiently during an extreme weather event.
Mobile Real-Time Flood Alerts
Previously, the water level at highways was reportable, but this initiative will allow for
more warning on neighborhood roads. While the levels on highways were reportable due to
cameras and sensors on the highways, the TranStar mapping will incorporate data collected from
Harris County Flood Control District’s rainfall flood gauges to give a better picture of flooded on
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local streets and roads (Gill, 2018). There will be a camera component to this system that uses
guided wave radar sensors to detect high water and will notify the local dispatchers, closest fire
stations and the city’s Office of Emergency Management of the high water detected on the
roadway (Bennett, 2018). All of this information feeds into TranStar and is available to the
public to use to build their navigation route and will notify them of any dangerous high water
along their route. This was available to users during the Imelda storm to help navigate flooded
highways.
While this is a step in the right direction, it does not reach a broad audience based on the
interviews I conducted. Only two people, a man aged 46 and one aged 65, cited using Houston
TranStar. More people used either Google Maps or Waze to check for better routes during
extreme flooding; however, the Houston TranStar Application does have the capability of
building a localized route with the radar as a layer and roadway flooding as another layer as seen
in the figure 20 below.

Figure 20 Flooding Risks on Harris County Roadways from Houston TranStar (Houston Transtar, 2020).

Perhaps a better initiative to inform the public of how this could help is necessary. Many
interviewed described the frustration of their chosen smartphone application not being dynamic
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enough to the changing situation of added water on the road. It is also perhaps necessary to
educate people on when they will most likely be impacted by showing the direct relation to roads
by bayous.
Houston Roadway Flood Warning System (HRFWS) Locations
The TIGER grant also includes adding new roadway signs to 40 locations in the Harris
County area. Below is Map 2 of the locations that will have the new signage, and many have
already been installed at locations.

Map 2 Locations of Flood Signal Warnings

Of the proposed 40 locations, three of the locations are where victims from my study
died: Ranchester at Westpark Tollway, Will Clayton at I-69, and Studemont. These new signs
will replace flood gates that drivers drove around and replace the system of yellow flashing
lights. Signs will be placed higher for better visibility and will change the color to red from
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yellow (Bennett, 2018). Below Figures 21 & 22 depict pictures of flood warning roadway signs
installed at the 1700 block of Studemont in the City of Houston where a victim perished in the
Memorial Day Flash Flood of
2015.
Figure 21 Road May Flood Sign with
Flashing Lights

Figure 22 High Water When Flashing Sign

Figures 23 and 24 explain the activation
process used by HRFWS during extreme weather events. It will be activated based on the
sensors located to detect water levels and will change from cautionary yellow to red once the
level reaches the curb and crosses all lanes as seen in Figure 33 below because they are
considered at grade locations.
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Figure 23 HRFWS Process to Change Lights and Warn Drivers of Flooded at Grade Locations (Houston Public Works, 2020).

The process works differently at underpass locations because they require pump stations and
backflow preventors to also begin the process of pumping water out of the tunnel as indicated in Figure
34. The hierarchy changes as well because it involves state and county transportation levels of
government, whereas the other locations will be governed by municipal entities.
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Figure 24 HRFWS Process to Change Lights and Warn Drivers of Flooded Underpasses

While the city and county have established the 500-year flood as the new requirement as
mentioned earlier in this chapter, this will not necessarily occur with the placement of this roadway
warning system. Some of the equipment would require raising to fifteen feet, but the City of Houston
told contractors that “it is not the City’s intent to raise existing equipment to meet the 500-year
floodplain” (City of Houston Public Works, 2020).

Decisions to Postpone or Cancel Events
Some of the deaths that have occurred in these storms were due in part to leaving or
going to a crowded event. Flash flood warnings cannot be effective if major events are still
occurring because this allows doubt of danger to become a factor in deciding to drive during
extreme weather. During the Memorial Day Flood, an elderly couple and their daughter were
rescued from their stranded car only for the elderly couple to die after the boat capsized. They
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had been out during the rainstorm because they had left their grandchild’s high school graduation
(Barned-Smith & Tolson, 2015).
Many were out in the rain, “Right now at 45 and I10, you can see that this long line of
cars is only getting longer, and other rain has stopped. But we check the radar, and it looks like
there is more on the way. So, this is definitely a very sticky situation here. People are getting
very frustrated leaving their cars walking around asking us…when this is going to end and to be
honest with you…we’re just waiting like everybody else” (KPRC-TV, 2015). There was also a
Houston Rockets game, the city’s professional basketball team, that evening with many
spectators and some sports players staying all night to avoid the dangers of driving in the storm
(KPRC-TV, 2015). Figure 35 below shows numbers of people who were attending special
events. They were during the flash flood of Memorial Day, which occurred on a holiday
weekend as well as Tropical Storm Allison, which had less exact weather prediction science.
A 21-year-old intern who had just moved to Houston two weeks prior to Allison died
despite emergency personnel trying to save him because he and two friends were set to attend a
concert. He died only a block from his residence (Flood Victim: Chad Green, 2001). One lady
who experienced engine damage by driving during Tropical Storm Imelda expressed to me that
schools had not closed for the day, and this impacted her decision to drive her children to school
and then later to a doctor’s appointment. Only after losing power during the doctor’s
appointment did, she realize the rainstorm as a threat to her children not being entertained and
felt desperate to make the drive home. She drove through water that caused extensive damage to
her vehicle. She then answered my question of how flood warning systems could be improved
as stating the importance of deciding the dangers of extreme flooding based on school closures
(Participant K).
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Summary
Harris County has made strides to mitigate vehicle related deaths due to extreme
flooding. There are several ways that the government does so, and the main programs are
including below in Table 9. Another way in which the government can mitigate deaths through
the Flood Warning Systems as covered next in Chapter Seven.
Table 9 Findings About Government Action.

Current Methods of Government Mitigation
Street Design to Save Homes
Addicks and Barker Reservoirs
Established Harris County Flood Control District
Build Houston Forward / Proposition One
“No Adverse Impacts” Drainage
Drainage Projects by Watershed
Temporary Barricades During Rain Event
Houston Roadway Flood Warning System (HRFWS)

CHAPTER 7
FLOOD WARNING SYSTEMS (FWS) AND DRIVERS
Mitigating flood fatalities is mentioned after every storm. With the Great Flood of 1994,
concern was addressed for the likelihood of more extreme rainfall events to occur, and that loss
of life would only lessen with better technology to prevent storms and improved warning
systems (Yung & Barrett, 1995). In the conclusion of the Allison Service Assessment,
NOAA/US Department of Commerce, responsible for warning the public, expressed lack of
comprehension for the deaths that occurred (National Weather Service, 2001, p. 24). However,
more deaths would come in future storms and the amount of extreme flooding would increase
after the landfall of Allison in 2001. The complacency of the statement in placing blame on the
public rather than understanding the motivations of the general population and better ways to
prevent this in flood warning systems would contribute to future deaths. As previously described
in the literature review, there is a disconnect between transportation policy and emergency
management (Mileti, 2004 & Mitsakis, Stamos, Diakakis, & Grau, 2014 & Terti, Ruin,
Anquetin, & Gourley, 2017). This chapter attempts to bridge that gap by offering how Flood
Warning Systems should factor in the driver experience. Much of the data provided in this
chapter is not traditionally seen in the broad warnings issued during flooding emergencies.
Sending a mixed message to the public can also contribute to more people venturing out
rather than staying in place. During the early broadcast of the Harvey rainfall arrival, a
meteorologist was being interviewed about the threats that could come from the rain, and in one
sentence expressed it was too early to tell how dangerous the storm would be, but then expressed
it was dangerous. He praised the national weather service for giving a strong message that the
91
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flooding would be historic, but said “we are still very early in this event…it is really hard to
wrap your head around what we could be dealing with until you start to see how quickly the rain
can fall….we could see periods and waves of rain” (KHOU-TV, 2017). When asked whether
people should be out in the storm, he said “I don’t think we are at that level yet. Right now, we
will be dealing with this feeder band. At this point we are taking it hour by hour” (KHOU-TV,
2017). He discusses water rescues that are currently being made and then states, “What we need
people to do right now is do not go out in drive where we see lots of water” (KHOU-TV, 2017).
Also, there is concern that the public has become desensitized to watches and warnings.
By improving Flood Warning Systems to alert the public in a more precise time frame of rain
and flooding as well as a more precise location of the major flooding may cause people to take
the warning more serious and impact her decision to stay in place (Mitchell, 2019). In July 2019,
the National Weather Service announced they would release fewer flood warnings and label
them as “considerable” or “catastrophic” to combat the problem of confusion or being
desensitized that people may have in not heeding warnings. The new program will also release
approximately 80 percent less flood warning systems (Childs, 2019).
While weather science has become more accurate, the advancements may not have been
explained effectively to the general public. One driver in Imelda said that the government
“prepares drivers very well. But drivers now don’t think it’s going to happen because sometimes
it happens and sometimes it doesn’t happen” (Participant WW). She mentioned getting so many
broad alerts for the region with extension of time notifications and no actual basis for where the
flooding is occurring in such a large space of land. Figure 25 below shows a broad flood
warning alert that was issued during the Tax Day Flash flood.
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Figure 25 Flood Warning System from Tax Day (Lindner J. , Tax Day Flood April 17-18,2016 Harris County, Texas, 2016).

Increased Risks
Knowing some factual circumstances from the drivers that perished and the retelling of
survivors’ experiences, there are specific known risks that can increase a person’s chances of
becoming trapped in a waterlogged vehicle such as visibility, damaged roads, length of rain
event, distractions, intensity of rain event, interruption of rain event and speed of water.
Visibility
Poor visibility can contribute to more deaths. Most of the 22 deaths from Tropical Storm
Allison occurred after midnight and during the night of Saturday, June 9, 2001, (National
Weather Service, 2001). During a telecast for Harvey, a newsperson urged people to stay off the
road and showed a frontage road at the Interstate Loop 610 and Westpark Tollway, “you can’t
see it. You could drive right into this. That is seven feet deep? And how tall is a car? Maybe
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five feet? That’s over my head. We’ve had people lose their life in a situation like this.”
(KHOU-TV, 2017). During Allison, a news camera caught a man driving his truck through
standing water and stall out in the water during heavy rain during the dark night. When the man
escaped the truck, he told the news reporter that he did not see the water that was up to his chest.
He had been called into work at a local hospital and when he saw the flashing lights and news
truck, he thought there had been a bad traffic accident ahead, never imaging it was a flooded
road (Flood of a Lifetime, 2001). When Harvey initially hit on Saturday night, meteorologist
Jeff Lindner for the Harris County Flood Control District, discussed that at 9:30 at night, most
water rescues were made by stalled vehicle rather than people in flooded homes. Due to poor
visibility, many of the rescues were drivers (KHOU-TV, 2017). One Harvey driver, interviewed
for this research, described driving on Interstate Ten around ten at night. She said that the
freeway and streetlights that normally help see the roads were out due to power outages and with
the rain as heavy as it was, her headlights were not enough to see the road in front of her
(Participant EEEE). Graph 4 below shows that the majority of deaths occurred between 5 pm
and 6:59 am when it is darker outside. The raw data for this can be found in Appendix 5.
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Time of Death
Day 7 am -459 pm, Night 5 pm - 659 am

17%

83%

Day

Night

Graph 4 Deaths Occurring in the Day versus Night

Of the 71 deaths studied in these flood event, almost 75% of the deaths occurred between
the hours of 5 pm and 6 am, when there is less visibility. Both the Tax Day Flood and Tropical
Storm Imelda share the same amount of rainfall in a 6-hour period, with Tropical Storm Imelda’s
at a slightly higher threshold for 24 hours as shown in Table 10. Both are considered in the
exceedance probability of a 100-year flood.
Table 10 Rainfall per Inch Comparison of Tax Day and TS Imelda (Lindner, 2019).

Storm Event
6-hr 24-hr
Tax Day 2016
13.5 17.4
Tropical Storm Imelda 2019 13.1 21.1

While the Tax Day Flood occurred primarily in the late night and early morning hours, the heavy
rains of Imelda occurred during the late morning/ midday hours, and consequently, the amount of
deaths in the Tax Day Flood could be higher due than Imelda due to poor visibility. This could
further be argued in comparing Tropical Storm Imelda to the death rate of other tropical storms,
since flash floods, such as Tax Day, have a lower threshold of deaths. The exceedance
probability of flooding in Harris County during Tropical Storm Imelda is much less than
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Tropical Storm Allison and Hurricane Harvey were however, the most rainfall from Allison
occurred in evening hours versus daylight hours as seen in Table 12.
Table 11 Exceedance Probability Comparison (Lindner, 2019)

Storm Event
Tropical Storm
Allison 2001
Hurricane
Harvey 2017
Tropical Storm
Imelda 2019
Average

15- 30min min
2.3 4.1

1-hr

2-hr

3-hr

6-hr

12-hr

24-hr

2-day

4-day

6.5

9.9

13.6

21.2

28.3

28.5

28.7

38.5

2.0

3.6

6.8

11.8

14.8

18.9

20.9

28.6

35.2

47.4

2.1

3.8

6.4

9.2

10

13.1

17.6

21.1

29.1

29.7

2.1

3.8

6.6

10.3

12.8

17.7

22.3

26.1

31.0

38.5

During daytime Imelda, one person I interviewed said she couldn’t recall seeing police or
barricades “because you couldn’t even see in front of you. So even if there was one, they
wouldn’t have any of those things because of the rain” (Participant Y).
Damaged Roads
Another factor of visibility is the unknown condition of the road covered in water. Many
times, the water causes significant damage to the integrity of the roads, and this is not visible to
the driver. One of the deaths in the 1994 storm was due to a truck that stalled in a roadway that
was damaged with a collapsed culvert, causing the water depth to be deeper than what was
visible (Teachey, 1994). During Harvey, a sinkhole developed south of Houston that caused a
road of five lanes to collapse that would not be visible during heavy rain or at night (KHOUTV/WFAA-TV, 2017). Allison claimed two victims who abandoned their vehicle and walked
through broken pavement to be dropped several feet into the flooded bayou (O'Hare, 2001).
Figure 26 below shows the road destruction that occurred on Interstate 10 after Tropical Storm
Allison in 2001.
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Figure 26 Road Destruction After Allison on Interstate Ten (Ueckert, 2019).

Length of Rain Event
Storms that last longer increase the risk of more people dying. Tropical Storm Allison
did not experience any flood related deaths during the first three days of rain (National Weather
Service, 2001). The Memorial Day Flood occurred during one of the wettest months in Texas
history, with some areas getting at least ten days straight of rain. This led to bodies of water with
higher levels and saturated soil with no room for absorption of more rain (Barned-Smith, 2015).
Tropical Storm Imelda’s deaths occurred on the third and last day of the rain event.
Distractions
This can be measured less concretely, but it can factor in a person’s survival rate. During
Tax Day, a woman drove past an exit with temporary barricades into twenty feet of water. She
had her cell phone in her hand trying to wave the worker placing barricades to save her, and this
could have influenced her driving past the barricades (Associated Press, 2016). Also, during Tax
Day, two drivers that did not survive, placed phone calls to relatives as they became trapped in
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their vehicles. It is hard to determine if they placed these when it was too late to escape or if this
potentially distracted them from the little time, they had to exit their vehicle (KHOU Staff,
2016). One of them called her husband and described what she thought were police lights. It
could have been the lights from the car behind her that also became trapped (Malhotra, 2016).
Flood gates have been installed at the location now. During the Tax Day floods, a news reporter
became a rescuer of an elderly man on live television when the man drove into high water on
Interstate 10. The man escaped the vehicle and stayed with the vehicle asking the news reporter
what he should do. Those seconds of delays could have meant a worse fate had he not had
people around to help him out of the water (KTRK-TV Houston, 2016).
Panic and stress can distract drivers from successfully escaping. Amidst reporting
Tropical Storm Allison, a news reporter discovered a couple sitting in their flooded car. The
news reporter asks them to leave with her and expressed how fast the water was moving. While
the woman described relief at being rescued, the male driver questioned if it would be more
dangerous to leave the vehicle and said he was scared to leave the vehicle. As soon as the trio
reached higher ground, they turned, and the vehicle was completely underwater (Flood of a
Lifetime, 2001). A driver in the Great Flood of 1994 killed a pedestrian when he was attempting
to avoid high water and swerved his car (Johnson S. , 1994). One man I interviewed that had
done multiple rescues during storms described helping a woman and two children that had driven
into high water and as a side note explained that vehicles become a high priority rescue when
there are multiple calls because the distractions of the children can cause more judgement
mistakes in a high stress situation (Participant D). A driver during the 1994 flood that I
interviewed told me that during Hurricane Harvey, her stepfather was trapped on Interstate 10 for
about 24 hours in his flooded car and that when he was rescued by the Cajun Navy team, he was
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mentally not well. She and others had to instruct him several times to go with the rescuers. He
was incapable of deciding for himself to leave the car for safety (Participant B). A 62-year-old
man had a heart attack when he drove his van into flood water during the Great Flood of 1994,
and in a separate location, a man in his 70s died when his truck was submerged in water
(Teachey, 1994).
Intensity of Rain Event
During the Memorial Day Flood, the storm was a shorter rainstorm, but more intense.
While Flood Warning Systems had been issued and coverage in the news mentioned these Flood
Warning Systems, but it was a national holiday weekend with many people traveling and
possibly missing the warnings especially since many interviewed only check for traffic
congestion on workday. On the air, a reporter described his fear,
You know if you're in your house obviously your natural reaction when you see three
inches of water coming into your front door is you kind of start to panic. But the best
thing you can do is stay inside because you would much rather be in your home than in a
vehicle and you know Jeff on my way in from the Sugarland area around 1:00 o'clock in
the morning I saw about eight or 10 cars stranded and flooded out by Oyster Creek Park
on Highway 6 and the water level was just at the base of their doors. And now with that
new redevelopment of heavy rainfall tracking right into Sugarland I'm concerned about
the people there already stranded in their cars because if they have water already at the
base of their car door and they have not gone out of their vehicle yet and they have an
additional two to three inches maybe four inches of rain heading their way. You know
that's going to cause a large concern with people being in a dangerous situation trapped in
a vehicle” (KPRC-TV, 2015).
This is the storm event where people lost lives to doing more than going to work and home.
They were attending graduations and major public events that had not been cancelled. People
need to understand the dangers that an intense rainstorm will bring. Tropical Storm Imelda
lasted for three days, and while it is the fifth wettest tropical storm to hit the United States, there
were many breaks in the rain to allow flooding to drain properly the first two days. The third day
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had intense rainfall for a short period of time that contributed to the casualties of the storm
(Lindner, 2019).
Interruption of the Event
If coverage or parts of coverage of an area experience a stop in the rain, the Flood
Warning Systems should reflect the probability of it followed with a band of rain that is just as
likely to be devastating in length and intensity. During the Memorial Day Flood, a field reporter
asked a sheriff’s deputy if his department had seen an increase in wrecks due to traffic hazards
and described seeing people trying to exit freeways in the wrong direction. By knowing that a
new rain band was coming soon, he asked the Deputy his thoughts on stranded motorists. The
Deputy responded,
all the service lanes on the sides are all flooded and everything. So, everybody's pretty
much staying on the main lanes of the freeway trying to get out of the flood area and
everything. The main concern route for you all try to keep everybody safe and clear off
the roadways. I mean that's pretty much what we're trying to go to calls but we can't go
anywhere right now so there's no sides where we can get on the go down to the roadway
we've trying to go further southbound to try to get off the service lines from the flooding
and to go back up north but we can we're stuck right here right now” (KPRC-TV, 2015).
One interviewed during Harvey had gone to a friend’s home to watch a nationally televised
sporting event and despite the trouble making it to the home, a twenty-minute commute that took
her over an hour. When the program ended, she and her companion decided due to a respite of
rain, they would venture out to try and return home. They spent over fourteen hours trying to
make it home and did; however, their van had significant engine damage (Participant EEEE).
Speed of Water
During flooding events, it does not take long for the water to accumulate. Drivers have
little time and must think quickly to escape from their vehicle. Even then, there is a chance the
force of the water will knock them off their feet. One driver from Allison described how it only
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took ten minutes for enough water to rise to completely submerge his vehicle (Freemantle,
Residents thrust into nightmare, 2001). Another remarked that the force of the water moved his
car further out than he had been stranded and that hours after he had abandoned his vehicle, the
water was still at least two a half or three feet deep (Flood of a Lifetime, 2001). It does not take
much depth to cause a car to stall or for a person to drown. Two victims in the 1994 flood
perished when they drove in only three feet of water. It caused them to escape their vehicle only
to be swept to their deaths by the strong current (Teachey, 1994).
Trapped
Once the vehicle submerges in water, the ability to survive is further reduced. One
victim of Allison was caught by an eyewitness trying to turn around, but the force of the water
caused him to back into more water. He could not be rescued, and when he was found, his hand
had lacerations where he had broken his windshield and still drowned (Flood victim: Jose
Romero, 2001).
Abandoning Vehicle
Successfully exiting a flooding car does not mean a driver or passenger will survive. One
victim left his car during Harvey and was found in a Walmart parking lock still holding onto the
shopping cart corral with his flashlight still on (KHOU-TV/WFAA-TV, 2017). The force of the
water is too strong. A news reporter who was walking during Harvey said, “I had a pretty scary
moment last night walking in high water. I fell into a canal that I thought was a street… I don’t
consider myself dumb or new hat at this kind of stuff and even I came into a dangerous situation”
(KHOU-TV/WFAA-TV, 2017, pp. 96:03-96:16). During Imelda, a passenger left his boss’s
vehicle to walk the rest of the way home due to the road being impassable and was swept to his
death (Sternitzky-Di Napoli & Cochran, 2019). During the Great Flood of 1994, a couple
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escaped their car that stalled in water that was only three feet deep. They were pulled under the
water by the strong currents (Teachey, 1994). Graph 5 below indicates the victims who died
after abandoning a vehicle by storm event.

Victims who Abandoned Vehicle
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2
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Memorial Day
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Tax Day
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Graph 5 Number of Deaths from Abandoning Vehicle by Storm

Summary
Flood Warning Systems are broad in nature. Oftentimes, they include a large geography
and do not cater to the information needed for drivers. Below in Table 13 shows information
that should be considered to educate the public about the dangers from traveling in extreme
weather.
Table 12 Findings About the Technology.

Flood Warning Systems Should Consider:
Visibility Reduction
Potential of Damaged Roads
Length of Storm
Distraction Warnings
Storm Intensity Risk
Storm Interruption & Return
Speed of Water Concern
Being in vehicle is most dangerous, abandoning vehicle second most dangerous

CHAPTER 8
HISTORICAL NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The previous chapters described through interviews and the victims as well as various
government and media documents the motivations behind driving in a storm, collective thought
and social norms about drivers and driving in extreme flooding as well as the local and county
policies set forth to mitigate the number of vehicle related deaths during extreme flooding. This
chapter looks holistically at the historical narrative of the storm, the victims, and their locations
to find historical patterns to be used in future mitigation policies.
I began my research first with collecting public records from the different rain events. I
did so before interviewing people so that I understood what occurred. Once this narrative was
established, I then conducted my interviews. Much of what was told to me matched themes I
had discovered from news stories, weather reports and public forums. Next, I went back to the
news stories to collect the information about the victims that had died. The storm of 1994
changed the reporting of floods for the Houston region because local news stations experienced
higher viewership ratings from offering nonstop coverage of the storm. Because of this, future
storms had more information available (McDaniel, 1994). From Allison to Imelda, news stories
covered the deaths and locations. It also provided demographic information about the victims. I
used this news coverage to build a table of all the background information on victims as seen in
Appendix 3, 4 and 5. I also used the locations to research the latitude and longitude to map out
their deaths.
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Tropical Storm Allison
The deaths that occurred during Tropical Storm Allison were situated north of the
Buffalo Bayou and downtown Houston. Both White Oak and Greens Bayou watersheds became
the most lethal during this storm, as shown in Map 3 below. It was a sunny day, and the
National Weather storm sent a helicopter out midday because they found a low-pressure system
(Flood of a Lifetime, 2001). By Friday evening, during rush hour traffic, the storm would move
over Houston a second time and stall. Those that I interviewed all remarked about how surprised
they became that the storm would be so lethal. Most of them were going about their normal
activities when they were caught in the storm, which was not as prevalent among the
interviewees for other storms except for Memorial Day.

Map 3 Deaths from Tropical Storm Allison
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As indicated in Table 14 below, all the drivers died at night on the second round of the storm,
except for two people who died on Sunday. This occurred during rush hour traffic on a Friday night. The
storm’s unpredicted move back over the Houston region a second time was a last-minute shift. Since the
storm occurred in 2001, weather prediction science was not as accurate as current practices. None of
these deaths were considered in the HRFWS Report for the Tiger 2017 funding because Allison was not a
selected storm in their report (City of Houston, 2017, p. 12).
Table 13 Drivers that died in Tropical Storm Allison

Victim
Jose Romero
Peter Diaz
Antonio Cordova
Isabel Cordova
Rev Thomas Lee Johnson
Jose Jesus Rodriguez
Freda Michelle Willis
Jeffery Green
Louis Carranza
Manuel Quiroga
Mary Garcia
Chad B. Garren

Day/Night
N
N
D
D
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Address
E. Crosstimbers (1600)
East Freeway (11000)
Gregdale / US 90
Gregdale / US 90
Hillis (9400)
Market St (12000)
North Freeway (1700)
North Freeway (1700)
North Freeway @ Patton
North Freeway @ Patton
North Freeway @ Patton
Wrightwood (1200)

Watershed
White Oak
Hunting
Greens
Greens
Greens
Hunting
White Oak
White Oak
White Oak
White Oak
White Oak
White Oak

Jose Romero, 22, moved to Houston from Honduras less than two years before his death.
He was found in his vehicle trying to return home from work. He had a cut on his hand from
trying to free himself out of his vehicle (Flood victim: Jose Romero, 2001). He was located near
an underpass on a collector road, but he died at the decline of the road leading to the underpass.
He was in an area outside the 500-year floodplain. At the time of my street observation, flood
warning roadway signs were present at this location that flash to warn drivers when there is
water on the road. These warning signs were probably installed after his death based on the
technology of the flashing lights.
Peter Diaz, 21, had lived in Houston since his teen years and was originally from
Harlingen, Texas. It is unknown why he was driving that night; however, he did die on a
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collector road where the pavement dipped, leading to an underpass (Christian, 2001). Where the
roadway was level, and behind him as he drove further into a decline, was Hunting Bayou. He
died in the pathway of storm water runoff into a valley of paved roads intersecting. Despite this
roadway in a 500-year flood zone, there are still no signs to warn drivers of the possibility of
water on the roadway. The underpass near his death does not have flood gauges to measure
depth or warn drivers there either.
Antonio Cordova, 70, and Isabel Cordova, 69, died on Sunday, two days after the
worst of the rain event had fallen, but were still counted in the official weather service report for
Allison (National Weather Service, 2001). The Cordovas feared the dangers of the storm, and
this led them to leave their home to check on their adult daughter. They were unable to reach
authorities to rescue the daughter from her home surrounded, but not flooded, by water (Flood
victims: Isabel and Antonio Cordova, 2001). Their death occurred on a dead-end two-lane road
that was slightly outside the 500-year flood zone. Running parallel on either side of the roadway
are open surface drains, but at the spot that this married couple died, an 8 feet deep gully runs
perpendicular to the roadway. There are no guardrails or shoulders, and as a National Guard
tank drove by full of soldiers and rescued neighbors, the tank caused a wake that floated the
Cordova’s truck down into the gully and to their deaths (Flood victims: Isabel and Antonio
Cordova, 2001). No warning signs cautioning drivers of water on the road was there at the time
of my street observation.
Reverend Thomas Lee Johnson, 70, pastored the Christian Love Missionary Baptist
Church for 27 years. At 7:30 in the evening, Johnson left the church to head home, a commute
under five miles, but did not make it (Flood Victim: Thomas Lee Johnson, 2001). He was found
on a local two-lane road that had a dip. This local road has ditch drains and no warning signs to
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watch for water on the road. The road is the closest road to run alongside Halls Bayou, a
tributary in the Greens Bayou Watershed, but the waterway is not visible from the street, and his
location was in the 500-year floodplain. There are also no roadway warning signs about water
on the road.
Jose Jesus Rodriguez, 38, was driving with a passenger in his vehicle. An immigrant
from Mexico, Rodriguez had lived in Houston for six years prior to his death. He and his friend
had gone to check on another friend’s home when they crossed a bridge that intersected Market
Street with Hunting Bayou, putting them in direct path with the floodway. The passenger of the
vehicle escaped and was rescued about twelve hours later where he had been clinging to a tree
branch (Flood victim: Jose Rodriguez, 2001). The local four lane road has a grassy median with
breaks in the median for vehicles to make turns. A railroad track runs parallel to the road. There
are low profile guardrails alongside the portion of the road that is the bridge across the bayou. A
warning sign of ice in cold weather is present to warn drivers before they cross the bridge portion
of the roadway, but there are no signs that warn about flooding or help measure depth of water
on the roadway.
Freda Michelle Willis, 35, and Jeffery Green, 39, brother and sister-in-law were with
two other passengers, one of which was Jeffery Green’s wife, sister to Freda Michelle Willis.
They had attended a Jehovah’s Witness Conference held at the Astrodome and were returning
home. The group first escaped their vehicle and were on top of their car when they felt it would
be better to wade to higher ground. They used battery cables to hold onto in an effort to stay
together, but the water reached over their heads, and they were separated. Of the two that
survived, one hung onto branches for hours and one was able to be pulled onto the top of a van
and wait for rescue with eleven other people (AP, Two storm victims remembered during
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memorial service, 2001). Freda Michelle Willis and Jeffery Green were on a local four-lane road
nearby Downtown Houston and close to the intersection of Interstate 10 and Interstate 45. There
is a city greenspace park alongside the banks of White Oak. While their car was stranded in a
100-year flood zone, they walked towards the floodway and were washed away by the bayou. At
the time of my street observation, there were several warning signs about potential flooding and
different water gauges, but I am unable to determine if the warning signs were there at the time
of their death. However, this area required many rescues of stranded motorists during Allison
and one block from their deaths, another motorist, Chad Garren, would die in the same storm.
Louis Carranza, 52, Manuel Quiroga, 44, and Mary Garcia, 35, were all patrons of
Vara’s Lounge, north of downtown Houston, and alongside Interstate 45 at a point where White
Oak Bayou twists and turns around the interstate. They were not traveling together, but when the
bar flooded, they opted to try to return home rather than cross the street and wait in an empty
house as the other patrons did. They quickly abandoned their vehicle and tried to walk.
Carranza left in his own car and Garcia and Quiroga and another person left together at 3 am as
they lived nearby. The person that survived reported they had never seen it flood in this area
before and how the current was strong. While they waded in waist deep water, Quiroga and
Garcia were pulled under to their deaths (Flood victims: Manuel Quiroga, Mary Garcia, Louis
Carranza, 2001). Located in a 100-year floodplain, this collector road had no warning signs or
flood gauges at the time of my street observation. There is also an underpass nearby with no
flood warning signs at the time of my observation. The road was even and had no noticeable
decline. The bayou is visible to the roadway.
Chad B. Garren, 21, had moved to Houston two weeks before Allison hit. He was to
graduate in December from Texas A&M University and had relocated to Houston for an
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internship at the now defunct Enron Corporation. On the night of his death, he and two friends
from college left in Garren’s truck to attend a concert near downtown. A block from his house,
they stalled at a sharp dip in the road where White Oak Bayou intersected the local two-lane
road, Wrightwood Street. Witnesses called 911 for the three to be rescued (Flood Victim: Chad
Garren, 2001). A police officer who could not swim and another officer went into the water to
save the three men. They were able to successfully save the two passengers. Garren, however,
was not calm during the rescue and kept screaming. Unfortunately, the police lost their grasp,
and he was washed away. His body was found tangled with the rescue rope (Freemantle, Flood
pushed ordinary people to do extraordinary things, 2001). Wrightwood Street is in the floodway
and there were no flood warning signs at the time of my street observation. The dip in the road
was not immediately visible on the clear sunny day that I drove down the street.

Memorial Day Flood
The Memorial Day Flood of 2015 was a flash flood event, in which only one victim was
not in a car. Map 4 below shows the locations and deaths of those from this storm event.
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Map 4 Memorial Day Deaths

The most intense portion of this storm system occurred in the middle of the night, which
contributed to all victims perishing when visibility is less as shown in Table 15.
Table 14 Drivers that died in the Memorial Day Flood

Victim
Christopher Kirby
Nihad Jeries Konsul
Jack Alter
Shirley Alter
Dennis Callihan
Jose Yebra Ibarra
Alice Tovar

Day/Night
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Address
Studemont (1700)
Ranchester Drive (5700)
N Braeswood (5000)
N Braeswood (5000)
West Loop South @ Eastman Street
Westpark @ Post Oak Exit
Gerken @ SH 36

Watershed
White Oak
White Oak / Underpass
Brays
Brays
White Oak
Underpass
Big Creek

Christopher Kirby, 35, was an IT specialist who owned his own company and was
called out to service machines at a local restaurant and bar. When he left the restaurant bar to
head home, he experienced bad weather and spent time assisting stranded motorists in the area.
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At two in the morning, he called his wife and stated he was returning home. He would be
discovered in his vehicle at the yard where it was towed (Shilcutt, 2015). Kirby died in the
floodway of White Oak Bayou on a six-lane busy collector road almost to the intersection of
Interstate 10 near the Heights neighborhood. The street where he died intersects with White Oak
Bayou and Interstate I10. The White Oak Bayou twists and turns around the interstate and is
lined with concrete at this juncture. This location was part of the initial upgrade in the HRFWS.
At the time of his death, this warning technology was not present at the location. Today at the
start of the decline in the road there are yellow signs that warn of high water on the road and red
lights that will flash to stop drivers. Further along the decline of the road, a yellow sign hangs
above the street with flashing red lights and a sign cautioning drivers to stop for high water if the
red lights are flashing. These lights are activated by the rainfall data collection from HCFCD
that then activates the HRFWS system at this location.
Nihad Jeries Konsul, 64, immigrated from Israel to the Houston area in 1975. Konsul
was one month away from retiring from her job at a local grocery store when she died.
Scheduled to work from midnight to 8 am that night, Konsul decided to call in to work and went
to bed for the night. The next morning, her husband woke up to her not at home and saw her
vehicle being pulled from the water on the local news report. An autopsy revealed that she had
suffered a heart attack, which caused her death though she and her vehicle were submerged in
water (Barned-Smith & Rice, Death Saddens, puzzles family, 2015). Konsul died on a local
three-lane road that runs under Westpark Tollway. It has a significant dip in the road that turns
into an underpass beneath the tollway. Konsul died before reaching the underpass portion. At
the time of her accident, there was a flood gauge present to measure the depth of the underpass.
She may or may not have seen this and it is unclear if her car stalled before her death, but it is
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clear from her heart attack that she experienced extraordinary stress that led to her death. This
location is included in the upgrade of the HRFWS and will be maintained by Harris County
rather than the City of Houston or the State of Texas and will include flood warning signs that
will activate red flashing lights when HCFCD’s rain gauges read that the location is inundated
with water but not a backup generator or backflow preventer (Houston Public Works
Department, 2021). The City of Houston Public Works and Engineering Department included
her death in their application for the HRFWS Tiger Grant Application as a drowning related
fatality although she died of a heart attack (City of Houston, 2017, p. 12).
Jack Alter, 87, and Shirley Alter, 85, were married to each other for more than sixty
years. They were attending their grandson’s graduation in Downtown Houston when the heavy
rain began. They left with their daughter earlier than other family members to try and avoid the
rain with a promise to meet at their son’s house. They made it to Braeswood Dr, a local road that
runs alongside Brays Bayou (Duke, 2015). They did not leave their car until rising waters forced
them on a porch outside a home where they were then rescued by a Houston Fire Department
(HFD) boat that capsized after engine failure (Duke, 2015 & Staff, 2015). The couple and their
daughter had life jackets on, but only the daughter was able to float on her back to safety (Duke,
2015). The City of Houston Public Works and Engineering Department did not include their
deaths in the application for the HRFWS Tiger Grant Application as they ultimately died from a
capsized boat; however, I have included them in this study as they were in a vehicle that they had
to abandon due to high water on a road (City of Houston, 2017, p. 12).
Dennis Calihan, 65, died along collector service road that alongside at a lower elevation
to Interstate 610. He had helped a stranded motorist push their stalled vehicle from high water
and suffered a heart attack when he went back to his car (Staff, 7 Deaths Confirmed Following
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Disastrous Houston Floods, 2015). Since he was not actively driving but had gotten out of his
vehicle to aid the woman in front of him, his death was possibly not considered in the drowning
fatalities listed in the HRFWS report (City of Houston, 2017, p. 12). The dip at the street
observation was less pronounced than other locations, and it is located outside the 500-year
floodplain zone near Buffalo Bayou. Nevertheless, the Houston Police Department reported
“his death is not believed to be weather related,” despite stating earlier in the report that a
witness saw him push a vehicle from a street during a storm (Houston Police Department, 2015).
Jose Yebra Ibarra, 31, traveled to Houston from his Port Arthur, Texas home and died
during the storm at an underpass for West Park Tollway (Duty, 2015). He was driving a Ford
150 truck, but the depth of the underpass is more than twenty feet deep (Toschlog, 2015).
Another victim would die at this same underpass in the Tax Day Floods the following year
(Rogers & Zaveri, 2016). His death was included in the drowning fatality numbers for the Tiger
2017 grant (City of Houston, 2017, p. 12). This location is not included in the initial rollout of
flood warning signs, backup generators or backflow preventers. At the time of the street
observation, there was a roadway flood gauge sign. This is the last stop off an arterial road that
turns into an underpass and twists and turns as is declines in elevation and creates a very deep
concrete pool for rainfall to collect. It is not in a flood zone and floods due to the built
environment of the transportation network. While this location was used in the argument for
HRFWS to win money, the location will not receive an upgrade in flood warning signage or
drainage (City of Houston, 2017, p.12 & Houston Public Works Department, 2021). Having
only a flood gauge and no flood gates to close the perimeters will require emergency personnel
to set up a temporary barricade or use their vehicles and flashing lights to stop traffic. The flood
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gauge is at the lowest portion of the decline and could be too late for a future motorist as it stands
at the time of my street observation.
Alice Tovar, 73, is the only death and location included in this dissertation that falls
outside the Harris County borders. She died in the same rain event and late night early morning
hours as the Harris County deaths in this Memorial Day flood. Tovar was headed to work at the
Chevron gas station near the intersection of Gerken and Texas State Highway 36 in Rosenberg,
Texas, situated southwest of Harris County’s borders. When she never arrived to her workshift,
her daughter drove to look for her (KHOU Staff, 2015). She was driving in a less densely
populated area. The topography at the time of the street observation indicated the land
surrounding the four lane road as used for agricultural purposes. In order to determine where her
car was found to accurately depict the location, I had to look at photos from the new articles.
She encountered rising floodwaters from Big Creek watershed and her car floated to the open
surface ditch and was submerged in water. She escaped the vehicle but was found in the swollen
creek across the roadway from where her car was found. It is possible that her death was
considered the fourth automobile accident in the Tiger 2017 grant to update flood warning
systems (City of Houston, 2017, p. 12). While I could not determine rainfall levels at her
location unlike the other deaths in this dissertation, rainfall levels can be read since July 23 rd,
2020 and can be found on the Harris County Flood Warning Systems. While the creek runs
perpendicular to the road Tovar traveled on and is visible, the road has a very flat elevation and
did not have any roadway signs warning of potential water on the road.

Tax Day Flood
The flash flood of Tax Day presented the most dangerous event for underpass deaths. Of
the seven deaths in vehicles shown in the map 5 below, three of them were near underpasses in
the Galleria area and were not in areas greater than a 500-year floodplain.
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Map 5 Tax Day Deaths

Like the Memorial Day Flood, this storm was a flash flood event with most of the rainfall
occurring at night. All deaths occurred at night as shown in Table 16 below.
Table 15 Drivers that died in the Tax Day Flood

Victim
Terri Rodriguez
Ariel Tapscott
German Antonio
FrancoRascon Morales
Pedro
Sunita Vikas Malhara
Suresh Kumar Talluri
Claudia Meglar

Day/Night
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Address
Briarcreek (1800)
Cypress-Rosehill Road
Imperial Valley (17400)
N Sam Houston Parkway East (800)
West Loop South (3600)
West Loop South (3600)
Westpark @ Post Oak Exit

Watershed
Cypress Creek
Cypress Creek
Greens
Greens
Underpass
Underpass
Underpass

Terri Rodriguez, 42, decided to drive home from her sister’s home around three in the morning
despite her family asking her to stay the night (KPRC Houston, 2016). Her sister’s home is in a
Memorial Hills subdivision north of downtown Houston. The road she traveled on was in the 100-year
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floodplain. To the left of her are trees that conceal Cypress Creek watershed in daytime hours. The local
road has four lanes, but there is a concrete lined ditch, running perpendicular to Cypress Creek, that
separates the driving directions from one another to help drain the flow of bayou water when it is out of
its banks. No warning signs of potential water on the road or of the bayou itself were located on the
roadway during my street observation. Rodriguez either did not see the water or underestimated its
danger. Her car floated from the lane of travel into the ditch, and she was unsuccessful in escaping her
vehicle. She was found in her vehicle, still wearing her seatbelt, an hour after she left her sister’s home
(KPRC Houston, 2016). It is likely that Terri Rodriguez was not considered one of the four vehicle
related Tax Day Flood deaths used in the Tiger 2017 grant because she was not one of the four located by
an interstate or major thoroughfare (City of Houston, 2017, p. 12).
Ariel Tapscott, 23, had recently graduated from college and was living in the Tomball area with
her aunt and uncle near the northwestern Harris County border. She died April 26 th after the storm had
passed; however, she also died in a flooded vehicle due to the rains from the Tax Day flood. Tapscott had
gone to dinner with friends and was on her way home. She called a friend when her car began filling with
water. She had driven to a road and encountered standing water, so she reversed her car unknowingly
into a retention pond (Willey, 2016 & Young, 2016). Tapscott’s death is likely not officially included as
a Harris County Tax Day flood related death or in the four deaths listed for the TIGER 2017 grant.
However, being in a vehicle and navigating flood roadways due to the Tax Day flood did lead to her
death. Tapscott died on a subdivision’s road. It is a new development called Rosehill Reserve and has
new homes being constructed at the time of my street observation. Upon entering the subdivision,
marked by a brick wall like entrance and sign, there is a retention pond to the right of the two-lane road.
Less than a mile from this detention pond is a pair of detention ponds on either side of the road. There is
a street curb and an elevated grassy bank. Fencing blocks some of the detention pond from immediate
access from the road, but there are spots in which there is no fencing. It is unclear which detention pond
she backed into, but there were no warning signs that water may be on the road.
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German Antonio, 66, retired manager from a local grocery store, had spent his retirement years
working as a chauffeur. During the night hours of the flood, he was driving to the airport in his sports
utility vehicle to pick up a passenger when he encountered a flooded roadway and died. A nearby witness
tried to break him out of the car but was unsuccessful (KPRC2 Houston, 2016), Antonio was
approximately 7.2 driving miles from the International Airport of Houston (IAH), but it is unclear if he
was in his own neighborhood at the time of his death or not, which would make the difference in his
knowledge of the local road he was trying to navigate when he died. He is also not likely considered in
the four related vehicle deaths presented in the Tiger 2017 application (City of Houston, 2017). At the
time of my observation, the busy location’s traffic at 12:05 pm in the afternoon prompted me to park at a
gas station and walked down a sidewalk to fill out my observation report and take pictures. The four-lane
drive has a median of grass and trees with turn style middle lanes at various segments. It is the closest
main road running somewhat parallel at this specific section of the drive to Greens Bayou. It is separated
from the bayou by a subdivision of houses and their neighborhood roads.

It is likely that Antonio’s

death was not included in the four vehicle deaths mentioned in the Tiger 2017 report (City of Houston,
2017).
Pedro Rascon Morales, 61, died during the storm at a declining road leading to an underpass. A
police officer would die at this underpass the following year in Hurricane Harvey. Morales lived in El
Paso, Texas with his wife, but he was in the Houston area due to his truck driver profession. He was
driving an 18-wheeler when he encountered high water and was unable to escape (Valencia, 2016). A
witness tried to free him from the cab of his vehicle but was too late (KVIA ABC-7, 2016). The location
that Morales died was the confluence of Hardy Toll Road and Sam Houston Tollway. From entering the
underpass of the two, there are no flood warning signs from the Hardy Toll service road’s entrance into
the underpass, which is as dangerous as the Sam Houston Tollway’s service road as the two join to create
an underpass. It is located in the 100-year floodplain though the bayou is not visible from this vantage
point.
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Sunita Vikas Malhara, 49, died at an underpass near the Galleria mall in the Uptown Houston
district. There was another victim in another vehicle that would die behind her at the same underpass.
Malhara moved to the US from India in 2006 and was an electrical engineer for Bechtel where she was
driving to when she died (Malhotra, 2016). She called her husband when she encountered high water but
told him she saw lights and believed she would be rescued. Malhara’s husband vocally called for
government action upon learning of her death. He stated “You’re letting people drive into high waters.
That’s ridiculous. That’s very painful. Cancer, heart problem, all that I understand. But this, driving into
high water in the middle of the city, and there’s nothing that can be done? It’s a terrible loss for me, for
everybody” (KHOU Staff, 2016). His pleadings for better mitigation policies would translate to public
officials promising to research and implement solutions.
Suresh Kumar Talluri, 38, immigrated to the United States on a work visa in 2014 from India.
He lived in Katy and was commuting to his job when he died at the same underpass as Sunita Vikas
Malhara (Malhotra, 2016).
Claudia Meglar, 25, also died at an underpass near the Galleria area. It was the same location
that Jose Yebra Ibarra had died during the Memorial Day Floods the year prior. Meglar left work and had
texted her mother to ask if she needed anything from the storm, when she was on her way home (Willey,
Exclusive: Mother of Woman in flood who drowned speaks out, 2016). Harris County Toll Road
Authority cameras captured Meglar drive her car into the water, and it sink from the front end as her
camera flashlight was shown at the back of the car, presumably her signaling her whereabouts and
attempting to escape the vehicle. She had driven past a toll road worker in his truck acting as a temporary
barricade to prevent drivers from driving into the water and his attempted rescue of her was recorded on
his dash camera inside his truck (KPRC2 Houston, 2016). This footage was released by the Houston
Police Department to bring awareness to fatalities during floods due to driving and the video and
Meglar’s death was covered both on national and international media sources. Meglar’s mother has
become a strong voice pushing for better mitigation policies to vehicle related flood fatalities and has
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argued that more than additional placement of roadway signage is needed from the government (Willey,
2017).

Hurricane Harvey
Harvey experienced the most deaths and there were more deaths that were not related to
driving a vehicle as shown in Map 6 below. While the HRFWS reported eight deaths, I am
unable to determine which ones they counted. I had access to the Harris County Medical
Examiner’s report that only mentions vehicle in two people’s circumstances of death (Harris
County Institute of Forensic Sciences, 2017).

Map 6 Harvey Deaths

Since Harvey occurred over several days with large portions of the country impassable, most
rescues occurred by boat. Because of the disruption of communication and transportation, the accuracy of
death being night versus day or even the exact date they died could be questioned on some. I used the
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Harris County forensic report to reconcile deaths that did not mention time of day below in table 17
(Harris County Institute of Forensic Sciences, 2017).
Table 16 Drivers that died in Hurricane Harvey.

Victim
Victor Acevedo
Charles Ray James
Michael Tucker
Belia Saldivar
Daisy Saldivar
Devy Saldivar
Dominic Saldivar
Manuel Saldivar
Xavier Saldivar
Steve Perez
Joseph Dowell
Martin Salazar
Ruben Jordan
Batool Qasem
Keisha Monique Williams
Travis Lynn Callihan
Colby Osorno

Day/Night
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
D
N
D
D
D
N
D
N

Address
Arkansas St (507)
Claiborne St (7400)
FM 1942 (6820)
Green River Dr (1400)
Green River Dr (1400)
Green River Dr (1400)
Green River Dr (1400)
Green River Dr (1400)
Green River Dr (1400)
N Sam Houston Pkwy
(800)
N Wayside
Dr (3500)
Preston Ave (5125)
W Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Warrenton Dr (7)
Woodforest Blvd (12473)
Hospital – Unknown
Unknown

Watershed
Sims
Greens
Cedar
Greens
Greens
Greens
Greens
Greens
Greens
Greens/ Underpass
Greens
Armand
Clear Creek
Buffalo
Greens
Unknown
Greens

Victor Acevedo, 67, had retired from his job and was a full-time caretaker to his wife. When
their home began to take on water during Harvey’s rain event, he went to his truck to evacuate them
safely (Staff, 2017). Acevedo’s street was located in a 100-year floodplain. The local two-lane road has
a pronounced dip where he died. No flood warning signs are present on the roadway.
Charles Ray James, 65, was concerned about his 90-year-old mother and had a friend drive him
to her. When the car could not go any further, he abandoned it to walk the last mile and a half to her
home. James had lived in the Houston area since 1971 (Staff, 2017). James was found on a drive that
ends in front of Halls Bayou, a tributary of Greens Bayou watershed. The road also intersects with the
neighborhood Bretshire road. It is a local two-lane road that slopes down to the bayou; however, the
waterfront is concealed by trees. He was found in a 500-year floodplain. No flood warning signs were
found at his location on Claiborne drive or on Bretshire road at the time of my observation.
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Michael Tucker, 66, wanted to stay in his home for the duration of the storm. His wife and
granddaughter and pet were rescued by boat after two feet of water entered their home. When the water
continued to rise, he left in his truck. His truck was found in chest high water, and he was discovered in
high water down the street (Staff, 2017). Tucker was traveling on a farm to market road with 2 lanes. It
was located in Baytown near Trinity Bay, the mouth of Trinity River, which leads to Galveston Bay and
the Gulf of Mexico. His location is within the 500-year floodplain and no signs warned of water on the
roadway. The legal speed limit in this area is 60 due to the area being less densely populated. Streetlights
are also not as prevalent as found in more developed transportation networks.
Belia Saldivar (81), Daisy Saldivar (6), Devy Saldivar (16), Dominic Saldivar (14), Manuel
Saldivar (84), and Xavier (8) Saldivar were all passengers in a van that drove through high water. The
driver, Sammy Saldivar, grandfather to the children and son of the elderly couple, was able to escape and
held on to a nearby tree until he was rescued, but the paternal grandparents and their grandchildren
drowned in the van. They had feared the safety of where they were sheltered and drove to find a safer
place (Banks, Ellis, & George, 2017). The driver was able to escape due to an open window on the
driver’s side, but he was unable to open the rear hatch to free his grandchildren and parents (Ellis,
George, & Webb, 2017). When I went to the location where they died, there was no visibility of Greens
Bayou, which curved to the north and west of them. The bayou intersects Green River Road where a
bridge is present with guardrails. No warning signs about flooding on the roadway are at the block where
they were reported as deceased; however, pictures of the van they drove where situated nearer to the
bridge. The road was a local two-lane road with ditch drains and no shoulder. It was level and straight
but within the 500-year floodplain of Greens Bayou. This location was slightly past a four way stop
intersection, two small industrial type shops, a gas station and a vacant lot cornering the intersection. The
road dead ends into a gated industrial site. There were no roadside warnings to indicate a hazardous
flooding potential at this location.
Steve Perez, 60, drove during Harvey to report to duty as a sergeant for the Houston Police
Department, despite his wife asking him to stay home. He had worked for HPD for thirty-four years and
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set out in the dark at four in the morning for work. When he could not arrive downtown, he notified
dispatch that he would report to the nearest station, Kingwood Police, per the department’s protocol. It is
known that he spent at least two and a half hours trying to report to work (Ellis, George, & Webb, 2017).
It was unsafe for them to recover his body until two days later (Staff, 2017). His body was found at the
same intersection of Morales from the Tax Day flood; however, he was found on the Sam Houston
Tollway side, where there were roadside flood warnings present. This side also had flood gates that can
be locked during a storm. I am unsure if the flood gates were placed before or after his death.
Joseph Dowell, 43, was driving to work at Houston’s Public Works Department when he died
(Staff, 2017). Dowell called his boss around one in the morning and told him he was in high water. His
boss suggested he pull over to a nearby fast-food restaurant, but Dowell told him that he would try to
make it to work. His vehicle was found abandoned and flooded, and he was found nearby (Lewis B. ,
2017). Dowell’s location was a local four-lane road with a dip in the road. It is located in the 100-year
floodplain. To the north and east of this location is a huge railyard. To the east and south of his location
is Hunting Bayou, though it is not visible from the road he traveled. There is also a grassy median, with
interruptions to allow for turning vehicles. It is a mixed neighborhood of industrial facilities and
residential homes.
Martin Salazar, 49, did not make it home from work at the City of Pasadena’s golf course. He
had tried to leave his car and was swept away by water according to investigators. His body was found in
the middle ditch drain of the roadway (Staff, 2017). He was found on a local four-lane road with a grassy
median. In some places of the road, the median was open surface (ditch) drains, and he was found in one
of those. There is a bridge on the road, with a drainage ditch running underneath it. No flood warning
signs were present on the road at the time of my observation. This is located in a 500-year floodplain.
The road is even with a slight curve.
Ruben Jordan, 58, left in his truck to check on his father when he went missing (Grundy, 2017).
He was unable to return home and was helping people evacuate homes about a mile and a half from his
Friendswood, Texas home. He had spent more than 34 years coaching for a Clear Creek Independent
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School District’s high school. Little is known about his death as the people he helped left by boat and he
stayed behind (Staff, 2018). Jordan was found on a four-lane boulevard that was separated by grassy
medians. Clear Creek is located to the west of his location but has a drainage canal that runs parallel to
the boulevard. His death occurred in the 500-year floodplain. The roadway had a slight dip and curves.
There were no roadside flood warning signs at the time of my observation.
Batool Qasem, 76, died by her vehicle. It is not clear why she was driving; however, she did
move her car to a higher point in a knot’s landing drive. At some point, she decided it was safe to leave
and did not make it (Domonoske & Wamsley, 2017). Buffalo Bayou is located west and south of the
location that Qasem died. While she parked her car on higher ground on a local two-lane road, downhill
was a collector road, Gessner Road. South of her location, Buffalo Bayou intersects with Gessner Road,
though she probably was unable to see the bayou due to the tall affluent homes built high alongside the
banks of the bayou in road she parked her car. At some point, she either decided to leave her car or tried
to drive it and it stalled as she was found outside the vehicle.
Keisha Monique Williams, 32, left to go to work and was unable to do so and stayed at a
friend’s home for two days. Once the rain had lessened, she went to her home to get clothes and rescue
her pets (Staff, 2017). She communicated with family members that she drove through some puddles but
was able to make it to her apartment. However, she would die in the parking lot and be discovered at the
gate entrance to her complex (George C. , 2017). Her apartment complex is on the north side of the
boulevard and Green’s bayou runs parallel to the south of the boulevard. It is four lanes that are separated
by a grassy median and young trees. The apartment sits at a slight elevation from the boulevard, but she
was found in the apartment driveway that dips to intersect the boulevard. As a resident, she may have
been aware of Greens bayou on the other side of the street, but it is hidden by trees though a guardrail
runs alongside the bayou past the sidewalk. Williams died in a 500-year floodplain with no roadway
warning signs indicating that it may flood.
Travis Lynn Callihan, 45, died at the Memorial Hermann hospital located in Memorial City,
Texas. He had exited a vehicle and fallen into floodwaters. It is unclear where this occurred or more
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circumstances about Callihan (Ellis, George, & Webb, 2017). While his death is considered as one who
abandoned a vehicle, I was unable to complete a street observation as the location is unknown.
Colby Osorno, 24, lived with his mother. He left when she was asleep, and she assumed he was
with a friend. It is unclear his location and anymore specifics because his body floated into the ship
channel from Greens Bayou (Staff, 2017). As a result, I did not conduct a street observation.

Tropical Storm Imelda
Imelda experienced fewer deaths, but the flooding during this storm occurred during the
daylight hours of the third day of landfall. Both fatalities were due to people driving, but one of
these abandoned his car to walk home and did not make it. Map 5 and Table 18 below shows
their location of death.

Map 7 Imelda Deaths
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Table 17 Drivers that died in Tropical Storm Imelda

Victim
Raul Rivas-Hernandez
Rene Salas

Day/Night
D
D

Address
Highway 59 N (18040)
Sweetwater Lane @
West Mount Houston

Watershed
Greens
Greens

Raul Rivas – Hernandez, 56, went to work despite his wife asking him to stay home.
At noon, she called again, and he did not respond. He would drive through Will Clayton
Parkway and the vehicle would sink into eight feet of water (Moreno, 2019). Witnesses claim
that he paused briefly when he approached the water and then accelerated into the water
(Ketterer, 2019). He was rescued by Harris County deputies and later died at the hospital.
Witnesses claim he was in the water for approximately twenty minutes (Homer, 2019). RivasHernandez drove on a collector road declining into an underpass. The depth of the water was
eight feet despite being several yards away from the light that reaches the underpass, an even
deeper decline. This is a busy collector road that leads to the Intercontinental Airport of
Houston. The road is six lanes and has a grassy median separating the traffic directions. Flood
gauges were located at the roadside during my observation, but they were added after his death.
Rene Salas, 52, caught a ride home from work from his boss. When they reached the
intersection of West Mount Houston and Sweetwater, Salas, decided to walk the rest of the way
home because the road was impassable by vehicle. He was found the next morning (SternitzkyDi Napoli & Cochran, Death of man found in ditch appears to be weather-related, authorities say,
2019). His location was directly in the floodway, which is why the vehicle was unable to go any
further. Sweetwater lane is a narrow two-lane local road. It has a bridge right past the
intersection where Salas got out of the vehicle because the roadway intersects with Halls Bayou.
At the time of my street observation, HCFCD was working on this site to correct bank and slope
failures under project number P118-28-00-X003 (Harris County Flood Control District, 2021).
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The bayou is visible from the roadway, but there were no roadside warning signs at the time of
my observation.

Summary
Based on reviewing the information known about the victims and from one-on-one
interviews, individuals have three stages of decision making that will impact their safety. These three

different stages of driver behavior should be factored in both transportation and emergency
management policy and are shown in Figure 27 below.
Driver Logic
• I really want to ____
• I must go home!
• I must get to work/school!
• It’s not safe here.
• I’m worried about ____

Should I continue?
• It was supposed to rain today?
• I can see road, water, and
warnings.
• The flooding on my route is not
bad.
• (Mental State) This is stressing me
out!

My car can’t make it!
• Ability to leave vehicle
• Ability to find higher ground quickly.
• Depth and speed of water

Figure 27 Stages of Individual Decision-Making
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Stage 1: The driver’s logic – This is the initial stage of the driver leaving a shelter and
getting into a vehicle with the intent to drive or ride in it. Primarily, those that make the decision
to get into the vehicle do so to either go to work or go home. However, other reasons can
include a special event, evacuation, or concern for others. At this stage, people can die before
they even enter the vehicle. This is where knowledge of the storm and shelter in place warnings
are critical. During and immediately prior to extreme flooding, the more people that know the
rain event is bad and know they should not entertain being in a vehicle, the more lives will be
saved.
Stage 2: Should I continue? – The next stage is when the driver is in their moving
vehicle. At this point, the question should be asked if they should continue their drive. This is
where the “Turn Around, Don’t Drown” prevention message may work. Upon interviewing
people driving in this experience and studying the information known about the deaths, four
clear factors to the decision to continue driving could mean life or death.
a. Knowledge that the event is an extreme natural hazard. If drivers were unaware of
the event due to not receiving the FWS or using existing technology to help direct
their route through safe roadways, they may make the deadly decision to drive instead
of parking their vehicle.
b. The driver can see the road, water, and warnings. Visibility is a key factor in the
difference between someone who lives or dies while driving in an extreme rain event.
Many of those interviewed described not being able to see in front of them, yet they
continued to drive. Live broadcasts of these storms that I reviewed, also had
interviews of stranded motorists. Some even captured them driving into water and
interviewed them afterwards. Many of them described not seeing the water on the
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road or the road itself. Also important is signage that warns of water on roadways
and gauges on roadways to measure depth. Visibility of all three is critical to
survival. Coincidentally, extra risk should be considered for night-time driving
versus day driving and adequate streetlights and running electricity can also impact
visibility.
c. The flooding the driver’s route has previously not been as bad. Flood patterns
change. Not discerning this can also cost a driver or passenger’s life. Many will
drive on a road they drive daily and may even have previous rain events they use to
decide whether to continue the route or not. This can be disastrous if the flooding for
the storm they are driving in is worse than previous ones they have successfully
driven on during other storms.
d. Mental State – This is stressing me out! Keeping a clear mind during moments that
become dangerous can help increase survival rate. Those that panic can decrease
their reaction time and ultimately cost their life. It can also cause a heart attack that
prevents them from making it to stage three of the experience.
Stage Three – My car can’t make it! – The alternative ending to this is that the driver and/or
passenger(s) make it to their destination. However, for those when they reach this stage and their
car cannot make it or stalls in high water, their danger does not end if they can abandon the
vehicle. They will need to be able to make it to higher ground and the depth and speed of the
water can impact their ability to do so. Also, their ability to remain calm and take the course of
actions can dictate whether it is a successful outcome.
Based on my discoveries of the human element to traveling in extreme weather, it
becomes equally important to study transportation design and safety of the known locations
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where people died. This can establish patterns and determine locations that are more vulnerable
to fatalities during times of extreme flooding.

CHAPTER 9
STREET OBSERVATION PATTERNS & ANALYSIS
Documenting the locations of vehicle related deaths in Harris County allowed me to build
a comprehensive prospective on the human aspect of driving during extreme flooding but going
to the various locations and performing a uniform street observation on all of them allowed me
the ability to establish patterns on which roadway warnings and roadway design could make
people most vulnerable during extreme flooding. Map 8 below shows all the vehicle related
deaths from Allison, Memorial Day, Tax Day, Harvey, and Imelda. This map displays how
widespread of a problem the county faces. Establishing patterns among all of them could help
shape better policy and practice in transportation and emergency planning alike.

130

131

Map 8 Deaths from Driving During Extreme Flooding in Harris County, TX

Once I created the maps, first on Google Earth to determine the latitude and longitude to
input into ArcGIS, I found that more people died on roads by the bayou rather than at underpasses and
interstates which were emphasized in current Harris County and City of Houston mitigation policies
described in chapter 6. This inspired me to drive to 30 different locations where 43 people died to
inventory the built environment features as they stood at the time of my observations. I did not conduct
street observations for two deaths in Harvey, Travis Lynn Callihan and Colby Osorno, as explained in
chapter 8 due to having no concrete information about their locations. As shown in Table 19 below,
primarily, deaths occurred at roads by the bayou. Five deaths occurred at a bayou, in which the driver
was approaching an underpass, or they were near an underpass. Only 7 deaths from the 43 could be
considered an underpass death.
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Table 18 Bayou versus underpass deaths

Location
Underpass
Bayou near Underpass
Bayou

Total Number of Deaths
7
5
31

Percentage of Total Deaths
16.3%
11.6%
72.1%

It is also important to understand which watersheds are impacted the most from these deaths.
Table 20 below delineates the locations and their watersheds. This information was collected from Harris
County Flood Control District website, https://www.hcfcd.org/Find-Your-Watershed, and from the
Environmental Protection Agency’s website, https://mywaterway.epa.gov/community.
Table 19 Raw Data Locations and their watersheds

Address
Arkansas St (507)
Briarcreek (1800)
Claiborne St (7400)
Cypress-Rosehill Reserve Rd
E. Crosstimbers (1600)
East Freeway (11000)
FM 1942 (6820)
Gerken @ SH 6
Green River Dr (1400)
Gregdale / US 90
Highway 59 N (18040)
Hillis (9400)
Imperial Valley (17400)
Market St (12000)
N Braeswood (5000)
N Sam Houston Pkwy (800)
N Wayside Dr (3500)
North Freeway (1700)
North Freeway @ Patton
Preston Ave (5125)
Ranchester Drive (5700)
Studemont (1700)
Sweetwater Ln @ W Mount Houston
W Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Warrenton Dr (7)
West Loop South (3600)
West Loop South (1433)

Number of
Victims
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1

Watershed
Sims
Cypress
Greens
Willow
White Oak
Hunting
Cedar Creek
Big Creek
Greens
Greens
Greens
Greens
Greens
Hunting
Brays
Greens
Hunting
White Oak
White Oak
Armand
Brays
White Oak
Greens
Clear Creek
Buffalo
Buffalo
Buffalo
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Address
Westpark @ Post Oak Exit
Wood Forest Dr (12400)
Wrightwood (1200)

Number of
Victims
2
1
1

Watershed
Buffalo
Greens
White Oak

As indicated from Table 21 below, almost forty percent of all the vehicle related deaths from my
selected storms occurred in the Greens Bayou watershed. Nearly twenty percent of the deaths occurred in
the White Oak Bayou watershed. This indicates that further research on mitigation could be done for both
watersheds.
Table 20 Deaths by Watersheds in Harris County for Select Storms

Watershed
Armand
Big Creek
Cedar Creek
Clear Creek
Cypress
Sims
Willow
Brays
Hunting
Buffalo
White Oak
Greens

Total Number of Deaths
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
6
8
16

Percentage of Total Deaths
2.3%
2.3%
2.3%
2.3%
2.3%
2.3%
2.3%
7%
7%
14%
18.6%
37.2%

I collected information on the road class, speed limit, and number of lanes to determine the types
of roads these accidents occurred as seen below in Table 22. I felt this was an important step as
mitigation policy and current common beliefs from interviews indicated the dangers of interstates during
extreme flooding; however, my exercise in mapping the deaths indicated otherwise. Road Classification
were based on the US Federal Highway Administration (US Department of Transportation Federal
Highway Administration, 2020). Roess, Prassas, and McShane (2011) offered guidance for developing
the qualifiers for street observations such as the legal speed limit, road classification, and lane structure of
the roadways.
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Table 21 Raw Data Road Classification of Street Observations

Address
Arkansas St (507)
Briarcreek (1800)
Claiborne St (7400)
Cypress-Rosehill Reserve Rd
E. Crosstimbers (1600)
East Freeway (11000)
FM 1942 (6820)
Gerken @ SH 6
Green River Dr (1400)
Gregdale / US 90
Highway 59 N (18040)
Hillis (9400)
Imperial Valley (17400)
Market St (12000)
N Braeswood (5000)
N Sam Houston Pkwy (800)
N Wayside Dr (3500)
North Freeway (1700)
North Freeway @ Patton
Preston Ave (5125)
Ranchester Drive (5700)
Studemont (1700)
Sweetwater Ln @ W Mount Houston
W Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Warrenton Dr (7)
West Loop South (3600)
West Loop South (1433)

Number of
Victims
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1

Road
Classification
Local
Local
Local
Local
Collector
Collector
Collector
Collector
Local
Local
Collector
Local
Local
Local
Local
Collector
Local
Collector
Collector
Local
Local
Collector
Local
Collector
Local
Collector
Collector

Speed
Limit
30
20
20
30
35
30
60
60
30
30
45
30
35
35
35
35
40
45
45
45
30
35
30
35
25
45
45

# Of
Lanes
2
4
2
2
4
4
2
4
2
2
5
2
4
4
4
3
2
4
4
4
3
6
2
4
2
2
3
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Address

Number of
Victims
2
1
1
1.43

Westpark @ Post Oak Exit
Wood Forest Dr (12400)
Wrightwood (1200)
Average

Road
Classification
Arterial
Local
Local
Mode: Local

Speed
Limit
45
30
25
36

# Of
Lanes
2
4
2
3.13

Table 22 above shows the raw data of my observations for each location with how many people
died, the road classification, speed limit and number of lanes. As indicated by the average speed of 36
miles per hour and an average of approximately 3 lanes, these are not major thoroughfares. Only two
deaths occurred on an arterial road, coincidentally at the same location but one in Memorial Day’s flood
and one in Tax Day’s flood, and the balance was split between local roads (18) and collector roads (13).
Speed limits between 30-45 miles per hour represented 24 of the 30 locations. Only two locations had
more lanes than four. Graph 6 below shows a comparison of total deaths by road classification and
number of locations by road classification. Local roads have the most deaths and locations. Arterial
roads are the least significant.

Road Classification at Deadly
Locations
30

25

24

20
15
10
5

18

17
13
2

1

0

Arterial

Collector

Total Deaths

Local

Per location

Graph 6 Comparison of Road Classifications by Number of Deaths and Number of Locations
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The criteria for street observations were developed based on previous interviews and data
collection as well as street observations made in Maples and Tiefenbacher (2009). I also included
character features of roads (straight, curve, level, decline), special features (bridge, underpass, railroad
crossing, street parking), and traffic controls (traffic lights, stop signs) based on a Kansas study of traffic
accidents (K-Tran, 2006). Simply observing the location was not sufficient. At many locations, I had to
retrieve the articles that reference the discovery of the car and body as well as look at the pictures taken
from the scene to ensure I was at the correct location. This was important to create in my observation
what occurred. Table 23 below indicates the raw data collection of special features at each location.
Table 22 Raw Data Special Road Features of Street Observations
Address

Deaths

Bridge

Overpass/
Underpass

Railroad
Crossing

Ramp

Street
Parking

Arkansas St (507)
Briarcreek (1800)
Claiborne St (7400)
Cypress-Rosehill Reserve Rd
E. Crosstimbers (1600)
East Freeway (11000)
FM 1942 (6820)
Gerken @ SH 36
Green River Dr (1400)
Gregdale / US 90
Highway 59 N (18040)
Hillis (9400)
Imperial Valley (17400)
Market St (12000)
N Braeswood (5000)
N Sam Houston Pkwy (800)
N Wayside Dr (3500)
North Freeway (1700)
North Freeway @ Patton
Preston Ave (5125)
Ranchester Drive (5700)
Studemont (1700)
Sweetwater Ln @ W Mount
W
Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Houston
Warrenton Dr (7)
West Loop South (3600)
West Loop South (1433)
Westpark @ Post Oak Exit
Woodforest Blvd (12400)
Wrightwood (1200)

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1

Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes

Number of Yes out of 30
locations

43

8

9

1

0

5
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Railroad crossings, ramps and street parking did not stand as important features to this type of
death. However, bridges seem to be a potential threat, as shown in Graph 7 below, there were eight
locations with a bridge present. The threat will be discussed later in this chapter in its own subsection
when describing driving by bayous.

BRIDGES

Yes
24%

No
76%

Graph 7 Presence of Bridges at Street Observations

Overpass and underpass features were important to observe as the mitigation policies described in
Chapter 6 stress their danger, and my mapping and street observation activities indicate they are a threat,
but not as dangerous in numbers as other road features and characteristics as only four locations had an
actual death in the underpass but a total of nine locations had an underpass observed. As shown in Graph
8 below, only 31% of deaths could be contributed to underpasses. The dangers of underpasses will be
described later in this chapter in its own subsection.

138

Underpass
YES
31%

NO
69%

Yes

No

Graph 8 Presence of Underpass at Street Observations

The character of the locations observed can be found in Table 24 below. Intersection and
interchanges did not represent a clear issue, though I felt it important to document as it may factor into
traffic safety.
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Table 23 Raw Data of Road Character of Street Observations

Address

Even

Dip

Straight

Curve

Intersection/Interchange

Arkansas St (507)
Briarcreek (1800)
Claiborne St (7400)
Rosehill Reserve Drive
E. Crosstimbers (1600)
East Freeway (11000)
FM 1942 (6820)
Gerken @ SH 36
Green River Dr (1400)
Gregdale / US 90
Highway 59 N (18040)
Hillis (9400)
Imperial Valley (17400)
Market St (12000)
N Braeswood (5000)
N Sam Houston Pkwy (800)
N Wayside Dr (3500)
North Freeway (1700)
North Freeway @ Patton
Preston Ave (5125)
Ranchester Drive (5700)
Studemont (1700)
Sweetwater Ln @ W Mount Houston
W Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Warrenton Dr (7)
West Loop South (3600)
West Loop South (1433)
Westpark @ Post Oak Exit
Wood Forest Blvd (12400)
Wrightwood (1200)
Number of Yes out of 30 locations

No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
9

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
21

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
16

No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
14

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
12

However, dips in the road became a visible issue, with roads that were straight or curved did not
matter to the dip as shown in Graph 9 below. This occurrence will be discussed further in its own
subsection of this chapter when describing driving by bayous.
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Dips in Road
NO
30%
YES
70%

Yes

No

Graph 9 Presence of Dips in the Road in Street Observations

I did factor in traffic safety measures in place at the locations as shown in Table 25 below. While
I included the intersection safety such as traffic lights or stop/yield signs, it was not important to the
safety of a driver in standing water on the road. Streetlights were present at most of the locations;
however, a further study of placement could be useful as visibility is problematic from my findings.
Another safety issue I found from the observation where the roads with open surface (ditch) drains. There
was a total of eight locations with this and it will be covered later in this chapter when describing driving
by bayous. While curbs are primarily for aesthetics, they do serve as a means to drain runoff water.
Primarily, there was an existence of curbs with only nine locations as an exception. Shoulders on the
roadway can provide a reduction of risk for hydroplaning and can aid in moving water from the roadway.
Only three locations had a shoulder on the road, therefore, this could be a significant improvement.
Another safety feature, guardrails, can prevent a car from driving from a high elevation to a lower
elevation to the side of the road. It is always necessary, but there were 26 locations out of 30 with no
guardrail. Almost half of the locations had a median. While it helps prevent head on collisions, it really
only proved detrimental to locations in which open drainage was in the middle of the median, such as the
case for Teri Rodriguez in the Tax Day flood and Martin Salazar in the Harvey flood.
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Table 24 Raw Data Traffic Safety Features of Street Observation
Address

Arkansas St (507)
Briarcreek (1800)
Claiborne St (7400)
Cypress-Rosehill Reserve Rd
E. Crosstimbers (1600)
East Freeway (11000)
FM 1942 (6820)
Gerken @ SH 36
Green River Dr (1400)
Gregdale / US 90
Highway 59 N (18040) *
Hillis (9400)
Imperial Valley (17400)
Market St (12000)
N Braeswood (5000)
N Sam Houston Pkwy (800)
N Wayside Dr (3500)
North Freeway (1700)
North Freeway @ Patton
Preston Ave (5125)
Ranchester Drive (5700) *
Studemont (1700) *
Sweetwater Ln @ W Mount Houston
W Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Warrenton Dr (7)
West Loop South (3600)
West Loop South (1433)
Westpark @ Post Oak Exit
Wood Forest Blvd (12400)
Wrightwood (1200)

Number of No out of 30 locations

Traffic
Lights

Stop/
Yield
Sign

Roadway
Flood
Gauge

Flood
Warning
Sign

Permanent
Flood
Barricade

Streetlights

Drains

Curbs

Shoulder

Guardrails

Median

No
No
No
No
Changing
Changing
No
Changing
No
No
Changing
No
No
No
No
Changing
No
Changing
No
No
No
Changing
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
23

Stop
Stop
No
No
No
No
No
No
Stop
No
No
Stop
No
No
No
No
No
No
Stop
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
25

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
24

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
25

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
28

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
5

No
Ditch
No
Street
Street
Street
Ditch
Ditch
Ditch
Ditch
Street
Ditch
Street
Street
Street
Street
Street
Street
Street
Ditch
Street
Street
Ditch
Ditch
Street
Street
Street
Street
Street
No
4

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
9

No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
27

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
26

No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
14
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I added Permanent Flood Warning Signs to the data collection as shown in Table 25 above to
make note of and roadway flood gauges, flood warning signs or flood barricade were present at the place
where a person died from traveling in the extreme flooding event. This was not criteria used in previous
traffic studies I used to develop my model for vehicle related deaths during extreme flooding. The
asterisk represents places that added roadway flooding signage posthumously. It was alarming to observe
how many places, twenty-two, had no warnings of flooding despite a previous death at the location as
indicated in Table 26 below .
Table 25 Street Observations with Roadside FWS Present

Locations and Presence of Roadside
FWS Signage
No FWS signage
FWS signage added posthumously
FWS Signage
Total Number of Locations Observed

Total Number of
Locations
22
3
5
30

Percentage
73.3%
10.0%
16.7%
100%

I looked for three different types of roadside FWS signage: flood gauges, FWS signs, and
permanent flood barricades. Flood gauges will help the driver measure the depth of the water. There are
two yellow diamond warning signs drivers may see on the roadside. Road may flood will help warn the
driver that ponding is potential on a roadway, and they should watch for this and exercise caution.
Another FWS warning sign is the yellow diamond with a picture of a car and curving tread marks to warn
drivers to slow speed on a wet surface. Permanent flood barricades will be manually or automatically
used to close of a portion of the roadway. Only five locations listed above in table 5 indicated a FWS
sign. Table 27 below indicates how many street observations did not show a flood gauge present, how
many did not show a roadside FWS sign and how many did not have the presence of a permanent flood
barricade.
Table 26 Street Observations Total of Various FWS Signs

Type of Warning Sign
No Flood Gauge
No FWS Sign
No Permanent Flood Barricade

Locations with No Sign
24 total locations
25 total locations
29 total locations
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Once I completed the street observations, I felt it necessary to include data regarding each
locations’ rainfall totals for each storm event and indication on whether the location fell in the
floodway, a 100-year floodplain or a 500-year floodplain as shown in Table 28 below. Historical
rainfall data were collected from the Harris County Flood Warning System website,
harriscountyfws.org, with the qualifiers as: seven days rainfall before June 10, 2001, for all
Allison related deaths; three days before May 27, 2015, for all Memorial Day related deaths;
three days before April 19, 2016, for all Tax Day related deaths; five days before August
30,2017 for all Harvey related deaths; three days before September 9, 2019, for all Imelda related
deaths. Floodplain levels for each location was determined through using FEMA’s flood map
service center, https://msc.fema.gov/portal/search#searchresultsanchor, to determine if the
address block for the reported death fell in the floodway, 100-year floodplain, 500-year
floodplain or outside of the floodplain risk.
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Table 27 Raw Data of Floodplain Status of Street Observations

Address

Arkansas St (507)
Briarcreek (1800)
Claiborne St (7400)
Cypress-Rosehill Reserve Rd
E. Crosstimbers (1600)
East Freeway (11000)
FM 1942 (6820)
Gerken @ SH 36
Green River Dr (1400)
Gregdale / US 90
Highway 59 N (18040) *
Hillis (9400)
Imperial Valley (17400)
Market St (12000)
N Braeswood (5000)
N Sam Houston Pkwy (800)
N Wayside Dr (3500)
North Freeway (1700)
North Freeway @ Patton
Preston Ave (5125)
Ranchester Drive (5700) *
Studemont (1700) *
Sweetwater Ln @ W Mount
W Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Houston
Warrenton Dr (7)
West Loop South (3600)
West Loop South (1433)
Westpark @ Post Oak Exit
Wood Forest Blvd (12400)
Wrightwood (1200)

1st Flood
Event
Harvey
Tax Day
Harvey
Tax Day
Allison
Allison
Harvey
Memorial
Harvey
Day
Allison
Imelda
Allison
Tax Day
Allison
Memorial
Tax Day
Day
Harvey
Allison
Allison
Harvey
Memorial
Memorial
Day
Imelda
Day
Harvey
Harvey
Memorial
Memorial
Memorial
Day
Harvey
Day
Allison

2nd Flood
Event

Harvey

Tax Day

1st Flood
Peak
Rainfall
44.08
10.44
38.08
.44
12.68
17.94
36.45
51.88
Unknown
38.84
27.02
14.6
34.69
11.36
36.25
8.76
11.36
37.32
17.46
15.34
41.96
11.6
9.48
11.6
44.64
36.92
7.92
8.32
7.92
40.44
15.34

2nd Flood
Peak Rainfall

31.24

7.92

Flood
Zone
1%
1%
0.2%
No
No
0.2%
0.2%
1%
0.2%
No
0.2%
0.2%
1%
Floodway
1%
1%
1%
1%
Floodway
0.2%
Underpass
Floodway
Floodway
0.2%
0.2%
Underpass
1%
Underpass
0.2%
0.2%
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My findings indicated as shown in Table 29 below, that the majority of deaths were located in a
floodplain risk location. More died in a 500-year floodplain than that of those in the floodway or 100year floodplain, signaling that it was correct for both Harris County and the City of Houston to adopt that
as the barometer for flood mitigation infrastructure. However, it is concerning this was not included in
the HRFWS upgrades to raise existing equipment below the 500-year floodplain due to added expense,
despite this joint emergency/transportation mitigation policy being funded after the flood mitigation
decree (City of Houston Public Works, 2020, p. 1)
Table 28 Street Observation Totals in Floodplain

Location
500-year Floodplain
100-year Floodplain
>500-year floodplain
Floodway
Underpass not in floodplain

Total Number
11
9
4
4
2

Percentage
36.7%
30.0%
13.3%
13.3%
6.7%

Only twenty percent of deaths occurred at a location greater than a 500-year floodplain, and of those, only
7 percent could be attributed to an underpass not located in a marked flood risk area. It is important to
mention the circumstances of the 4 deaths not in a floodplain that died in locations other than an
underpass:
a. Tapscott who backed her vehicle into a newly developing subdivision’s retention pond to
avoid standing water on the roadway in front of her.
b. Romero who died in Allison near but not at an underpass where the closest rainfall gauge
recorded 17.94 inches in the second heaviest rainfall event recorded in Harris County’s
history.
c. the Cordova couple in Tropical Storm Allison, who slid into a ditch gully from a National
Guard rescue vehicle creating a wake, as shown from my street observation in Figure 32
below.
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Location on road where ditch is
located.

Location on road where
the Cordova’s left the
roadway and floated into
the ditch.

Figure 28 Street Observations of Cordova couple from Allison, Location: Gregdale/US 90

Proposed Mitigation Theory from my Analysis
Because of this, I have determined there are two types of flood related automobile deaths that my
observations established: those at/or near underpasses and those by roadways that run parallel or intersect
with waterways in Harris County.
As indicated in Figure 33 below, there are main factors to consider when mitigating deaths from
urban driving during extreme flooding. The Houston Flood Warning System is making excellent strides
towards mitigating those from underpasses; however, much work is needed regarding those deaths that
occur from driving near bayous in both permanent roadway signage and through better street design. As a
result, I have divided the remainder of this chapter to explaining these as two types of deaths: those near
underpasses and those near a bayou. The section for underpass deaths has less to review as it has
primarily been focused on with the HRFWS, whereas less attention has been on mitigation of driving near
bayous. Also, I included deaths at underpasses and deaths at bayous near underpass as a combined look
for the category of driving near and underpass.

Urban Driving During Extreme Flooding
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Dont Exit

Driving Near
Underpass
(12 deaths 28%)

Local Driving: Roadway
Warning Present
Roadway Signs or Barriers
at Decline of Exit
Not Visible

Warning

Flood Pattern
Change/ Unfamiliarity

Driving Near
Bayou

Lack of Warning

(31 deaths 72%)

Dips
Entrapment of Street
Design

Bridges
Open Drain (Ditch)

Figure 29 Types of Vehicle Related Deaths During Extreme Flooding
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Underpass Deaths
Deaths from driving into deep waters can be mitigated by flood gates and warning
signals. This section will address that found in Figure 33 above. I have also isolated the

Underpass Deaths - 28%

information as shown below in Figure 34.

Don't Exit
Local Driving: Roadway
Warning Present
Roadway Signs or
Barriers at Decline of Exit

Figure 30 Deaths Near or/at an Underpass

Nine locations where twelve deaths occurred are included in this section. The locations
are shown below in Table 30. Seven of the twelve deaths occurred at the underpass, and those
location addresses are italicized. The other five were near the underpass but occurred at a
declining road leading to the underpass. However, the mitigation infrastructure of the HRFWS
will aid most in the prevention of deaths at these locations, so it is important to qualify them
under this category rather than the driving by bayou death’s category.
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Table 29 Street Observations Included in Qualifiers for Underpass Deaths

Address

E. Crosstimbers (1600) **
East Freeway (11000)
Highway 59 N (18040)
N Sam Houston Pkwy (800)
Ranchester Drive (5700)*
Studemont (1700)*
West Loop South (3600)
West Loop South (1433)
Westpark @ Post Oak Exit

Number
of
Victims
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
2

Flood Event 1

Allison
Allison
Imelda
Tax Day
Memorial Day
Memorial Day
Memorial Day
Memorial Day
Memorial Day

Flood
Event 2

Harvey

Tax Day

Do not Exit Interstate

Based on the historical pattern of deaths in Harris County during my selected extreme
flooding storms, I think it becomes more essential to educate the public about the dangers of
exiting and entering the interstate system. The best position for a driver caught in Houston rains
during an extreme flooding event is to be on an interstate because it is the highest and most lit
road surface in Harris County. Ideally, the driver would have stayed home, but it is important to
understand that if there are drivers on the road, broadcasted flood warnings as well as roadway
signage should explain the dangers of exiting the interstate. This is counterintuitive to collective
thought and public officials’ explanations of roadway flood hazards in Harris County. The ugly
truth to doing so creates the potential threat of many cars to tow away that delay vital emergency
response and logistics on the arterial network, but this potentially might save lives. This does not
mean that there are not low-lying portions of the interstate in Harris County where vehicles could
flood as shown in previous chapters from all the storms; however, no one has actually died from
this. Several reasons for this could include better street lighting and these places are typically
blocked off by emergency response faster since they are more densely traveled than local and
collector roads.
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Declining Roads that Intersect an Underpass
Some of the deaths attributed to underpass death are on the declining collector road near the
underpass to enter the interstate, and gates to stop traffic at the interstate exit would be an ideal barrier.
However, as mentioned in Chapter 6, the joint efforts of TranStar and HCFCD’s Houston Floodway
warning system is an excellent start to mitigating these deaths. Two locations in Table 33 above have an
asterisk to indicate they have already been outfitted with the technology for the HRFWS.
Minimum of Permanent Flood Warning Signs
As it is established that underpasses, even those not in a floodplain, can add risk of death due to
flooding and flooding patterns can change, all underpasses in Harris County should at least have a road
gauge for people to determine the depth of the water ponding at underpasses. One of the below Figure 36
is a picture of an underpass with a shot of the road declining as well as an image of the underpass. Notice
that the underpass does not have any flood warning signs or gauges but does have a height safety sign for
oversized vehicles.

This intersection had many stranded motorists on the third rain day of Tropical

Storm Imelda (ABC13 Houston, 2019). Figure 35 illustrates the rising water.

Figure 31 News Coverage of the Intersection of 610 and Fournace During Imelda (ABC13 Houston, 2019)

Figure 32 Intersection of 610 and Fournace
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It is also important to note is that Harris County Tropical Storm Imelda was a 1000-year storm for the
Bellaire section of Harris County where this intersected is located. The exit / underpass before this one in
the Galleria area has had four deaths from two separate storms but is not in a floodplain. It would be ideal
to have flood warnings and gauges added to all underpasses in Harris County. They represent an
environment where measuring depth is vital to survival during extreme flooding. Map 10 below shows a
map of vulnerable high-water underpasses that should have flood gauges and sign improvement.

Map 9 Underpasses that Need Updated Signage

Bayou Deaths
After mapping each death, I was able to see that in Harris County the biggest threat to
motorists are neighborhood roads next to the bayous in the city. Because Hurricane Harvey
brought more rainfall, the distance from the bayou was slightly more prevalent from where
bodies were found. However, the patterns I discovered from analyzing the data indicate overall
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that being on a road next to the bayou that has risen will be the most detrimental place for
motorist. Figure 37 below indicates those types of deaths and ways to improve this.

Driving Near Bayou- 72%

Not Visible
Roadway Warnings
Needed

Flood Pattern Change/
Unfamiliarity
Lack of Warning Signs

Dips
Entrapment of Street
Design

Bridges

Open Drain (Ditch)
Figure 33 Deaths driving near bayou

Table 31 below lists the locations that I observed that qualify as driving near the bayou.
Motorists and/or passengers either died while in their car or after abandoning a vehicle due to
high water on the roadway. The Cypress-Rosehill Reserve Rd location was Tapscott who
backed into a detention pond in a rural subdivision. I have counted this as part of the bayou
network for types of fatalities.
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Table 30 Street Observation Qualifiers for by Bayou Driving Deaths

Address
Arkansas St (507)
Briarcreek (1800)
Claiborne St (7400)
Cypress-Rosehill Reserve Rd
FM 1942 (6820)
Gerken @ SH6
Green River Dr (1400)
Gregdale/US 90
Hillis (9400)
Imperial Valley (17400)
Market St (12000)
N Braeswood (5000)
N Wayside Dr (3500)
North Freeway (1700)
North Freeway @ Patton
Preston Ave (5125)
Sweetwater Ln @ W Mount
Houston
W Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Warrenton Dr (7)
Woodforest Blvd (12400)
Wrightwood (1200)
Totals

Number of
Victims
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
1
1

Flood Event

Watershed

Harvey
Tax Day
Harvey
Tax Day
Harvey
Memorial Day
Harvey
Allison
Allison
Tax Day
Allison
Memorial Day
Harvey
Allison
Allison
Harvey
Imelda

Sims
Cypress Creek
Greens
Spring Creek
Cedar
Big Creek
Greens
Greens
Greens
Greens
Hunting
Brays
Hunting
White Oak
White Oak
Armand
Greens

Harvey
Harvey
Harvey
Allison

Clear Creek
Buffalo
Greens
White Oak

1
1
1
1
31

As Table 22 indicated earlier, more than 70 percent of driving related deaths in my case
storms selected can be attributed to a person driving near the bayou and being overpowered by
the water that floods the roadway. Flood modeling can aid governmental officials to warn
people of these danger spots through permanent signage, public education, or public
announcements during a flooding event. Figure 38 below describes issues I found in street
observations from deaths resulting from driving near a bayou.
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Driving Near Bayou

Not Visible
Roadway Warnings
Needed

Flood Pattern Change/
Unfamiliarity
Lack of Warning Signs

Dips
Entrapment of Street
Design

Bridges

Open Drain (Ditch)
Figure 34 Deaths Driving Near Bayou

My street observations indicated there are ways the built environment fails to warn
drivers and there are ways that transportation design can entrap drivers. I illustrate these
concepts in Figure 38 above and will explain them further in the below subsections. These
components are not addressed adequately by the Houston Roadway Flood Warning System and
my findings could help mitigate those types of deaths on local and collector roads that neighbor
channels of bayou.
Roadway Warnings Needed

By observing the street locations of deaths that occurred blocks from the bayou, I found
three significant discoveries regarding the warnings of the Harris County’s transportation-built
environment:
1. Bayou Visibility on Roadway
2. Change of Previous Flood Pattern
3. Lack of Roadway Warning Signage
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Bayou Visibility

I first discovered the pattern of driving near a bayou occurring more than at the interstates
by exploring Google Earth to obtain the latitude and longitude coordinates for ArcGIS. The
bayou was so close on the map to the roadway that it became curious to me how this happened. I
added the question “Is bayou visible?” to the street observation checklist I created for conducting
observations. At 20 of the locations (66%), the bayou was not visible to me from the roadway
where the victim died, as shown in Table 32 below. I believe this makes a difference in the
drivers’ understanding of the threat. If they do not see the bayou and water on the road is visible,
they may believe the water is ponding from rainfall rather overflowing banks of the bayou. This
could hypothetically alter their ability to determine depth of water and speed of water, potentially
causing a driver to make a deadly decision.
Table 31 Bayou Visibility

Is Bayou Visible from
roadway?
No
Yes

Number of
Locations
20
10

Percentage of Locations
66.7%
33.3%

In Table 33 below, I indicate the street observation locations and which ones had a bayou
visible, labelled “yes”. Those that did not are labelled “no.” I also noted the built environment
and topography around the location but did not find any conclusions about them.
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Table 32 Raw Data Visibility of Bayou and Surrounding Environment of Street Observations

Address

Arkansas St (507)
Briarcreek (1800)
Claiborne St (7400)
Cypress-Rosehill Reserve Rd
E. Crosstimbers (1600)
East Freeway (11000)
FM 1942 (6820)
Gerken @ SH 36
Green River Dr (1400)
Gregdale / US 90
Highway 59 N (18040) *
Hillis (9400)
Imperial Valley (17400)
Market St (12000)
N Braeswood (5000)
N Sam Houston Pkwy (800)
N Wayside Dr (3500)
North Freeway (1700)
North Freeway @ Patton
Preston Ave (5125)
Ranchester Drive (5700) *
Studemont (1700) *
Sweetwater Ln @ W Mount
W
Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Houston
Warrenton Dr (7)
West Loop South (3600)
West Loop South (1433)
Westpark @ Post Oak Exit
Wood Forest Blvd (12400)
Wrightwood (1200)
Total No

Bayou
Visible

Built
Environment

Topography

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
20

Commercial
Residential
Residential
Residential
Commercial
Commercial
Residential
Residential
Mixed
Residential
Commercial
Residential
Mixed
Commercial
Residential
Commercial
Commercial
Mixed
Commercial
Commercial
Commercial
Commercial
Mixed
Mixed
Residential
Mixed
Commercial
Commercial
Residential
Residential

Grass
Trees
Trees
Grass
Grass
Grass
Grass
Grass
Trees
Creek
Grass
Grass
Grass
Grass
Grass
Concrete
Grass
Grass
Grass
Grass
Trees
Concrete
Grass
Grass
Grass
Concrete
Grass
Concrete
Grass
Trees

Change of Previous Flood Patterns

Thirty percent of the locations had bayou rainfall gauges added to the locations after the
deaths as shown in Table 37 below. This indicates that new flood patterns emerged that
prompted HCFCD to add rainfall gauges to use in the Harris County flood warning system. A
good example of this impacting a driver is the death of Reverend Thomas Johnson during
Allison. Chapter 8 discussed him leaving his church to go home and not making it. The flood
pattern had shifted evidently as HCFCD installed a new rainfall gauge closer to the location that
he died. Figure 39 below, from HCFCD, A represents the location of the 9400 block of Hillis
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where he died (https://www.harriscountyfws.org/). The flood gauge representing 0.0 is closest to
him but was added six months after his death (Harris County Flood Warning System, 2021).

Figure 35 A represents the block of 9400 Hillis where a driver died (https://www.harriscountyfws.org/).

Nine locations had a rainfall gauge installed closer to their deaths posthumously as shown below
in Table 34. It is not clear if the death impacted the decision to add a flood gauge at the bayou point, but
it is doubtful since no roadway warning signs were added at locations with the new gauges at the bayou to
measure rainfall. The locations with the asterisk had no new rainfall gauge installed after those deaths,
though signs were added as shown in Table 37 below. Having rainfall gauges allows residents to sign up
and receive text and email warning alerts from Harris County Flood Warning Systems during rainfall
events. Having these engaged near a location where a death previously occurred indicates that flooding
changed significantly enough to prompt a new rainfall gauge added.
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Table 33 Raw Data New Bayou Rainfall Gauge Installs

Address

1st Flood
Event

Arkansas St (507)
Briarcreek (1800)
Claiborne St (7400)
Cypress-Rosehill Reserve Road
E. Crosstimbers (1600)*
East Freeway (11000)
FM 1942 (6820)
Gerken @ SH 36
Green River Dr (1400)
Gregdale / US 90
Highway 59 N (18040) *
Hillis (9400)
Imperial Valley (17400)
Market St (12000)
N Braeswood (5000)
N Sam Houston Pkwy (800)
N Wayside Dr (3500)
North Freeway (1700)
North Freeway @ Patton
Preston Ave (5125)
Ranchester Drive (5700) *
Studemont (1700) *
Sweetwater Ln @ W Mount
Houston
W Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Warrenton Dr (7)
West Loop South (3600)
West Loop South (1433)
Westpark @ Post Oak Exit
Wood Forest Blvd (12400)
Wrightwood (1200)

Harvey
Tax Day
Harvey
Tax Day
Allison
Allison
Harvey
Memorial
Day
Harvey
Allison
Imelda
Allison
Tax Day
Allison
Memorial
Day
Tax
Day
Harvey
Allison
Allison
Harvey
Memorial
Day
Memorial
Day
Imelda
Harvey
Harvey
Harvey
Memorial
Day
Memorial
Day
Harvey
Allison

2nd
Flood
Event

Harvey

Tax Day

1st Flood
Peak
Rainfall
44.08
10.44
.44
38.08
12.68
17.94
36.45
51.88
Unknown
38.84
27.02
14.6
34.69
11.36
36.25
8.76
11.36
37.32
17.46
15.34
41.96
11.6
9.48
11.6
44.64
36.92
7.92
8.32
7.92
40.44
15.34

2nd Flood
Peak
Rainfall

New Water Gauge
Installed at Bayou

09/10/2018

7/23/2020

1/3/2002

31.24

2/3/2016
10/30/2018

1/15/2020

5/24/2018
5/24/2018
7.92

5/24/2018

Lack of Roadway Flood Warning Signage

The locations overwhelmingly had no road sign to warn about dangers that the road may
flood as chronicled earlier in the chapter with Tables 29 and 30. Of the eight locations where
signs warn drivers of this threat, four of the locations were part of an install after the victim had
passed in the respective storm. Over forty percent of the total deaths to occur were at locations
where both the bayou was not visible from the roadway and flood warning signs were not present
at the time of my street observations as shown in Table 38 below. While the TIGER grant was
awarded to improve flood warning signs near interstates, local roads are responsible for as many
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deaths and these locations did not have any flood warning sign. Changing to more advanced
technology helps, which the TIGER grant allows, but the next phase incorporates mitigation for
roads not connected as close to the Interstate system. However, at a minimum, permanent
yellow warning signs should be placed where previous people have died.
Built Environment Entraps Drivers
There are various types of dangerous street designs that have been observed on local and collector
roads located near bayous that require more government attention to mitigate future deaths. If nothing
else, conveying these threats to the public in driver education programs or public announcements will
help drivers understand locations that may have more risk that other roadway locations.
Roads with Dips
Seventy percent of the roads had a decline or dip in the road. This becomes important when a
person is deciding to continue if they do not see a bayou or if they do not see a warning sign, then they
may continue to drive unaware that there is a significant decline in the road. Table 35 below compares
the 21 locations with other known visibility issues: ability to see roadside signage warning drivers that a
road may flood, and ability to see the bayou from the roadway. Of the 21 locations, a high percentage of
these locations either do not have FWS signage present or do not seeing the bayou from the roadside
could have made caused them to make a fatal decision. Forty-two percent of these locations had neither
present.
Table 34 Street Observation Relationship between Dip, FWS Signs and Bayou Visibility from Roadway

Total Location Count with Decline/Dip - 21
Total Location Count with Dip and NO FWS signs - 13
Total location count with dip, no bayou visible - 15
Total location count with dip, no FWS signs, & no bayou visible – 9

% From locations with dip
61%
71%
42%

If flood patterns change or a person is unfamiliar with the road, visibility can cause them to miss
the roadway declining into a lethal pond on the roadway. A great example of this was the death of Garren
in Allison at the 1200 block of Wrightwood. The dip was not noticeable as I drove to observe the
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intersection in daylight. There were no roadway signs at this local roadway, and this death happened
twenty years before my observation. Figure 40 shows various pictures from this observation.

Bridge at dip of the road where Warren was washed off roadway.
Dip in road is not visible in distance.

White Oak Bayou intersects Wrightwood at the dip in road.

Bridge at dip in road on Wrightwood.

Figure 36 1200 Block of Wrightwood Observation

Bridges
Roadways that intersect bayous with bridges are also dangerous in Harris County. This has also
contributed to deaths on local and collector roads. As shown in table 36 below, eight locations did have a
bridge present, and 87.5% of them had no flood warning sign or roadside flood gauge. If water surpassed
the height of the bridge railing, it is possible, that like a dip in the road, motorists were unable to see the
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depth and made a fatal decision to continue driving. Bridge height design should be considered in future
studies.
Table 35 Street Observations with Bridges and Visible FWS Signage Relationship

Total Location Count with Bridge - 8
Total Location Count with Dip and NO FWS signs - 7

% Of locations with dip
87.5%

An example of my street observation of a death near a bridge can be seen in figure 41 below.
This is the location where Salas died in Imelda at Sweetwater Lane. He left a car and tried to
walk home but was swept by the bayou waters at the bridge. At the time of my observation, I
noted the low profile of the bridge. It is possible that he misjudged where the road was and
could have taken a step where pavement was not underneath him. It is also possible that he did
not measure the depth correctly or that the strong currents swept him away. What is clear is that
no FWS signage was at the location, he was at a bridge and HCFCD is doing work to fix a
bank/slope failure at this location as previously mentioned.
Intersection
where Salas left
car.

Bridge where Salas
was washed away
after walking from
vehicle.

Figure 37 Sweetwater Lane @ West Mount Houston
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Streets with Ditch or No Drain

Forty percent of the locations have streets with ditch drains or no visible drain and no
way to guard the street from spillover. All of these locations had no FWS roadside signage or
gauges present as shown below in Table 37. Also, almost sixty percent of these locations also
did not have the bayou visible from the roadside. This can cause a driver to not understand depth
and danger of the water and cause a fatal decision.
Table 36 Street Locations with observed Ditch or No Drain Comparison to FWS Signs and Bayou Visibility

Total Location Count with Ditch or No Street Drain - 12
Total Location Count no FWS signs - 12
Total location count with no bayou visible - 7

% From locations with dip
100%
58%

During the Tax Day flood, Rodriguez died at the 1800 block of Briarcreek with a ditch
drain. Trees obstructed the view of the bayou and the drainage ditch’s overflowed due to the
flooding of Cypress Creek. Figure 42 shows an image of the flooding during the event that
claimed her life. Figure 43 is a picture from my street observation of this location.

Figure 38 Street view of Briarcreek flooded during Tax Day (KPRC Houston, 2016).
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Terri Rodriguez’s car floated from the roadway
into the ditch that divided the flow of traffic.
Bayou is behind the trees.

Figure 39 1800 Block of Briarcreek with no flooding

Summary
While I agree that the HRFWS will bring significant changes to mitigate deaths around
the arterial network of Harris County, it will not help mitigate the majority of deaths from
motorists or passengers in a moving vehicle or those that abandon the vehicle. This will require
more mitigation strategies at local and collector roads closest to the bayous such as either better
design or ample roadside warnings to indicate the risk to drivers.

CHAPTER 10
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
In speaking with people and reviewing and mapping each death, it began clear to me how
valued vehicle ownership is in Harris County, and how overlooked its significance is to overall
mortality rate during extreme flooding events. This becomes missed opportunities of mitigation
in both arenas of transportations and emergency’s communication and concrete infrastructure.
Figure 44 below shows the current government view on roadway deaths. As the street is
designed to flood, they look at deaths from what the driver did wrong versus how roadway
design may contribute to the death. They have claimed they cannot prevent deaths from those
that drive through barriers, but only one death out of the forty-five I studied resulted from this.
They also argue that drivers disregard roadway warning signs that could prevent their deaths, but
only twelve of the forty-five deaths had roadway warning signs present. After some deaths
occurred in the same locations as previous floods, the victims’ families asked for improvement.
This resulted in the Houston Roadway Flood Warning System, which will help only five
locations out of thirty where people have died.
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Government View on
Roadway Deaths
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Drive through barrier
(1 of 45 deaths)
Street is designed to flood,
driver should know better.

Disregard of Roadway Warning
Signs
(12 of 45 deaths)

Public Outcry of Underpass
Deaths

HRFWS
(5 of locations observed)

Figure 40 Current Government View on Roadway Deaths

Historical Narrative of Government Response
In the official assessment report for Tropical Storm Allison, National Weather Service
reported “It is difficult to understand why there were 22 fatalities on June 8-9… with the
exception of the two deaths on Sunday afternoon, June 10, all of the Houston fatalities perished
while a Flash Flood Warning was in effect” (National Weather Service, 2001, p. 24). At the
time of Memorial Day’s flooding in 2015, comparisons were made to the last memorable flood,
Tropical Storm Allison in 2001. A missed opportunity emerged of comparing the deaths of the
two storms and the human impact of the transportation network in Harris County, rather focus
was primarily on the physical impact the storms played on the roadway infrastructure and
technology. Even more focus would be placed on the storm’s socio-economic impact on housing
and industry as well as years of research lost from the Medical Center. The Tax Day flood of
2016 occurred eleven months after Memorial Day’s 2015 flood and resulted in frustrated
victims’ family members being interviewed about deaths occurring at underpasses near and at

166

the same locations during the Memorial Day flood a year before. The Harris County Judge and
presiding officer of Harris County’s Commissioner’s Court at the time of the Tax Day floods
stated that he would work with the Texas Department of Transportation and Harris County
authorities to determine the most dangerous areas of the highway system and he admitted that
“I’m not sure anybody has ever put together an exact list of where we’ve had drowning victims”
(Begley, Officials pledge action after flooded roadway deaths, 2016). My dissertation has
created the list of the victims and locations, has mapped them, and completed street observations
as well.
Hurricane Harvey would follow the Tax Day flood only 16 months later. The National
Weather Service’s final report on Harvey would conclude that the death toll was low due to
proper FWS, and they would state that Harris County, TX experienced the most deaths from the
storm (2018). The Memorial Day, Tax Day and Harvey floods were then studied by public
officials that in turn brought about funding and planning for the County’s infrastructure with the
Tiger 2017 grant (City of Houston, 2017). The report would credit Memorial Day Flood with
causing four vehicle related deaths, Tax Day with four vehicle related deaths and Harvey with
eight vehicle related deaths. My discoveries from studying the selected storms would find seven
vehicles related for Memorial Day, seven for Tax Day, and 17 for Harvey, in addition to twelve
for Allison. This is shown below in Table 37.
Table 37 HRFWS vs Dissertation Deaths Counted

Storm
Tropical Storm Allison

Tiger Grant Deaths
Counted
Not Included

Dissertation Deaths
Counted
12

Memorial Day Flood

4

7

Tax Day Flood

4

7

167

Hurricane Harvey

8

17

Tropical Storm Imelda

Not Included

2

Average

5.3

9.6

When Tropical Storm Imelda occurred, much of the communication infrastructure for
warning drivers was available through the collaboration of HCFCD and Houston TranStar’s
technology while signage and drainage updates were a work in progress. However, the low
number of deaths for Harris County from Imelda proved more likely due to daytime flooding
rather than nighttime flooding as was the case primarily in the other four storms that I studied.
Visibility of the road, the bayou and the appropriate roadside warning signs all appear as critical
in the outcome for drivers and passengers as received warnings/knowledge of the storm. Also,
many interviewed were still surprised by the extreme weather of the storms despite ample
warnings, indicating more work is needed to ensure people do receive the warnings and
adequately understand the storm’s threat.
People included in my counts either died as the driver or passenger in their car from
drowning or heart attack, or from abandoning the vehicle in a self or organized rescue effort.
The report submitted for the Tiger Grant did mention that they used numbers directly related to
their proposal, but that they believed their number may be too conservative. My findings agree
that their numbers were too low, resulting in a mitigation policy that will fall short of preventing
potential deaths, especially on local roads further away from Harris County’s arterial network,
yet closer to the waterway (City of Houston, 2017).
Not included in my dissertation, but potentially should be considered when factoring in
the significance of a vehicle to a death in a storm, were other deaths from driving to a location
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and then getting electrocuted or going to a parking garage to get in a vehicle and experiencing an
elevator drowning, one of each outcome both happened in the Allison and Harvey storms. The
lowest potential way of a person dying from my studies was sheltering in place, which
transportation and emergency management should stress more than Turn Around Don’t Drown,
which could inadvertently and subliminally promote being in a vehicle during extreme flooding.
It also might be a catchy phrase that interviewees associated with government response, but it is
vague and generalizing, misleading at best and fatal at worst, as in the case of Ariel Tapscott,
who reversed her car into a retention pond to avoid standing water in the roadway. Harris
County’s culture is submersed in the ability to move about freely as well as strong essence of
individualism.

Cultural Value of Freedom that an Automobile Represents
However problematic the past may be, Harris County is home to the battleground of San
Jacinto, which many Texans claim and celebrate as the place independence was won from
Mexico prior to annexation by the United States. This victory is especially claimed by groups of
people who have historically held positions of power in the Harris County. The city of Houston
was named after general Sam Houston, who led the Texas army in this battle. The city of
Houston, founded by the Allen brothers, advertised for settlers by promoting it as the established
central shipping hub of the United States. Public efforts immediately began the project of
dredging the bayou to bring ships inland from the Gulf of Mexico. The city adopted an official
logo with a train to embody this vision of transportation and progress. The train is still in the
city’s current logo. The local professional baseball stadium is located at the former site of Union
Station in downtown Houston and has a train that moves when the home team scores. The
annual social event of the year for the area is the largest rodeo held in the United States, the
Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo, which first began in 1932. Trail rides come from all areas
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of the state and traffic is paused to allow people in wagons and on horseback to arrive safely at
the Rodeo grounds. For three weeks, there are daily rodeos and livestock shows. This event
raises scholarship money for agricultural and veterinary fields, but it also shapes the identity of
the community as it displays romantic nostalgia of frontieresque individualism and the ideology
of equating mobility with freedom.
Therefore, the value of owning a car and the freedom to move about independently and
individually cannot be understated. Perhaps Harris County is a critical case study of vehicle
related flood fatalities because it is more prone to flooding, but it could also have become a
critical case study due to its heritage of the freedom the automobile provides. Harris County’s
height of growth came during the rise in automobile usage. For years, the region has built
roadways alongside and intersecting natural waterways, in addition to channelizing more miles
of water that twist and turn alongside the county’s transportation infrastructure. The county and
local governments have largely been able to do so from the economic growth in the energy
sector, itself a part of Harris County’s cultural composition to continue heavy dependance on
single family vehicles. As the population has expanded, the built environment has concealed
bayous from roadways and the direction the water flows to a roadway is a critical factor. No
segment of the roadways bends or curves the same and the ability to change route becomes very
situational, very quickly to offer a blanket solution such as “Turn Around Don’t Drown.” A
person driving during extreme weather who cannot see the road in front of them, should not rely
on the idea that the most dangerous waterway is in front of them because the waterway can
potentially be on either side of them or behind them. The place in which their car is at on a
specific roadway can alter the position of the waterway as well.
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Human Element Missing in Fatality Studies
What my research has indicated, is that the human element of drivers has been absent
from previous studies about vehicle related flood fatalities, and below in Figure 45, I illustrate
how the driver’s behavior runs against the cycle of collective thought and government response.
My study reveals that despite omitting a driver’s logic, the sense making that occurs post flood
event is still factored and shapes mitigation policy. The problem with this is that the collective
thought, in many ways, promotes theories that contradict verified data in my dissertation. The
following section describes my observation of the current network of actors and their role in
events which lead to a driver or passenger dying due to extreme flooding.
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Figure 41 Current network of actors in Vehicle Related Flood Fatalities
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Time of Day
The time of day that the rain event occurs, and the driving takes place matter to the
outcome of the driver and/or passenger(s) so it is included in Figure 54 above. When heavy rains
occur at night, it reduces overall visibility and likely creates a better opportunity for the fatality
of people in vehicles. If this occurs during morning or evening rush hours, when it is dark
outside, this increases the amount of people on the road and further creates the chance of a
fatality.

Driver
As described in the conclusion of chapter 8, there are three stages of the driver process
during extreme flooding that mitigation policy and education should address
Stage 1 – Decision to Drive – There is a psychology adopted by the driver to either go
about their day as ordinary or to use the vehicle to flee what they perceive is a bad situation. It is
important to mitigate this thought process. For example, prior to a tropical storm, DMS signs
along the freeway warn drivers a storm in the Gulf is brewing and to fill their tanks. The purpose
of this message is to warn of potential need to evacuate prior to the storm. However, this may
subliminally tell drivers to stay on alert because they may need to get in their vehicle and drive to
safety at a moment’s notice. This should not be the imagery a person conjurs up in the midst of
an extreme rainfall event because sheltering in place is by far safer than deciding to go to a
vehicle to get in and leave.
Stage 2 – Should I continue? – Here is where the Turn Around, Don’t Drown ideology
could prove helpful. The driver and/or passengers get in the vehicle and see that they cannot see
the built and natural environment in front of them and should not continue. They should park
and find higher ground if they have traveled far, or they should return to their shelter if they
discover a visibility issue upon getting in the car or walking to get in the car. Here is also where
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DMS signs on the arterial transportation network should read, once the extreme rainfall occurs in
which extreme flooding is predicted, “Flash Flood Alert, Seek Higher Ground” or “Flash Flood
Alert, Read Here for Exit Closures” and when extreme flooding alerts are signaled by HCFCD
that a DMS sign should be activated, then it can change the message to indicate to drivers not to
exit.
Stage 3- My car can’t make it! – At this stage, the driver either cannot escape the
vehicle, or they abandon it. Even abandoning the vehicle can prove fatal.

Social Norms
Meanwhile, common myths prevail in collective thought that can promote ideology
counterintuitive to the prevention of deaths.
There is a right way and a wrong way to drive! - Many I interviewed described the
right versus wrong ways a person should drive during storms. Rather than stating I should not
have driven in the storm, or it would be better to not drive, they described speed, measuring
depth and other practices as the correct way to drive. This was more prevalent among the male
population that I interviewed than the females. It was also more common among people that had
lived in Harris County the longest amount of time. Interestingly, males represented 67% of the
deaths in vehicles or from abandoning their vehicles in this study, and 80% of the deaths have
occurred from people living in Harris County for more than ten years.
They are not from around here. – Most people believe that those most likely to die by
driving in an extreme flooding event have not lived in Harris County long enough to know that
flooding is common and dangerous. However, as previously mentioned, only twenty percent of
the people that died in this dissertation’s selected storms had lived in Harris County for less than
ten years. There were different ways that interviewees brought this myth up in their answers.
Many recalled earlier storms not included in this study and stating they learned to have a healthy
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fear of flooding from their childhood. Many who had driven in more recent storms justified their
action by expressing they were new to the area and did not know how bad flooding was. These
comparisons came naturally to all interviewed to mention or suggest longer tenure of living in
Harris County meant knowing better, when this is simply not what the deaths studied indicated.
These can contribute to next two common myths. It also raises the question of how much a
county steeped in systemic racism may play a role in shaping this social norm, as almost 75% of
the deaths represent black, indigenous and people of color (BIPOC) as described earlier in
Chapter 4. Or it could be more literal, in that people believe those that die have not lived in the
area long, and if so, this false narrative promotes complacency among residents who have lived
in the area longer than ten years.
It’s their own fault. - Many interviewed made sense of the recurring tragedy to
associate this with driver error rather than as transportation or emergency design error. How
much is this due to racism, mitigation design flaws or driver error could be further studied.
It wouldn’t happen to me. – There is a detachment that occurs in making sense of the
tragedy from people dying due to driving during extreme rain events.
Just stay away from the underpasses and interstates. – From the interviews that I
conducted to interviews by policymakers to the public, people isolate underpasses and interstates
as the area most vulnerable to dying. This information is inaccurate as seen in the locations
where victims have died.

Public Officials and Policy
It is evident that arterial networks are valued more than local and collector roads based on
current mitigation policies matching collective thought on the phenomenon of vehicle related
casualties in extreme flooding. It is also evident from comparing my data to that used by the
county and city to shape mitigation policy, is closely aligned more with collective social thought
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than meaningful change in outcome. The results of my study reveal that while deaths may be
prevented close to the arterial network, those most vulnerable to this phenomenon, those on local
and collector roads by the bayou, will need further action to mitigate in the future. Finding
victim demographics by searching outside of the reports provided from the first responding
officials, emergency personnel, also indicate a need to reverse the stigma of root cause analysis
stemming from the perspective of what the driver did wrong to cause his or her death. This starts
when the police officer fills out the report. Also, the language in government documents indicate
how the driver errs and how the government needs to change things to prevent driver error.
While driver error contributes to the problem, it omits a larger issue of vulnerable locations
without any roadway warning signs in place. Roads are designed and maintained by the
government. Properly warning drivers of safety on the roadway falls on the government.

Road Design and Warnings
Road design and roadside warnings play a significant role in this phenomenon. Their
effectiveness is severely underappreciated in current collective thought and mitigation strategies.
More emphasis blames the driver from those that I interviewed to the language of the official
mitigation reports that stated the need to make signs higher, switch the colors from yellow to red
and other arguments to get the driver to pay attention better. The data from my street
observations revealed a lack of roadside warning signs at roads designed to flood, which presents
a situation in which the government did not properly warn the driver.

Reversing Current Ideology & Practice
From reviewing all of my information, I found it important to reverse current ideology
that shapes Harris County mitigation practice. Currently, both collective social thought and the
government process the tragic phenomenon from a reactionary and counterintuitive perspective
as shown in Figure 46 below. Current social norms and mitigation policy mitigates human
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driving error that may occur on the built environment of our transportation network. Factoring
the flood source of the roadway, a bayou or waterway above its banks due to extreme rainfall and
viewing the roadway for its design flaws is segmented from this process but should be
considered equally important to the outcome.
1. Human driving errors include but are not limited:
a. to continuing to drive when road, bayou or signage visibility is low.
b. responding to an extraordinary event as an ordinary day.
c. and allowing the extraordinary event to cloud their ability to focus and respond
quickly and calmly to the threat.
2. Roadway design and warning errors include but are not limited:
a. to streets that conceal design meant to flood the street such as dips or ditches.
b. not offering adequate permanent warning signage in roadways that are visible
every day to aid in shifting a driver’s mindset in a time when extreme rainfall
occurs,
c. this roadway is vulnerable to rainfall hazards.
d. providing warnings and public education that promotes usage of a vehicle over
sheltering in place.

Roadways' Built
Environment
-Human Driving Error

Roadway Flood Source
-Roadway Design/Warning Error

Figure 42 Reactionary Sense Making of Tragic Phenomenon
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Recommended Perspective on Mitigation Policy
Rather than center mitigation policy from the perspective of the built environment of
roadways, mitigation policy should center the program around the natural environment during an
extreme rainfall event. The HRFWS uses bayou channel rainfall levels to communicate at the
arterial network. Focus is on the dangers this event places on the built environment of roadways.
However, focus should be more like pictured in Figure 47 below. Human driving error and
roadway design error all contribute to deaths when extreme rainfall occurs and causes ponding

Evidence Based Approach to
Phenomenon

due to stormwater drainage issues at an underpass and over-the-banks waterway flooding.

Night (35 of 43 deaths)

Driver Error

Visibility
During Extreme Event (39 of 43 deaths)

Driving Near Bayou (31 of 43 deaths)
Road Design

Underpass (7 of 43 deaths)
Interstate

Design
Error

Near Underpass (5 of 43 deaths)

Warning
Design

Road Warnings (Missing 22 of
30 locations)
Public Warnings

Figure 43 Paradigm Shift in Collective Thought and Mitigation Policy

Summary
The current system focuses on driver error. Current government mitigation policies
stemming from the establishment of the Houston Roadway Flood Warning System would only
help mitigate the deaths of 12 people from the 43 people where I conducted street observations.
My research shows that design error covers 22 out of 30 locations where a death occurred.
These locations should be addressed to offer a more comprehensive flood warning program. I
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found that my street observation checklist was invaluable for documenting the data needed to
analyze the deaths. By doing a population-based study of the victims, I discovered more
effective data than what is currently being done by Harris County’s government.

Previous

studies that focused on what if scenarios do not adequately address the behavior and problem.
The interviews I conducted, the population study of deaths and the street observations were
necessary to understand the phenomenon. However, I do find drivers are risky and better driver
training and public education is needed to also mitigate these types of deaths.
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Policy Recommendations
Based on what I have discovered from this dissertation, there are policy recommendations that
can help reduce the number of vehicle related deaths during extreme flooding. Flood modeling
can aid governmental officials to warn people of dangerous spots on roads by bayous through
permanent signage, public education, and public announcements during a flooding event.
1. Better driver training is needed. While literature previously reported that drivers act
more cautiously during rain events, this was not my finding (Lee, BooHyun, &
Abdel-Aty, 2015). I do agree that new risks are present when rainfall occurs and the
more extreme the rain, the more extreme the traffic incidents (Mitsakis, Stamos,
Diakakis, & Grau, 2014).
2. Warnings should be worded to prevent driving during extreme weather. Sheltering in
place should be used in the warning system as this is the least likely type of death that
occurs during a flood event.
3. Roadways that are designed to flood should have adequate roadside warnings in
place. They should be on the roads closest to the banks of waterways and warnings
and roadside flood gauge signs should be present at every underpass in Harris County
regardless of if it is located in an area greater than a 500-year floodplain or if it has
not decline in the roadway surface.

APPENDIX 1
SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Introduction / Build Rapport / Signed Consent Form
Questions Focused on Research
Day of Flood
• Describe for me your experience driving in flood water during a bad storm?
• Possible probing and follow-up questions for any missing details.
• Which flooding event?
• Were you scheduled to work?
• Did you attempt to make it (was it immediately when you
needed to leave or later when you thought it was safe)?
• Did you safely arrive?
• How far do you live from your job?
• Did you see any flood water?
• Did you drive through any water?
• Did you see abandoned cars?
• See any barricades?
• See any emergency personnel?
• What was the time of day?
• Were you directed to go a different path than your normal route by barricades
or emergency personnel? (This question will depend on the answers above
and if time permits).
• What influenced your decision to travel in the rain versus staying in place?
(This question will depend on the answers above and if time permits.)
Driving Patterns (This section will be used as a follow-up to the broader description
they provide of their driving experience).
• How do check traffic pattern before a commute?
• How often do you check traffic patterns before a commute?
• When do you decide to check traffic patterns versus not checking?
Background Knowledge on Flooding in Houston
• Did you grow up in Houston?
• If not, how long have you lived here
• How soon did you learn of flood warnings in Houston?
• How many days before the flood did you hear the warning/watch?
• How did you learn (word of mouth, news, social media)?
Transportation
• Have you ever had a vehicle damaged during flood?
• What extent?
• Do you know anyone that has and how many people?
• How do you get to work? Bus/ drive /walk etc.
• If you drive do you own your car/ lease / finance
• Year Model
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• Level of Insurance – Full / Liability / None
• What type of vehicle: SUV/ Truck/ Midsize / Compact?
Education about Flooding / Weather Patterns
• Where did you learn about flood hazards?
• School/driver’s education/ parents / experience
• What do you think causes the most problems to flooding in Harris County?
Houston Government & Floods
• In what ways do you wish our government to prepare more for flooding?
• What ways could the flood warnings be improved in our area?
Demographics
• Current Age
• Gender
• Race
• Level of Education
• Profession
• Income
• Shift worked
• Married/Single
• Responsibilities at Home (Children, Pets, Elderly, Disabled)
• Area of Houston you live (Zip Code)
• Area of Houston you work (Zip Code).
Conclusion
• Is there anything else you’d like to tell me?

APPENDIX 2
CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS
Appendix II - Consent Form
Consent for Participation in Interview Research

I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by Liza T Powers from Texas Southern
University. I understand that the project is designed to gather information about drivers in Harris
County during flooding events. I will be one of approximately 30 people being interviewed for
this research.
1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for my participation.

I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty. If I decline to
participate or withdraw from the study, any information obtained will not be used in the research project.
2. I understand that most interviewees in will find the discussion interesting and thought-provoking. If,

however, I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview session, I have the right to decline to
answer any question or to end the interview.
3. Participation involves being interviewed by researchers from Texas Southern. The interview will last

approximately 30-45 minutes. Notes will be written during the interview. An audio tape of the
interview will be made. If I don't want to be taped, I will not be able to participate in the study.
4. I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any reports using information obtained

from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure. Subsequent
uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect the anonymity of
individuals and institutions.
5. I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review

Board (IRB) for Studies Involving Human Subjects: Behavioral Sciences Committee at the Texas
Southern University.
6. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions answered to

my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.
7. I have been given a copy of this consent form.

My Signature

Date

My Printed Name

Signature of the
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APPENDIX 3
VICTIM DATABASE OF DEMOGRAPHICS
Tropical Storm Allison 2001
Victim
Age
Gender
Race
Tenure
Antonio Cordova
70
M
Hispanic More than 10
Betty Rucker
52
F
Unknown More than 10
Cecil Hutchinson
62
M
Black More than 10
Chad B. Garren
21
M
White
2 weeks
Charles Rucker
30
M
Unknown More than 10
Freda Michelle Willis
35
F
Unknown More than 10
Isabel Cordova
69
F
Hispanic More than 10
Jeffery Green
39
M
Unknown More than 10
Jose Jesus Rodriguez
37
M
Hispanic 6-10 years
Jose Romero
22
M
Hispanic
1-5 years
Kristie Lee Tautenhahn
42
F
White More than 10
Lola Thomas
56
F
Black More than 10
Louis Carranza
52
M
Hispanic More than 10
Manuel Quiroga
44
M
Hispanic More than 10
Maria Escobedo
45
F
Hispanic More than 10
Mary Garcia
35
F
Hispanic More than 10
Patrick Lane
32
M
White
Unkown
Peter Diaz
21
M
Hispanic 6-10 years
Rev Thomas Lee Johnson
70
M
Black More than 10
Unidentified Man
Unknown
M
Unknown
Unkown
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Memorial Day 2015
Victim
Alice Tovar
Anh Phan Nguyen
Christopher Kirby
Dennis Callihan
Jack Alter
Jose Yebra Ibarra
Nihad Jeries Konsul
Raul Velazquez Valentin
Shirley Alter

Age
73
50
35
65
87
31
64
57
85

Gender
Race
Tenure
F
White More than 10
M
Asian
Unkown
M
White More than 10
M
White More than 10
M
White More than 10
M
Hispanic Traveling
F
White More than 10
M
Hispanic More than 10
F
White More than 10

Tax Day 2016
Victim
Age
Gender Race
Tenure
Ariel Tapscott
23
F
Black More than 10
Charles Odom
56
M
White More than 10
Claudia Meglar
25
F
Hispanic More than 10
German Antonio Franco
66
M
Hispanic More than 10
Pedro Rascon Morales
61
M
Hispanic Truck Driver
Sunita Vikas Malhara
49
F
Asian
6-10 years
Suresh Kumar Talluri
49
M
Asian
1-5 years
Terri Rodriguez
42
F
Hispanic More than 10
Woman
Unknown
F
Unknown More than 10
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Harvey 2017
Victim
Agnes Stanley
Alexander Sung
Alonso Guillen
Andrew Pasek
Batool Qasem
Belia Saldivar
Benito Cavazos
Benjamin Vizuet
Calvin Oran Montalbano
Cathy Harling Montgomery
Charles James Ray
Colby Osorno
Daisy Saldivar
Devy Saldivar
Dominic Saldivar
Donald Rogers
Efrain Angel
Gary Wayne Sanchez
Gustavo Hernandez Rodriguez
Jill Renick
Jorge Raul Perez
Joseph Dowell
Keisha Monique Williams
Manuel Saldivar
Martin Salazar
Michael Tucker
Nancy Reed
Robert Arthur Haines
Rochelle Rogers
Ruben Jordan
Samuel Lawrence Burns, Sr
Steve Perez
Tomas Carreon, Jr
Travis Lynn Callihan
Victor Acevedo
Wilma Ratcliff Ellis
Xavier Saldivar
Yahir Vizueth

Age
89
64
31
25
76
81
42
33
54
71
65
24
6
16
14
65
26
58
40
48
33
43
32
84
49
66
77
71
58
58
62
60
25
45
67
73
8
25

Gender
F
M
M
M
F
F
M
M
M
F
M
M
F
F
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
F
M
M
M
F
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M

Race
White
Asian
Hispanic
White
Asian
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
White
Black
White
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Black
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
White
Hispanic
Black
Black
Hispanic
Hispanic
White
White
White
Black
Black
White
Hispanic
Hispanic
White
Hispanic
Black
Hispanic
Hispanic

Tenure
More than 10
More than 10
Traveling
More than 10
Unkown
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
Minor Child
Minor Child
Minor Child
More than 10
1-5 years
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
Traveling
More than 10
More than 10
More than 10
Minor Child
More than 10
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Imelda 2019
Victim
Age Gender Race
Tenure
Raul Rivas-Hernandez 56
M
Hispanic More than 10
Rene Salas
52
M
Hispanic More than 10

APPENDIX 4
LOCATION VICTIM FOUND & CAUSE OF DEATH
Allison 2001
Victim
Antonio Cordova
Betty Rucker
Cecil Hutchinson
Chad B. Garren
Charles Rucker
Freda Michelle Willis
Isabel Cordova
Jeffery Green
Jose Jesus Rodriguez
Jose Romero
Kristie Lee Tautenhahn
Lola Thomas
Louis Carranza
Manuel Quiroga
Maria Escobedo
Mary Garcia
Patrick Lane
Peter Diaz
Rev Thomas Lee Johnson
Unidentified Man

Address Found
Gregdale @ US 90
Soft Shadows (600)
Little York (2700)
Wrightwood (1200)
Soft Shadows (600)
North Freeway (1700)
Gregdale @ US 90
North Freeway (1700)
Market Street (12000)
E. Crosstimbers (1600)
Louisiana (700)
Shady Lane (10600)
North Freeway @ Patton
North Freeway @ Patton
Edgecreek Drive (3200)
North Freeway @ Patton
North Freeway (3939)
East Freeway (11000)
Hillis (9400)
Commerce @ Fannin
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Lat
Long
Cause
29.8298841 -95.2115499 Driving
29.7779027 -95.2368429 Electrocution
29.8706253 -95.3437908 Walking
29.7809786 -95.368853 Abandoned Vehicle
29.7779027 -95.2368429 Electrocution
29.7804714 -95.3697216 Abandoned Vehicle
29.8298841 -95.2115499 Driving
29.7804714 -95.3697216 Abandoned Vehicle
29.7674161 -95.2236814 Driving
29.8287101 -95.3530598 Driving
29.7605707 -95.3662309 Elevator
29.8685951 -95.3425917 Walking
29.7995203 -95.3724531 Abandoned Vehicle
29.7986789 -95.3716859 Abandoned Vehicle
29.9416798 -95.4672303 Electrocution
29.7995203 -95.3724531 Abandoned Vehicle
29.8217405 -95.3804653 Walking
29.773008 -95.2342032 Driving
29.848958 -95.2681494 Driving
29.7619385 -95.3560369 Walking
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Memorial Day 2015
Victim
Alice Tovar

Address Found
Gerken @ SH 36

Anh Phan Nguyen
Christopher Kirby

N Braeswood (5000)
Studemont (1700)

Dennis Callihan

West Loop South @ Eastman

Jack Alter

N Braeswood (5000)
N Sam Houston Parkway East
(800)
29.7110479 -95.6445918 Driving
Ranchester (5700)
29.7165368 -95.5487238 Driving
Bryan Beach
28.8833056 -95.3785523 Fishing
Abandoned Vehicle /
N Braeswood (5000)
29.7101596 -95.3492893 Rescued Boating Death

Jose Yebra Ibarra
Nihad Jeries Konsul
Raul Velazquez Valentin
Shirley Alter

Lat
Long
Cause
29.4786115 -95.8203184 Driving
Walking / Rescued
29.7058729 -95.3943283 Boating Death
29.7706536 -95.3455064 Driving
29.812576

-95.380913 Driving / Heart Attack
Abandoned Vehicle /
29.7117543 -95.3119942 Rescued Boating Death

Tax Day 2016
Victim
Ariel Tapscott
Charles Odom
Claudia Meglar
German Antonio Franco
Pedro Rascon Morales
Sunita Vikas Malhara
Suresh Kumar Talluri
Terri Rodriguez
Woman

Address Found
Rosehill Reserve
Adams Flat Road
Westpark @ Post Oak
Imperial Valley (17400)
N Sam Houston Parkway East
(800)
West Loop South (3600)
West Loop South (3600)
Briarcreek (1800)
Plum Creek Road

Lat
Long
Cause
30.035779 -95.6976228 Driving
29.8093078 -95.9851894 Driving
29.731716 -95.460621 Driving
29.9489853 -95.3986022 Driving
29.9381296
29.7384089
29.7384089
30.0206761
29.8307807

-95.378613 Driving
-95.4589444 Driving
-95.4589444 Driving
-95.4262511 Driving
-96.2670021 Driving
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Harvey 2017
Victim
Agnes Stanley
Alexander Sung

Address Found
Meyerwood Drive (4311)
College Ave (915)
Cypress Preserve at Trevor
Alonso Guillen
Way
Andrew Pasek
Hickory Downs (4638)
Batool Qasem
Warrenton (7)
Belia Saldivar
Green River Dr (1400)
Benito Cavazos
E Freeway (12420)
Benjamin Vizuet
Wallisville Rd (12801)
Calvin Oran Montalbano
EastTx Freeway (13401)
Cathy Harling Montgomery
Memorial Dr (12633)
Charles James Ray
W Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Colby Osorno
S Hwy 146 (2651)
Daisy Saldivar
Green River Dr (1400)
Devy Saldivar
Green River Dr (1400)
Dominic Saldivar
Green River Dr (1400)
Donald Rogers
Fulshear
Efrain Angel
Salt Grass Trail Way
Gary Wayne Sanchez
Houston Ship Channel
Gustavo Hernandez Rodriguez Province Pt Dr (12503)
Jill Renick
Riverway (4)
Jorge Raul Perez
Texaco Rd (12800)
Joseph Dowell
N Wayside Dr (3500)
Keisha Monique Williams
Woodforest Blv (12473)
Manuel Saldivar
Green River Dr (1400)
Martin Salazar
Preston Ave (5125)
Michael Tucker
FM 1942 (6820)
Nancy Reed
Memorial Herman Hospital
Robert Arthur Haines
Langwood Dr (754)
Rochelle Rogers
Fulshear
Ruben Jordan
W Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Samuel Lawrence Burns, Sr
Airline Dr (4903)
N Sam Houston Parkway East
Steve Perez
(800)
Tomas Carreon, Jr
Greenbrook Dr (22411)
Travis Lynn Callihan
Victor Acevedo
Wilma Ratcliff Ellis
Xavier Saldivar
Yahir Vizueth

Memorial Hermann Hospital
Arkansas St (507)
LBJ Hospital
Green River Dr (1400)
Wallisville Rd (12801)

Lat
Long
Cause
29.6807894 -95.449812 Drown in Building
29.6571482 -95.2421669 Drown in Building
30.0326839
29.8426299
29.7541139
29.8386881
29.7700563
29.8037879
29.913271
29.7647133
29.8527216
29.7707303
29.8386881
29.8386881
29.8386881
29.7085033
29.8133224
29.7460899
29.7885386
29.76137
29.7996673
29.7932612
29.7913733
29.8386881
29.6345385
29.8463639
29.713986
29.7772696
29.7085033
29.5205819
29.8376041

-95.4261283 Boat
-95.6399007 Electrocution
-95.5439693 Abandoned Vehicle
-95.2271753 Driving
-95.2339262 Walking
-95.2164346 Boat
-95.313127 Unknown
-95.5566977 Residence
-95.2941897 Abandoned Vehicle
-94.9162144 Unknown
-95.2271753 Driving
-95.2271753 Driving
-95.2271753 Driving
-95.9446302 Driving
-95.8036016 Walking
-95.2667175 Unknown
-95.206647 Boat
-95.459288 Elevator
-95.2115993 Boat
-95.2898947 Driving
-95.2065531 Unknown
-95.2271753 Driving
-95.1686567 Abandoned Vehicle
-94.9613694 Driving
-95.3951377 Necrotizing Fasciitis
-95.6220364 Residence
-95.9446302 Driving
-95.1615934 Unknown
-95.3848664 Walking / Homeless

29.9376505 -95.3798181 Driving
30.0365856 -95.4157595 Boat
29.7825166
29.6565844
29.812903
29.8386881
29.7996673

-95.5461676 Abandoned Vehicle
-95.2302361 Abandoned Vehicle
-95.312913 Walking
-95.2271753 Driving
-95.2115993 Boat
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Imelda 2019
Victim
Raul Rivas-Hernandez
Rene Salas

Address Found
Highway 59 N (18040),
Humble, TX 77396
Sweetwater Lane @ West
Mount Houston

Lat

Long

Cause

29.9870493 -95.2584276 Driving
29.8974133 -95.4086843 Abandoned Vehicle

APPENDIX 5
REASONS FOR DRIVING & WATERSHEDS
* Day is 7am - 459 pm / Night is 5pm - 659am

Allison 2001
Victim
Antonio Cordova
Chad B. Garren
Freda Michelle Willis
Isabel Cordova
Jeffery Green
Jose Jesus Rodriguez
Jose Romero
Louis Carranza
Manuel Quiroga
Mary Garcia
Peter Diaz
Rev Thomas Lee Johnson

Day/Night*
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Cause
Driving
Abandoned Vehicle
Abandoned Vehicle
Driving
Abandoned Vehicle
Driving
Driving
Abandoned Vehicle
Abandoned Vehicle
Abandoned Vehicle
Driving
Driving

Reason
Check on Loved One
Special Event
Special Event
Check on Loved One
Special Event
Check on Loved One
Home from Work
Special Event
Special Event
Special Event
Unknown
Home from Work

191

Bayou
Spring Gully
Little White Oak
White Oak
Spring Gully
White Oak
Hunting
Underpass
White Oak
White Oak
White Oak
Underpass/ Hunting
Halls

Watershed
Greens
White Oak
White Oak
Greens
White Oak
Hunting
White Oak
White Oak
White Oak
White Oak
Hunting
Greens
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Memorial Day 2015
Victim
Alice Tovar
Christopher Kirby
Dennis Callihan
Jack Alter
Jose Yebra Ibarra
Nihad Jeries Konsul
Shirley Alter

Day/Night*
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Cause
Driving
Driving
Driving / Heart Attack
Abandoned Vehicle / Rescued Boating Death
Driving
Driving
Abandoned Vehicle / Rescued Boating Death

Reason
Work from Home
Home from Work
Special Event
Special Event
Traveling
Work from Home
Special Event

Bayou
Big Creek
Buffalo
Little White Oak
Brays
Greens
Brays
Brays

Watershed
Big Creek
White Oak
White Oak
Brays
Greens
Brays
Brays

Reason
Home
Check on Loved One
Home from Work
Work from Home
Truck Driver
Work from Home
Work from Home
Check on Loved One
Unknown

Bayou
Rosehill Reserve
Bessie's
Underpass
Greens
Buffalo
Underpass
Underpass
Cypress Creek
Litte Bernard Creek

Watershed
Spring Creek
Bessie's
Buffalo
Greens
Greens
Buffalo
Buffalo
Cypress Creek
Little Bernard Creek

Tax Day 2016
Victim
Ariel Tapscott
Charles Odom
Claudia Meglar
German Antonio Franco
Pedro Rascon Morales
Sunita Vikas Malhara
Suresh Kumar Talluri
Terri Rodriguez
Woman

Day/Night*
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Cause
Driving
Driving
Driving
Driving
Driving
Driving
Driving
Driving
Driving
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Harvey 2017
Victim
Batool Qasem
Belia Saldivar
Charles James Ray
Daisy Saldivar
Devy Saldivar
Dominic Saldivar
Donald Rogers
Joseph Dowell
Manuel Saldivar
Martin Salazar
Michael Tucker
Rochelle Rogers
Steve Perez
Travis Lynn Callihan
Victor Acevedo
Xavier Saldivar

Day/Night*
D
N
D
N
N
N
D
N
N
D
N
N
D
D
N
N

Cause
Abandoned Vehicle
Driving
Abandoned Vehicle
Driving
Driving
Driving
Driving
Driving
Driving
Abandoned Vehicle
Driving
Driving
Driving
Abandoned Vehicle
Abandoned Vehicle
Driving

Reason
Home
Evacuation
Check on Loved One
Evacuation
Evacuation
Evacuation
Check on Loved One
Check on Loved One
Evacuation
Home from Work
Evacuation
Check on Loved One
Police Officer
Evacuation
Evacuation
Evacuation

Bayou
Buffalo
Greens
Halls
Greens
Greens
Greens
Brookshire Creek
Hunting
Greens
Ditch / Armand
Cedar
Brookshire Creek
Greens
Unknown
Berry
Greens

Reason
Home from Work
Home from Work

Bayou
Underpass
Halls

Watershed
Buffalo
Greens
Clear Creek
Greens
Greens
Greens
Brookshire Creek
Hunting
Greens
Armand
Cedar
Brookshire Creek
Greens
Unknown
Sims
Greens

Imelda 2019
Victim
Raul Rivas-Hernandez
Rene Salas

Day/Night*
D
D

Cause
Driving
Abandoned Vehicle

Watershed
Greens
Greens

APPENDIX 6
DEMOGRAPHICS OF THOSE INTERVIEWED

Interviewed
Anonymous
a

Flood
Event
Unknown

Current
Age
21

Age
Range
18-25

aa
aaa

Allison
Multiple

42
27

aaaa
b
bb
bbb
bbbb
c

Tax Day
1994
Flood
Imelda
Harvey
Allison
Tax Day

cc
ccc

Gender
M

Race
Asian

M
M

White
Hispanic

60

41-59
26-40
60 &
up

Education
High School
Some
College
High School

M

White

College

46
31
42
43
32

41-59
26-40
41-59
41-59
26-40

F
F
F
F
M

White
White
White
White
Black

High School
Masters
Masters

Halloween
2015
Multiple

44
31

41-59
26-40

M
F

Hispanic
White

cccc
d

Imelda
Multiple

18
55

18-25
41-59

F
M

Hispanic
White

dd
ddd
dddd

Mother's
Day 2019
Harvey
Tax Day

26
36
57

26-40
26-40
41-59

F
F
F

White
White
White
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College
Some
College
Bachelors
Some
College

Bachelors
High School
MD

195
Some
College
High School
Some
College
Some
College
Bachelors
Bachelors
High School
Some
College
Some
College

e
ee

Harvey
Harvey

23
34

18-25
26-40

M
F

White
White

eee

Imelda

31

26-40

F

White

eeee
f
ff
fff

Harvey
Allison
Tax Day
Harvey

28
56
34
40

26-40
41-59
26-40
26-40

F
M
F
M

Black
White
White
White

ffff

Imelda

34

26-40

M

Black

g
gg

23
56

Hispanic
White

75
34

18-25
41-59
60 &
up
26-40

M
M

ggg
gggg

Imelda
Multiple
1976
Flood
Tax Day

M
F

White
White

h

Tax Day

21

18-25

F

Hispanic

hh

Memorial
Day

41

41-59

F

Hispanic

hhh
hhhh

Imelda
Multiple

45
29

41-59
26-40

M
F

White
White

i
ii

Imelda
Imelda

26
33

26-40
26-40

M
F

Black
White

iii

Harvey
1994
Flood
Imelda

30

26-40
60 &
up
41-59

M

Asian

Some
College

M
M

White
Hispanic

Bachelors
High School

iiii
j

68
57

Bachelors
Bachelors
Some
College
Masters
Some
College
PhD
Some
College
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jj
jjj

Allison
Allison

44
49

41-59
41-59

F
F

White
White

jjjj
k
kk

Imelda
Imelda
Harvey

23
46
34

18-25
41-59
26-40

M
F
F

Black
White
Hispanic

kkk

Harvey

35

26-40

M

Hispanic

kkkk

Harvey

30

26-40

F

Hispanic

l

Harvey

19

M

White

ll
lll

Multiple
Harvey

65
30

18-25
60 &
up
26-40

M
M

White
Hispanic

llll

Imelda

30

26-40

F

White

m
mm

Memorial
Day
Imelda

20
26

18-25
26-40

F
F

Hispanic
Hispanic

mmm

Harvey

22

18-25

F

mmmm
n

Imelda
Multiple

20
44

18-25
41-59

M
M

Black
Hispanic /
Asian
White

nn

Harvey

35

26-40

F

Black

nnn

Harvey

19

18-25

F

Asian

High School
High School
Some
College
Some
College
Bachelors
Some
College
Some
College

nnnnn

Memorial
Day
Allison
Harvey

36
50
43

26-40
41-59
41-59

M
F
F

White
White
White

Bachelors
Bachelors
Bachelors

o
oo

PhD
Masters
Some
College
PhD
High School
Some
College
Some
College
Some
college
Bachelors
High School
Some
College
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ooo
oooo

Harvey
Tax Day

35
46

26-40
41-59

F
F

White
Hispanic

p
pp

Allison
Imelda

37
25

26-40
18-25

F
F

Black
White

ppp
pppp

Harvey
Harvey

20
40

18-25
26-40

F
F

Asian
White

High School
Some
College
Bachelors
Some
College

q
qq
qqq

Harvey
Harvey
Allison

40
30
36

26-40
26-40
26-40

M
M
F

White
White
White

qqqq
r

Harvey
Unknown

21
35

18-25
26-40

M
F

Asian
Black

rr
rrr

Harvey
Harvey

26
25

26-40
18-25

F
F

Hispanic
Asian

rrrr

Harvey

35

26-40

F

White

s
ss
sss

Allison
Imelda
Harvey

38
55
42

26-40
41-59
41-59

F
M
M

White
White
Asian

Some
College
PhD
Masters
Some
College
High School
Some
College
Bachelors
Some
College
Some
College
Bachelors
Bachelors

t
tt
ttt

Memorial
Day
Imelda
Multiple

26-40
41-59

M
F
M

White
White
White

Masters
Bachelors

34
46

u

Harvey

23

18-25

F

Hispanic

uu

Harvey

19

18-25

F

Hispanic

Some
College
Some
College
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uuu

Memorial
Day

36

26-40

M

Hispanic

v

Harvey

26

26-40

M

Asian

vv

Harvey

19

18-25

M

Black

vvv
w
ww

Harvey
Imelda
Imelda

22
34
36

18-25
26-40
26-40

F
M
Female

Hispanic
White
Hispanic

www

Memorial
Day

33

26-40

F

Hispanic

x
xx

Imelda
Tax Day

23
50

18-25
41-59

M
F

Asian
White

xxx
y

Harvey
Imelda

22
43

18-25
41-59

F
F

Asian
Hispanic

yy

Multiple

28

26-40

M

White

yyy

Memorial
Day

23

18-25

F

Hispanic

z

Imelda

25

18-25

F

Hispanic

zz
zzz

Harvey
Imelda

25
26

18-25
26-40

F
M

Hispanic
White

zzzz

Imelda

26

26-40

F

Asian

Some
College
Some
College
Some
College
Some
College
Masters
Bachelors
Some
College
Some
College
High School
Some
College
High School
Some
College
Some
College
Some
College
Some
College
Bachelors
Some
College

APPENDIX 7
RESPONSIBILITY AT HOME OF THOSE INTERVIEWED

Interviewed
Anonymous
a
aa
aaa
aaaa
b
bb
bbb
bbbb
c

Flood
Event
Unknown
Allison
Multiple
Tax Day
1994
Flood
Imelda
Harvey
Allison
Tax Day

cc
ccc
cccc
d

Halloween
2015
Multiple
Imelda
Multiple

No
No
No
No

Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes

No
No
Yes
No

dd
ddd
dddd
e
ee
eee

Mother's
Day 2019
Harvey
Tax Day
Harvey
Harvey
Imelda

No
No
Yes
No
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
No
No
No

Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No

Elderly
Yes
No

Spouse Children Pet
Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
No
No
No
No

No
Yes
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
No

No
No
Yes
No
No
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200

eeee
f
ff
fff
ffff
g
gg
ggg
gggg
h

Harvey
Allison
Tax Day
Harvey
Imelda
Imelda
Multiple
1976
Flood
Tax Day
Tax Day

iiii
j
jj
jjj
jjjj
k
kk
kkk

Memorial
Day
Imelda
Multiple
Imelda
Imelda
Harvey
1994
Flood
Imelda
Allison
Allison
Imelda
Imelda
Harvey
Harvey

kkkk
l
ll

Harvey
Harvey
Multiple

hh
hhh
hhhh
i
ii
iii

Yes
No
Yes
No

No
No
No
Yes

No
No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No
No
No

Yes
No
No

Yes
No
Yes

No
Yes
No

No
No
No
No

No
Yes
No
No

Yes
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
No
No

No

No

No

No

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

201

lll
llll

Harvey
Imelda

Yes
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

m
mm
mmm
mmmm
n
nn
nnn

Memorial
Day
Imelda
Harvey
Imelda
Multiple
Harvey
Harvey

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

Memorial
Day
Allison
Harvey
Harvey
Tax Day
Allison
Imelda
Harvey
Harvey
Harvey
Harvey
Allison
Harvey
Unknown
Harvey
Harvey
Harvey
Allison
Imelda

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

nnnnn
o
oo
ooo
oooo
p
pp
ppp
pppp
q
qq
qqq
qqqq
r
rr
rrr
rrrr
s
ss
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sss

Harvey

No

Yes

Yes

No

t
tt
ttt

Memorial
Day
Imelda
Multiple

No
No
No

No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

u
uu

Harvey
Harvey

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

uuu
v
vv
vvv
w
ww

Memorial
Day
Harvey
Harvey
Harvey
Imelda
Imelda

No

Yes

Yes

No

No
Yes
No
No

No
No
No
Yes

No
No
No
Yes

No
No
Yes
No

www
x
xx
xxx
y
yy

Memorial
Day
Imelda
Tax Day
Harvey
Imelda
Multiple

No
Yes
No
No
No
No

No
No
Yes
No
No
No

No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

yyy
z
zz
zzz
zzzz

Memorial
Day
Imelda
Harvey
Imelda
Imelda

No
No
No
No

No
No
No
Yes

No
No
No
No

No
No
No
Yes

APPENDIX 8
REASONS FOR DRIVING OF THOSE INTERVIEWED

Interviewed Flood
Anonymous Event
a
aa

Unknown
Allison

aaa
aaaa
b

Multiple
Tax Day
1994
Flood

bb
bbb

Imelda
Harvey

bbbb
c

Allison
Tax Day

Day/Night Tenure
More than 10
Day
years
Night
More than 10
More than 10
years
Night
1-5 years
More than 10
Night
years
More than 10
Day
years
Day
Less than year
More than 10
Night
years
Night
1-5 years

cc

Halloween
2015

Night

ccc

Multiple

Night

cccc

Imelda

Day

d

Multiple

Both

Immigrated
From

Reason

NA

Work
Work

Job
Interview

East Texas

More than 10
years
6-10 years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years

Where
from
Home

New Jersey

Work
Pet
Pick up
Child
Work
Home

Friends

Home

Special
Event

School
Rescue
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204

dd
ddd

Mother's
Day 2019
Harvey

Day
Day

dddd

Tax Day

Night

e

Harvey

Day

ee

Harvey

Day

eee

Imelda

Day

eeee

Harvey

Night

f

Allison

Night

ff

Tax Day

Day

fff
ffff
g

Harvey
Imelda
Imelda

Day
Day

More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
1-5 years

gg

Both

More than 10
years

ggg

Multiple
1976
Flood

gggg

Tax Day

Day

h

Tax Day

Night

hh

Memorial
Day

Night

hhh
hhhh

Imelda
Multiple

Day
Night

Day

1-5 years
6-10 years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years

1-5 years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
6-10 years

Siberia

Home
Rescue

Errands

Work
Curiosity
Work
Home

Work

Event
Home

Check on
Loved One

Home

Ethiopia

Rescue
Home
School

Work

Rescue
Hill Country

Home

Work

Home

Florida

Home

Friends

Home

Special
Event

Home
Home

Work
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i
ii
iii

Day
Day
Day

iiii

Imelda
Imelda
Harvey
1994
Flood

j

Imelda

Day

jj
jjj

Allison
Allison

Night
Day

jjjj

Imelda

Day

k
kk

Imelda
Harvey

Day
Day

kkk

Harvey

Day

kkkk
l

Harvey
Harvey

Day
Day

ll

Multiple

Day

lll

Harvey

Night

llll

Imelda

Day

m
mm

Memorial
Day
Imelda

Night
Day

Day

mmm
mmmm

Harvey
Imelda

Night
Night

n

Multiple

Day

1-5 years
3 months
1-5 years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
Less than year
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
6-10 years
More than 10
years
1-5 years
1-5 years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years

Home

School

Amarillo, TX
Home
Home

Work

Home

Work

Travel
Work
School
Alabama

Medical
Work
Curiosity

Honduras
Louisiana

Help Friend
Work
Work
Work
School
Home
Work

Vacation

Home
Home

Work
School

Rescue
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More than 10
years
More than 10
years

nn

Harvey

Day

nnn

Harvey

Day

nnnnn
o

Memorial
Day
Allison

Day
Night

oo

Harvey

Night

ooo

Harvey

Night

oooo

Tax Day

Night

p
pp

Allison
Imelda

Night
Day

ppp

Harvey

Day

pppp

Harvey

Night

6-10 years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
1-5 years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years

q

Harvey

Night

More than 10
years

qq

Harvey

Night

qqq

Allison

Night

qqqq

Harvey

Night

r

Unknown

Day

rr

Harvey

Night

More than 10
years
Less than year
More than 10
years

1-5 years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years

Louisiana

Food
Work

Spain

Kentucky

Curiosity
Home

School

Home

Friends

House
Flooded
Work
Home
Home

Work
Work

Work
Evacuation
Homeless /
Stay at
Family out
of town
Lebanon

Check on
Others
Home

Pakistan

School

Home
Home
Special
Event

Work
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rrr

Harvey

Night

More than 10
years

rrrr

Harvey

Day

s
ss
sss

Allison
Imelda
Harvey

Night
Day
Day

More than 10
years
More than 10
years
1-5 years
1-5 years

t

Memorial
Day

Night

6-10 years

tt

Imelda

Day

ttt

Multiple

Day

u

Harvey

Night

uu

Harvey

Day

More than 10
years
More than 10
years

uuu

Memorial
Day

Day

More than 10
years

v
vv

Harvey
Harvey

Day

vvv
w

Harvey
Imelda

Day
Day

ww

Imelda

www

Memorial
Day

1-5 years
More than 10
years

Arizona
China

Home

Gas for
Evacuation

Home

Return
early from
trip

Home
Work
Home

Friends
Work

Home
Iowa /
Louisiana

Home

Mississippi

Rescue

Work

Special
Event
School
Work

1-5 years
More than 10

Home
Food

Louisiana

Check on
Loved One
Medical

Day

More than 10
years
6-10 years
More than 10
years

Mexico

Home

Day

1-5 years

San Antonio,
TX

School

Hanging
Out with
Friends
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x

Imelda

Day

xx
xxx

Tax Day
Harvey

Day
Day

y

Imelda

Day

yy

Multiple

Both

yyy
z
zz

Memorial
Day
Imelda
Harvey

Night
Day

zzz
zzzz

Imelda
Imelda

Day
Day

1-5 years
More than 10
years
6-10 years
More than 10
years
More than 10
years

Vietnam

Work
Stayed
Home

More than 10
years
More than 10
More than 10
years
Less than year

School

Special
Event
Work
Trip

China

Home
School

Work

APPENDIX 9
DRIVING EXPERIENCE OF THOSE INTERVIEWED

Interviewed
Anonymous
a
aa
aaa
aaaa
b
bb
bbb
bbbb
c

cc
ccc
cccc
d

Flood
Event
Unkno
wn
Allison
Multipl
e
Tax
Day
1994
Flood
Imelda
Harvey
Allison
Tax
Day
Hallow
een
2015
Multipl
e
Imelda
Multipl
e

Outcome

Different Path

Engine Damage
Safe

No
Yes

Vehicle
Damaged

Know
Anyone
with
Own
Vehicle Lease
Damage Finance

Full
Liability
None

No

No

None

New
Driver

Route

Safe
Safe
Returned to Original
Spot
Body Damage
Safe
Stranded

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
No

Stayed

No

Yes

Own

10 miles
Yes

Totaled Car

Yes
Yes
No

Yes

Own
Own

Full
Full

Own

Full

Totaled Car
Safe

Yes

Yes

Yes

Own

Full

Safe

Yes

No

Yes

Own

Full
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30 miles
2 miles

210

dd
ddd
dddd
e
ee
eee
eeee
f
ff
fff
ffff
g
gg
ggg
gggg
h
hh
hhh
hhhh
i
ii
iii

Mother'
s Day
2019
Harvey
Tax
Day
Harvey
Harvey
Imelda
Harvey

Safe
Safe
Returned to Original
Spot
Safe
Safe
Safe
Engine Damage

Yes
Yes

No

Yes

Own

Full

No

Yes

Own

Full

6 miles

Yes

No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Finance
Own
Own

Full
Liability
Full

10 miles
20 min
45-1hr

Allison
Tax
Day
Harvey
Imelda
Imelda
Multipl
e
1976
Flood
Tax
Day
Tax
Day

Safe

Yes

No

Yes

Own

Full

Safe
Safe
Safe
Safe

Yes
Yes

No

Yes

Own

Full

Memori
al Day
Imelda
Multipl
e
Imelda
Imelda
Harvey

Yes

Yes

Safe
Safe

No

Safe

Yes

Engine Damage

Yes

Yes

Yes

Own

Liability

Returned to Original
Spot
Safe

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Own
Own

Liability
Full

Yes

Yes

Own

Full

Safe
Safe
Safe
Safe
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iiii
j
jj
jjj
jjjj
k
kk
kkk
kkkk
l
ll
lll
llll
m
mm
mmm
mmmm
n
nn
nnn

1994
Flood
Imelda
Allison
Allison
Imelda
Imelda
Harvey
Harvey
Harvey
Harvey
Multipl
e
Harvey
Imelda
Memori
al Day
Imelda
Harvey
Imelda
Multipl
e
Harvey
Harvey

Totaled Car
Safe
Safe
Safe
Totaled Car
Engine Damage
Stayed
Safe

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No

Yes

Safe
Stayed

Yes
Stayed

Safe
Totaled Car
Engine Damage

Yes
Yes

Totaled Car
Stayed
Engine Damage
Returned to Original
Spot / Engine Damage

Yes
No
Yes

Safe
Totaled Car
Stayed

Yes

o
oo

Memori
al Day
Allison
Harvey

Safe
Engine Damage
Stranded

ooo

Harvey

Safe

nnnnn

Yes
No

Finance
Own
Own

Full
Liability
Full

30 miles

Yes

Yes

Finance

Full

1 mile

No

Yes

Own

None

Yes

Yes

Own

Liability

5 miles

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Own
Own
Own

None
Full
Full

5 miles

Own

Liability

No

No

Finance

Full

No

Yes

Finance

Full

Yes
Yes
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oooo
p
pp
ppp
pppp

Tax
Day
Allison
Imelda
Harvey
Harvey

Engine Damage
Safe
Safe
Safe
Safe

q

Harvey

Safe

qq
qqq
qqqq

Safe
Safe
Totaled Car

Yes
Yes
Yes

r
rr

Harvey
Allison
Harvey
Unkno
wn
Harvey

Engine Damage
Stayed

Yes
Yes

rrr

Harvey

Totaled Car

rrrr

Harvey

s

Allison

Safe
Stranded / Engine
Damage

ss
sss

Imelda
Harvey

Stranded
Totaled Car

ttt

Memori
al Day
Imelda
Multipl
e

u

Harvey

t
tt

Yes

No

Yes

Finance

Full

Yes
No
Yes

No

Yes

Own

Full

Own

Full

No

No

Own

Full

Yes

Yes

Finance

Full

Yes

No

Compan
y Truck
Own

Full
Full

Yes

Yes

No

Finance

Full

No

No

Yes

Own

Full

40 miles

No
No

Yes
Yes

Finance
Finance

Full
Full

45
minutes
17 miles

Yes

Yes

Own

Full

5 miles

Yes
Profession
Driving

Yes

Yes

Totaled Car
Safe

Yes

Safe

Yes

Totaled Car

Yes
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uu

Harvey

Safe

No

No

uuu

Memori
al Day

Safe

Yes

No

v
vv

Harvey
Harvey

Stranded for days /
Totaled Car
Safe

Yes

Yes
No

vvv
w

Harvey
Imelda

Totaled Car
Safe

Yes
Yes

ww

Safe

yy

Imelda
Memori
al Day
Imelda
Tax
Day
Harvey
Imelda
Multipl
e

yyy
z
zz
zzz
zzzz

www
x
xx
xxx
y

Finance

Full

Yes

Yes
Yes

Own
Own

Liability
Liability

Yes

No
No

No
Yes

Own
Own

Liability

Yes

No

Yes

Finance

Full

Safe
Safe

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Own

Liability

Safe
Stayed
Safe

Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes

Own
Own

None
Full

Damaged Car

Yes

No

Yes

Own

Full

Memori
al Day
Imelda
Harvey
Imelda

Safe
Safe
Safe
Safe

Yes

Yes

No
No
No

No
Yes
Yes

Full
Full

Imelda

Safe

Yes

No

Yes

Finance
Finance
Compan
y Truck

Full

30-50 min

2 miles

29 miles
Drive
Profession

45 miles
30
minutes

Yes

APPENDIX 10
KNOWLEDGE OF WEATHER EVENT & NAVIGATION PREFERENCES

Interviewed Flood
Anonymous Event
a
Unknown
aa
aaa
aaaa

Check Traffic
Pattern
No
Waze, Google,
News

How Often
No

b
bb
bbb
bbbb
c

Allison
Multiple
Tax Day
1994
Flood
Imelda
Harvey
Allison
Tax Day

cc

Halloween
2015
Waze

Daily

ccc
cccc
d

Multiple
Imelda
Multiple

No
GPS
No

No
Everyday
No

dd
ddd
dddd
e

Mother's
Day 2019
Harvey
Tax Day
Harvey

TV

Mornings

TV

Mornings

No
No
Yes
No

Deciding Factor

Learn of FWS

How many days
before event
know

Not Often

No
No
Daily
No

0
0
1
0

Social Media
Word of Mouth
Traffic

Traffic
Smart Phone

Can't Remember

TV
Work

0
TV
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0

215

ee
eee
eeee

Harvey
Imelda
Harvey

Google
Google

f
ff
fff
ffff
g
gg

Allison
Tax Day
Harvey
Imelda
Imelda
Multiple
1976
Flood
Tax Day
Tax Day

No
Yes

ggg
gggg
h
hh
hhh
hhhh
i
ii
iii
iiii
j
jj
jjj
jjjj
k
kk
kkk

Memorial
Day
Imelda
Multiple
Imelda
Imelda
Harvey
1994
Flood
Imelda
Allison
Allison
Imelda
Imelda
Harvey
Harvey

Daily
Daily

Traffic
New Route
Event

Smart Phone

5
Can't Remember

No
Sometime

Few Days

Phone

0
GPS
Waze

Daily
Frequently

Radio/Waze

Rarely

Google Maps

Weekly

Yes

Daily

In a Hurry

2

Traffic

2
0
0

TV

Social Media

1
Harvey 4, Tax
Day 0

No
Radio / App

No
Regularly

Weather
No

None

0

No

No

Trip

Social Media

1
0
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kkkk
l
ll
lll
llll

Harvey
Harvey
Multiple
Harvey
Imelda

m
mm
mmm
mmmm
n
nn
nnn

Memorial
Day
Imelda
Harvey
Imelda
Multiple
Harvey
Harvey

o
oo

Memorial
Day
Allison
Harvey

ooo
oooo
p
pp
ppp
pppp

Harvey
Tax Day
Allison
Imelda
Harvey
Harvey

q

Harvey

qq
qqq

Harvey
Allison

nnnnn

No
Google Maps

No
Frequently

Phone

Daily

Traffic

Social Media

2

0

Radio
Rarely
Google Maps
Google Maps
Siri

Rarely
Rarely
Sometime
Rarely
Rarely

Google Maps

Rarely

Waze

Daily

TV

Daily

Google Maps
Google Maps

Daily
Sometime

New Route
In a Hurry
Traffic

TV / Phone
Word of Mouth
News

1
0
Few Days

0
Traffic

Social Media
Weather App

5
5

Traffic
Traffic

Social Media
Social Media

2
2
0
0

New Route
No
Google Maps

No
Rarely

Social Media

0
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qqqq
r
rr

Harvey
Unknown
Harvey

No

Word of Mouth

rrr

Harvey

GPS

Daily

rrrr
s
ss
sss

Harvey
Allison
Imelda
Harvey

GPS
TV News
Google

Rarely
Rarely
Daily

t
tt
ttt

Memorial
Day
Imelda
Multiple

u
uu

Harvey
Harvey

uuu

Memorial
Day

v
vv

Harvey
Harvey

vvv
w
ww

Harvey
Imelda
Imelda

www

Memorial
Day

Word of Mouth

0
0
0

Social Media

5

Space City Weather
App

3

Work Routes

iPhone Maps
Houston TranStar

Bad weather / new route

Daily
In a Hurry

0
Social Media

Few Days

NOAA/NWS

Few Days

Periodically
Daily

Always

That day

Waze

Daily

Google Maps

New Destination
Occasionally In a Hurry

Harvey
Ike

Google Maps
Waze

Often
Daily

Daily
Rain

Experience
Harvey
Experience

Smartphone

Not Often

In a Hurry

Experience

0
Few days

1
5
3-4 days
5
0
2
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x
xx
xxx
y
yy

Imelda
Tax Day
Harvey
Imelda
Multiple

yyy
z
zz
zzz
zzzz

Memorial
Day
Imelda
Harvey
Imelda
Imelda

Radio
Yes
Word of Mouth
Google Maps

Google Maps
Google Maps

Daily
Regularly

Often

Daily

In a Hurry

School

0

New Route
Weather
Weather

News
Social Media

0
5
0

Traffic

Word of Mouth

Traffic
Traffic

TV / Smartphone

2
0
0

APPENDIX 11
COMMUNITY TOOLKIT
The information from this dissertation can be used for community education meetings. Points to include
consists of the following:
Include Conceptual Framework of Driving in Extremes Flooding
Include Video Clips (From all the Storms) in Community Presentations
Conduct a community workshop on the “Risks” associated with driving in floods.
Work: Tips on how to tell your boss that you cannot risk your life driving in flood water to work (ex:
Police Officer(veteran on the police force for many years assisted people with problems during storms,
etc.)
Grandparents: Risk your life to make sure they are safe or have supplies during the flood.
Kids/Children: In college (Risk going to pick them up and bring them back home to safety). Not
comfortable with colleges/universities emergency evaluation response plans on campus (students and
parents not really sure if they have a plan at all.).
Males: Take more risks than females. (Drive in 1-2 feet of water in their vehicles but get swept away
sometimes by the flood water).
Cheat Sheet: Develop one on what to do if stranded or stuck in your call during a flood. (Call 911; call a
relative or friend for assistance; decide on when to get out of the car; when to roll the window down
before the electrical power is shut off in the car.).
Organize a group: Organize a group to advocate for “signage” for bridges, over pa, interstates, highways,
roads, streets, etc. that have a history of severe flooding and especially if someone has died on it.
Policy Change(s): Advocate for policy change.
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APPENDIX 12
STREET OBSERVATIONS

Date: 01/04/21
Time: 05:00 PM
Event: Harvey
Peak Rainfall: 5 days before 08/30/17 (44.08)

Arkansas (507)

220

221
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: No
Flood Zone: 1%
Legal Speed Limit: 30
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: Yes
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: Yes
Road Safety Features
Drains: No
Curbs: No
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): Stop
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Depth Gauge: No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: No
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial

222

223

Briarcreek Blvd (1800)
Date: 12/27/20
Time: 12:31 PM
Event: Tax Day
Peak Rainfall: 3 days before 4/19/16 (10.44)
Flood Zone: 1%
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: No
Flood Zone: 1%
Legal Speed Limit: 20
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 4
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: Yes
Road Safety Features
Drains: Ditch
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median: Median Ditch
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): Yes
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Even
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: Yes
Surface Type: Paved
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Flat, Trees
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential
Alternative Routes: No

224

225

226

Claiborne St (7400)
Date: 04/22/21
Time: 01:30 PM
Event: Harvey
Peak Rainfall: 5 days before 8/30/17 (38.12)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: No
Flood Zone: 0.2%
Legal Speed Limit: 30
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: Yes
Road Safety Features
Drains: No
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.):
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: Yes
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential
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228

229

Cypress-Rosehill Reserve Rd
Date: 04/22/2021
Time: 03:00 PM
Event: Tax Day
Peak Rainfall: 3 days before 4/19/16 (10.16)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: Yes
Flood Zone: No
Legal Speed Limit: 30
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: Yes
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: No
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: Yes
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: Yes
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential

230

231

232

E. Crosstimbers (1600)
Date: 01/05/21
Time: 01:30 PM
Event: Allison
Peak Rainfall: 7 days before 6/10/01 (17.94)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: No
Flood Zone: No
Legal Speed Limit: 35
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 4
Road Special Features
Bridge: NO
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing):
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: Yes
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: Yes
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial

233

234

235

East Freeway (11000)
Date: 01/05/21
Time: 03:00 PM
Event: Allison
Peak Rainfall: 7 days before 6/10/01 (36.45)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: No
Flood Zone: .2%
Legal Speed Limit: 30
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 4
Road Special Features
Bridge: NO
Overpass / Underpass: Yes
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing):
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: Yes
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial

236

237

FM 1942 (6820)
Date: 01/11/21
Time: 05:00 PM
Event: Harvey
Peak Rainfall: 5 days before 8/30/17 (51.88)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: No
Flood Zone: .2%
Legal Speed Limit: 60
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: NO
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Ditch
Curbs: No
Shoulder: Yes
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: No
Road Character
Even / Dips: Even
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential
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239

Gerken @ SH 36
Date: 01/05/21
Time: 05:00 PM
Event: Memorial Day
Peak Rainfall: 3 days before 05/27/15 (UNKOWN)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: 05/28/2019
Flood Zone: 1 %
Legal Speed Limit: 60
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 4
Road Special Features
Bridge: NO
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Ditch
Curbs: No
Shoulder: Yes
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing):
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: YES
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dips
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: Yes
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential

240

241

Green River Dr (1400)
Date: 12/27/20
Time: 10:20 AM
Event: Harvey
Peak Rainfall: 7 days before 08/30/17 (38.84)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: No
Flood Zone: .2 %
Legal Speed Limit: 30
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Ditch
Curbs: No
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): Yes
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: No
Road Character
Even / Dips: Even
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass & Trees
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Mixed

242

243

Gregdale @ US 90
Date: 12/27/20
Time: 10:50 AM
Event: Harvey
Peak Rainfall: 7 days before 06/10/01 (27.02)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: No
Flood Zone: No
Legal Speed Limit: 30
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Ditch
Curbs: No
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: No
Road Character
Even / Dips: Even
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass & Trees
Bayou Visible: Yes
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential
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245

246

Highway 59 N (18040)
Date: 12/29/20
Time: 10:50 AM
Event: Imelda
Peak Rainfall: 3 days before 09/20/19 (14.6)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: No
Flood Zone: .2%
Legal Speed Limit: 45
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 5
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: Yes
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing):
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): Yes
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial

247

248

249

Hillis (9400)
Date: 12/27/20
Time: 11:05 AM
Event: Allison
Peak Rainfall: 7 days before 06/10/01 (34.69)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: 01/03/02
Flood Zone: .2%
Legal Speed Limit: 30
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Ditch
Curbs: No
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.):
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential
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251

Imperial Valley (17400)
Date: 12/27/20
Time: 12:05 AM
Event: Allison
Peak Rainfall: 7 days before 06/10/01 (34.69)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: 01/03/02
Flood Zone: .2%
Legal Speed Limit: 30
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Ditch
Curbs: No
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.):
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential
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253

254

Market Street (12000)
Date: 12/27/20
Time: 2:13 PM
Event: Allison
Peak Rainfall: 7 days before 06/10/01 (36.25)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge:
Flood Zone: Floodway
Legal Speed Limit: 35
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 4
Road Special Features
Bridge: Yes
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: Yes
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: No
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.):
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Even
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: Yes
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial
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N Braeswood (5000)
Date: 01/13/21
Time: 2:35 PM
Event: Memorial
Peak Rainfall: 3 days before 05/27/15 (8.76)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: 02/03/16
Flood Zone: 1%
Legal Speed Limit: 35
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 4
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: Yes
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: Yes
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential
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N Wayside Dr (3500)
Date: 12/27/20
Time: 1:55 PM
Event: Harvey
Peak Rainfall: 5 days before 08/30/17 (37.32)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: 02/03/16
Flood Zone: 1%
Legal Speed Limit: 40
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial
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N Freeway (1700)
Date: 01/14/21
Time: 12:50 PM
Event: Allison
Peak Rainfall: 7 days before 06/30/01 (17.46)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge:
Flood Zone: 1%
Legal Speed Limit: 35
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 4
Road Special Features
Bridge: Yes
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing):
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): Yes
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: Yes
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: Yes
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Mixed
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North Freeway @ Patton
Date: 12/27/20
Time: 1:05 PM
Event: Allison
Peak Rainfall: 7 days before 06/30/01 (15.34)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge:
Flood Zone: 1%
Legal Speed Limit: 35
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: Yes
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: Yes
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing):
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.):
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Even
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: Yes
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: Yes
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial
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N Sam Houston Pkwy (800)
Date: 12/27/20
Time: 10:00 AM
Event: Tax Day & Allison
Peak Rainfall: 3 days before 04/19/16 (11.36)
5 days before 08/30/17 (31.24)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: 10/30/2018
Flood Zone: 1%
Legal Speed Limit: 35
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 3
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: Yes
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: Yes
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing):
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): Yes
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: Yes
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Concrete
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial
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Preston (5125)
Date: 01/04/21
Time: 4:30 PM
Event: Harvey
Peak Rainfall: 5 days before 08/30/17 (41.96)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: 01/15/20
Flood Zone: .2%
Legal Speed Limit: 45
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 4
Road Special Features
Bridge: Yes
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Ditch
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Even
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: Yes
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial
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Ranchester (5700)
Date: 12/22/20
Time: 3:30 PM
Event: Memorial
Peak Rainfall: 3 days before 05/27/15 (11.6)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge:
Flood Zone: Underpass
Legal Speed Limit: 30
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 3
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: Yes
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): Yes
Flood Warning Sign: Yes
Permanent Flood Barricade: Yes
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial
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Studemont (1700)
Date: 01/04/21
Time: 3:30 PM
Event: Memorial
Peak Rainfall: 3 days before 05/27/15 (9.48)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge:
Flood Zone: Floodway
Legal Speed Limit: 30
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 6
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing):
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): Yes
Flood Warning Sign: Yes
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: Yes
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: Yes
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial
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W Bay Area Blvd (3000)
Date: 01/11/21
Time: 4:30 PM
Event: Harvey
Peak Rainfall:7 days before 08/30/17 (44.64)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge:
Flood Zone: .2%
Legal Speed Limit: 35
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 4
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: No
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Mixed
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Warrenton (7)
Date: 01/11/21
Time: 12:30 PM
Event: Harvey
Peak Rainfall:7 days before 08/30/17 (36.92)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: 05/24/2018
Flood Zone: .2%
Legal Speed Limit: 25
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: Yes
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential
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W Loop South (3600)
Date: 12/27/20
Time: 2:25 PM
Event: Tax Day
Peak Rainfall:3 days before 04/19/16 (7.92)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: 05/24/2018
Flood Zone: Underpass
Legal Speed Limit: 45
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 3
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: Yes
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median: No
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): Yes
Flood Warning Sign: Yes
Permanent Flood Barricade: Yes
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Concrete
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Mixed
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West Loop South (1433)
Date: 01/15/21
Time: 3:00 PM
Event: Memorial
Peak Rainfall:3 days before 05/27/15 (8.72)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: No
Flood Zone: No
Legal Speed Limit: 45
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 3
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): Yes
Flood Warning Sign: Yes
Permanent Flood Barricade: Yes
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential
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West Mount Houston @ Sweetwater
Lane
Date: 12/27/20
Time: 11:35 AM
Event: Imelda
Peak Rainfall:3 days before 09/20/19 (11.6)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge:
Flood Zone: Floodway
Legal Speed Limit: 30
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: Yes
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Ditch
Curbs: No
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Grass
Bayou Visible: Yes
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Mixed
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Westpark @ Post Oak Exit
Date: 01/02/21
Time: 11:30 AM
Event: Memorial & Tax Day
Peak Rainfall:3 days before 05/27/15 (9.28)
3 days before 04/19/16 (7.92)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge: 05/24/18
Flood Zone: Underpass
Legal Speed Limit: 45
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Collector
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: No
Overpass / Underpass: Yes
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: No
Road Safety Features
Drains: Street
Curbs: No
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): Yes
Flood Warning Sign: Yes
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Curve
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Concrete
Bayou Visible: No
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Commercial
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Wood Forest Blvd (12400)
Date: 04/22/21
Time: 2:05 PM
Event: Harvey
Peak Rainfall:5 days before 08/30/2017 (15.34)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge:
Flood Zone: .2%
Legal Speed Limit: 25
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: Yes
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: Yes
Road Safety Features
Drains: No
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Trees
Bayou Visible: Yes
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential
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Wrightwood (1200)
Date: 01/05/21
Time: 2:05 PM
Event: Allison
Peak Rainfall:7 days before 06/10/01 (15.34)
New Flood Rainfall Gauge:
Flood Zone: .2%
Legal Speed Limit: 25
Roadway Built Environment
Road Class: Local
Number of Lanes: 2
Road Special Features
Bridge: Yes
Overpass / Underpass: No
Railroad Crossing / Bridge: No
Ramp: No
Street Parking: Yes
Road Safety Features
Drains: No
Curbs: Yes
Shoulder: No
Guardrails/Median:
Traffic Controls
Traffic Lights (Changing / Flashing): No
Signs (Stop/ Yield/ etc.): No
Permanent Flood Warning Signs
Flood Gauge (Depth range): No
Flood Warning Sign: No
Permanent Flood Barricade: No
Streetlights: Yes
Road Character
Even / Dips: Dip
Straight / Curve: Straight
Intersection / Interchange: No
Waterway & Surrounding Natural Environment
Topography: Trees
Bayou Visible: Yes
Road Sign of Waterway: No
Surrounding Built Environment
Residential / Commercial: Residential
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